

THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN EL SALVADOR

By:

Ricardo Córdova Macías, FUNDAUNGO
José Miguel Cruz, IUDOP-UCA

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D., Scientific Coordinator and Editor
of the Series, Vanderbilt University



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

San Salvador, January 2007



This study was carried out thanks to the support of the Democracy and Governance Program of the United States Agency for International Development. The opinions expressed in this study belong to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development.

Table of Contents

List of Figures	vi
List of Tables	x
Executive Summary	xi
Preface	xvi
Prologue	xviii
Introduction	1
I. The national context	2
1.1 The socioeconomic context.....	2
1.1.1 A regional view of human development in El Salvador.....	2
1.1.2 Poverty in El Salvador	5
1.1.3 Economic performance	5
1.1.4 Citizen evaluation of economic performance	8
1.2 The political-electoral panorama.....	10
1.2 The study of political culture in El Salvador.....	13
II. Survey methodology	17
2.1 Characteristics of the final sample	17
2.2 Comparison of sample characteristics with population characteristics.....	21
III. Concepts of democracy	23
3.1 Salvadorans' definitions of democracy.....	23
3.2 Opinions of democracy	33
3.3 Definitions of democracy and support for the system.....	39
3.4 Conclusions	41
IV. Support for democracy	43
4.1 Support for the system.....	43
4.1.1 Levels of support for the system (1995-2006).....	45
4.1.2 A comparative view of support for the system.....	47
4.1.3 An explanation for levels of support for the system in El Salvador	47
4.1.4 Support for the system model	47
4.1.5 Age and support for the system	48
4.1.6 Income levels and support for the system.....	48
4.1.7 Education and support for the system.....	49
4.1.8 Evaluation of the president's job performance and support for the system.....	51
4.1.9 Ideology and support for the system.....	52
4.1.10 Political preferences and support for the system	53
4.1.11 Satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance and support for the system.....	54
4.1.12 The country's economic situation and support for the system	56
4.1.13 Trust in the judicial system and support for the system	57
4.1.14 Treatment received from municipalities and support for the system.....	58
4.1.15 Population stratum and support for the system.....	59
4.1.16 Extended factors of support for the system	61
4.2 Tolerance.....	64
4.2.1 Levels of political tolerance (1995-2006).....	65
4.2.2 A comparative view of political tolerance.....	67
4.2.3 An explanation of political tolerance in El Salvador.....	67
4.2.4 Political tolerance model	68
4.2.5 Education and tolerance.....	68
4.2.6 Gender and tolerance	69

4.2.7 Home furnishings and tolerance	70
4.2.8 Evaluation of the president’s job performance and tolerance.....	70
4.2.9 Ideology and tolerance.....	71
4.2.10 Satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance and tolerance.....	73
4.2.11 Populational stratum and tolerance.....	74
4.3 Support for stable democracy.....	75
4.3.1 Empirical relationship between tolerance and support for the system in El Salvador.....	76
4.3.2 A comparative view of democratic stability.....	77
4.4 Conclusions.....	78
V. Corruption and democracy.....	79
5.1 Perception of the magnitude of corruption.....	81
5.2 Levels of corruption	88
5.2.1 Victims of corruption.....	92
5.3 Justification for corruption.....	94
5.4 Corruption and democracy.....	100
5.5 Conclusions.....	102
VI. Crime and the Rule of Law.....	104
6.1 Victimization by crime.....	106
6.1.1 Reporting crimes.....	109
6.1.2 Victimization and trust in the system	114
6.2 Perception of insecurity due to crime.....	119
6.3 Conclusions.....	125
VII. Local governments.....	127
7.1 Citizens’ relations with various levels of government.....	127
7.2 Participation municipal government activities.....	129
7.2.1 Attendance at town hall meetings.....	129
7.2.2 Determiners of attendance at town hall meetings.....	132
7.2.3 A comparative view of attendance at town hall meetings	132
7.2.4 Submission of requests for assistance or petitions.....	133
7.2.5 A comparative view of submission of requests for assistance or petitions to municipal governments.....	134
7.3 Satisfaction with municipal services.....	135
7.3.1 Representation of citizen interests and satisfaction with services provided by municipalities	136
7.3.2 Satisfaction with municipal services (1995-2006).....	137
7.3.3 Determiners of satisfaction with municipal services	137
7.3.4 A comparative view of satisfaction with municipal services.....	138
7.4 Satisfaction with treatment received in municipalities	138
7.4.1 Representation of citizen interest and satisfaction with treatment received in municipalities.	139
7.4.2 Determiners of treatment received in municipalities.....	140
7.5 To whom should more obligations and money be given?.....	140
7.5.1 To whom should more obligations and money be given? (1995-2006)	141
7.6 Willingness to pay higher taxes	143
7.6.1 Willingness to pay higher taxes (1995-2006).....	144
7.7 Trust in municipal governments.....	144
7.7.1 Determiners of trust in municipalities	145
7.8 Conclusions.....	145
VIII. Voting behavior.....	147
8.1 Salvadoran voters.....	147
8.1.1 An educated guess as to why some citizens do not vote	149

8.1.2 Evaluation of whether or not recent elections reflect the will of the people.....	151
8.1.3 Voting determiners	153
8.1.4 Sociodemographic reasons	153
8.1.5 Income level and intention to vote.....	156
8.1.6 Political factors.....	158
8.2 Representation of citizens' interests.....	160
8.3 Evaluations of political parties.....	164
8.3.1 Levels of trust in parties.....	164
8.3.2 Closeness of relationships with political parties	166
8.3.3 Evaluations of party performance.....	168
8.3.4 Opinions about two items electoral reform issues	170
8.4 Political inclinations.....	172
8.5 Evaluations of government.....	177
8.6 Conclusions	180
IX. Social capital and democracy.....	181
9.1 Interpersonal trust in El Salvador.....	182
9.2 Trust in institutions.....	188
9.3 Civic participation.....	191
9.4 Social capital and democracy.....	195
9.5 Conclusions.....	200
X. Conflict resolution and mediation centers.....	202
10.1 Conflict resolution.....	203
10.2 Mediation centers	211
10.3 Conclusions.....	220
Bibliografía	221
Apéndice A: Descripción metodológica del estudio en El Salvador.....	228
1.0 Determinación de la muestra.....	228
1.1 Universo poblacional.....	228
1.2 Población.....	228
1.3 Método de muestreo	228
1.4 Marco muestral.....	229
1.5 Tamaño de la muestra	229
1.6 Determinación de la muestra por estrato y áreas urbano/rural.....	229
1.7 Ajuste de la muestra por “no cobertura”	231
1.8 Selección de las diferentes unidades de muestreo.....	232
Procesamiento de la información.....	236
Análisis estadístico	236
Precisión de los resultados.....	237
Apéndice B: Las tablas de de regresión.....	239
Apéndice C: Carta de consentimiento del IUDOP	246
Apéndice D: Cuestionario aplicado en El Salvador	247

List of Figures

Figure I.1 Central America: Index of Human Development, 1997-2003.	3
Figure I.2 Real GNP growth rate (in colons 1990).	6
Figure I.3 Remittances as a percentage of the GNP, 1995-2005.	7
Figure I.4. Evaluation of the national economy, 2006.	9
Figure I.5. Evaluation of the national economy compared one year ago, 2006.	9
Figure II.1. Distribution of survey respondents, by gender.	18
Figure II.2 Distribution of survey subjects by age.	18
Figure II.3 Distribution of survey subjects by level of education.	19
Figure II.4 Distribution of survey subjects by monthly family income.	20
Figure II.5 Distribution of survey subject by city size.	20
Figure III.1 Alternate concepts of democracy in El Salvador, 2006.	28
Figure III.2 A comparative view of alternative concepts of democracy, 2006.	29
Figure III.3. Concepts of democracy accoring by gender, 2006.	30
Figure III.4 Concepts of democracy by educational level, 2006.	31
Figure III.5 Concepts of democracy by urban or rural zones, 2006.	32
Figure III.6 Concepts of democracy according to ideology, 2006.	33
Figure III.7 Satisfaction with democracy in El Salvador, 2006.	34
Figure III.8 Opinion of how democratic El Salvador is, 2006.	35
Figure III.9. Preferred regime type by survey year, 2004 y 2006.	37
Figure III.10 Preference for a strongman or an electoral democracy by survey year, 2006.	38
Figure III.11 Support for the system according to concepts of democracy, 2006.	40
Figure III.12 Tolerance according to concepts of democracy, 2006.	41
Figure IV.1 Averages from questions constituting.	45
Figure IV.2 Averages of questions that constitute the scale of support for the system,	46
Figure IV.3 Support for the system in El Salvador (1995-2006):Main items scale.	46
Figure IV.4. A comparative view of support for the system.	47
Figure IV.5 Support for the system, by age, 2006.	48
Figure IV.6 Support for the system by income level, 2006.	49
Figure IV.7 Support for the system by educational level, 2006.	50
Figure IV.8 Support for the system according to.	51
Figure IV.9 Support for the system according to.	52
Figure IV.10 Support for the system according.	53
Figure IV.11 Support for the system according to political preference, 2006.	54
Figure IV.12 Support for the system according to opinions.	55
Figure IV.13. Support for the system according to satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance, 2006.	56
Figure IV.14 Support for the system according to.	57
Figure IV.15 Support for the system according to level of.	58
Figure IV.16 Support for the system according to satisfaction.	59
Figure IV.17 Support for the system according to size of residence, 2006.	60
Figure IV.18 Support for the system.	61
Figure IV.19 Trust in institutions, 2006.	62
Figure IV.20 Comparison of 2004 and 2006 data on institutional trust.	63
Figure IV.21 Averages of questions that constitute.	65

Figure IV.22 Averages of questions constituting the political tolerance scale, 1995-2006..... 66

Figure IV.23 Political tolerance in El Salvador, 1995-2006. 66

Figure IV.24 A comparative view of political tolerance..... 67

Figure IV.25 Tolerance by educational level, 2006. 68

Figure IV.26. Tolerance by educational level and gender, 2006. 69

Figure IV.27. Tolerance by gender, 2006. 69

Figure IV.28 Tolerance according to home furnishings, 2006. 70

Figure IV.29 Tolerance according to the president’s job performance rating, 2006. 71

Figure IV.30 Tolerance according to ideology, 2006. 72

Figure IV.31 Tolerance according to political preference, 2006. 73

Figure IV.32 Tolerance according to satisfaction with democratic governance, 2006..... 74

Figure IV.33 Tolerance according to population stratum, 2006. 75

Figure IV.34 A comparative view of attitudes that favor a stable democracy in El Salvador..... 78

Figure V.1 Opinion of corruption among public officials, 2006. 82

Figure V.2 A comparative view of the perception of corruption, 2006. 83

Figure V.3 Perception of corruption according to..... 85

Figure V.4 Perception of corruption according to survey participants’ level of education, 2006.86

Figure V.5 Perception of corruption, by gender, 2006..... 87

Figure V.6 Perception of corruption survey participant’s age, 2006. 87

Figure V.7 Perception of corruption by urban/rural area, 2006..... 88

Figure V.8 Acts of corruption experienced during the last year, 2006. 90

Figure V.9 Bribes paid to public employees and in schools, 2004-2006..... 91

Figure V.10 A comparative view of percentages of..... 92

Figure V.11. Victimization by corruption by level of wealth, 2006. 93

Figure V.12 Victimization by corruption according to 94

Figure V.13 Opinions on the justification of corruption, 2006. 95

Figure V.14 A comparative view of justification of corruption, 2006..... 96

Figure V.15 Justification of corruption by gender, 2006. 97

Figure V.16. Justification of corruption by age, 2006. 97

Figure V.17 Justification of corruption according to victimization by corruption, 2006. 98

Figure V.18 Trust in institutions according to victimization by corruption, 2006..... 101

Figure V.19 Support for the system according to victimization by corruption, 2006..... 101

Figure V.20. Tolerance according to victimization by corruption, 2006..... 102

Figure VI.1 Salvadorans’ identification of the municipality’s major problems, 2006. 104

Figure VI.2 A comparative view of victimization, 2006. 107

Figure VI.3 Types of offenses suffered by respondents, 2006..... 108

Figure VI.4 Level of victimization by crime, 2006..... 109

Figure VI.5 Reporting crimes, 2006..... 110

Figure VI.6 Reasons for not reporting crimes, 2006..... 111

Figure VI.7 Trust that the judicial system will punish those 112

Figure VI.8. Level of trust in judicial and public safety institutions, 2004-2006. 113

Figure VI.9 Opinions of the role of the police in the community, 2004-2006..... 114

Figure VI.10 Opinions of authorities’ respect for the law, 2006. 115

Figure VI.11 Institutional trust according to level of victimization, 2006..... 116

Figure VI.12. Support for the system according to level of victimization, 2006..... 117

Figure VI.13 Satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance..... 118

Figure VI.14 Justification of a coup d’etat according to various conditions,2006. 119

Figure VI.15. Perception of safety, by year, 2004-2006. 120

Figure VI.16 A comparative view of the perception of safety, 2006. 120

Figure VI.17 Opinions regarding the effects of gangs on neighborhoods, 2006. 122

Figure VI.18 Perception of safety according to the effects of gang activity, 2006. 123

Figure VI.19 Victimization according to the effects of gang activity, 2006. 123

Figure VI.20 Perception of safety according to opinions. 124

Figure VI.21 Support for the system and satisfaction with the 125

Figure VI.22 Opinions regarding delinquency as a threat 126

Figure VII.1 From whom have you 128

Figure VII.2. Requests for municipal government assistance, by populational stratum, 2006. 129

Figure VII.3 Attendance at a town hall meeting 130

Figure VII.4 Attendance at a town hall meeting in the last year according to populational stratum, 2006. 131

Figure VII.5 How much attention do municipal officials pay to 132

Figure VII.6 A comparative view of attendance 133

Figure VII.7 Have you requested assistance or presented a petition 134

Figure VII.8 A comparative view of submission of requests. 135

Figure VII.9 Satisfaction with services provided by municipalities, 2006. 136

Figure VII.10 Satisfaction with services provided by municipalities according to representation of citizen interests by local government, 2006. 137

Figure VII.11 A comparative view of satisfaction. 138

Figure VII.12. Satisfaction with treatment received in municipalities, 2004 and 2006. 139

Figure VII.13 Satisfaction with services received in municipalities according to local governments' representation of citizen interests, 2006. 140

Figure VII.14 Should more obligations and money be given to national or local government?, 2006. 141

Figure VII.15 To whom should more responsibilities and more funds. 143

Figure VII.16 Willingness to pay higher municipal taxes, 2006. 144

Figure VII.17 Trust in municipalities, 2004 y 2006. 145

Figure VIII.1 Most important reason for vote cast in presidential election, 2004. 148

Figure VIII.2 Evaluation of whether the result of recent elections 152

Figure VIII.3 Evaluation of whether the result of recent elections reflects the will of the people, according to party voted for in legislative election, 2006. 153

Figure VIII.4. Voting, by age, 2006. 154

Figure VIII.5 Voting, by level of educational level, 2006. 155

Figure VIII.6 Voting according to educational level, by gender, 2006. 156

Figure VIII.7 Voting according to home furnishings, 2006. 157

Figure VIII.8 Voting according to interest in politics, 2006. 158

Figure VIII.9 Voting according to involvement in political campaigns, 2006. 159

Figure VIII.10 Voting according to party preference, 2006. 160

Figure VIII.11 National government represents interests, 2006. 161

Figure VIII.12. Legislative Assembly representative represents interests, 2006. 162

Figure VIII.13 City Hall and municipal council represent interests, 2006. 163

Figure VIII.14. Comparison of representation of interests, 2006. 164

Figure VIII.15 Trust in political parties, 2004 and 2006. 165

Figure VIII.16 Trust in political parties by ideology, 2006. 165

Figure VIII.17 Do you sympathize with any political party at this time? 2006. 166

Figure VIII.18 How close do you feel to the party with which you sympathize?, 2006.	167
Figure VIII.19 To what extent does that party represent your interests?, 2006.	167
Figure VIII.20 How democratic are parties in their internal performance? 2006.	169
Figure VIII.21 Opinions of how democratic political parties are,	169
Figure VIII.22 Opinions regarding whether parties can recover lost credibility, 2006.	170
Figure VIII.23 Interest in participation in the process of.....	171
Figure VIII.24 Approval of passing legislation to regulate political party finances 2006.	172
Figure VIII.25 Ideology, 2006.	173
Figure VIII.26 Ideology 2004 and 2006.....	174
Figure VIII.27 Average on left-to-right scale according to	176
Figure IV.1 Party preference by ideology, 2006.....	177
Figure VIII.29. Evaluation of President Saca's.....	178
Figure VIII.30 Question series concerning government efficacy, 2006.	179
Figure VIII.31 Efficacy of the current administration, 2006.	180
Figure IX.1 Trust in people in the community, 2006.....	183
Figure IX.2 A comparative view of interpersonal trust, 2006.	184
Figure IX.3 Interpersonal trust, by gender, 2006.	185
Figure IX.4. Level of interpersonal trust by.....	186
Figure IX.5. Interpersonal trust according to.....	187
Figure IX.6 Support for the system and satisfaction with.....	188
Figure IX.7 A comparative view of trust in institutions, 2006.	189
Figure IX.8 Trust in institutions, by year, 2004 and 2006.	190
Figure IX.9 Support for the system and satisfaction with democratic governance.....	191
Figure IX.10 Averages of questions regarding civil participation, 2006.	192
Figure IX.11 A comparative view of civic participation, 2006.	193
Figure IX.12. Civic participation by gender, 2006.	194
Figure IX.13 Civic participation according to size of city, 2006.....	195
Figure IX.14 A comparative view of social capital, 2006.	196
Figure IX.15 Social capital, by year, 2004 y 2006.....	197
Figure IX.16 Social capital according to respondents' ideology, 2006.	198
Figure IX.17 Social capital according to victimization by crime, 2006.	199
Figure IX.18 Social capital according to perception of public safety, 2006.	199
Figure IX.19. Support for the system and satisfaction with the.....	200
Figure X.1. Opinions about course of action when facing a conflict, 2006.....	204
Figure X.2 Opinions regarding conflict resolution by	205
Figure X.3 Opinions regarding to whom to turn.....	207
Figure X.4 Opinions concerning whom to turn to with a problem	208
Figure X.5 Opinions regarding whether public hearings have helped.....	209
Figure X.6 Opinions regarding whether public hearings have helped reduce	210
Figure X.7 Opinions regarding whether public hearings have helped.....	211
Figure X.8. Have you heard about the mediation centers?, 2006.	212
Figure X.9. Knowledge of mediation centers according to media exposure, 2006.	214
Figure X.10 Level of information about the mediation centers, 2006.	215
Figure X.11 Level of information concerning the mediation centers according to area of residence, 2006.....	216
Figure X.12 Level of approval of the existence of mediation centers, 2006.	217
Figure X.13. Level of approval of mediation centers, 2004 and 2006.....	218

Figure X.14 Importance of the mediation centers, 2006.....219
 Figure X.15 Importance of mediation centers, 2004 and 2006.....220

List of Tables

Table I.1 World ranking regarding human development and IHD of El Salvador.....3
 Table I.2 El Salvador: Index of Human Development by municipality 1999-2004 and its dimensions in 2004.....4
 Table I.3 Existing Free Trade Agreements in El Salvador.8
 Table I.4. Presidential election results, 1999-2004.11
 Table I.5 Legislative election results (2000-2006).....11
 Table I.6 Number of representatives elected, by party, 2000-2006.12
 Table I.7 Municipal election results, 2000-2006.....12
 Table I.8 Number of mayoralites won , by party Elections 2000-2006.....13
 Table II.1 Characteristics obtained from the sample and the population according to EHPM data and the DIGESTYC population projection.22
 Table III.1. What does democracy mean to you?.....25
 Table III.2 The meaning of democracy, by category.27
 Table III.3 Satisfaction with democracy in El Salvador according to concept of democracy, 2006.35
 Table III.4 Preferred type of regime according to concepts of democracy, 2006.....38
 Table III.5 Preference for a strongman or an electoral democracy according to definitions of democracy, 2006.39
 Table IV.1 Theoretical relationship between support for the system76
 Table IV.2 Empirical relationship between support for the system77
 Table IV.3 Empirical relationship between support for the system77
 Table V.1. Opinion of corruption among public officials by year, 2004-2006.....82
 Table V.2. Opinions regarding issues of corruption, 2006.99
 Table VIII.1. Most important reason for vote cast in 2004 presidential election cross-referenced with party voted for in the 2004 presidential election, recoded.149
 Table VIII.2. Reasons for not voting in the 2004 presidential election.150
 Table VIII.3. Reasons for not voting in the 2006 legislative elections.151
 Table VIII.4. How close do you feel to the party with which you sympathize and to what extent does that party represent your interests, cross-referenced, 2006.168
 Table VIII.5. Party voted for in the 2006 legislative elections.172
 Table VIII.6. Ideology and party voted for in175
 Table X.1 Responses concerning dealing with conflict according to206
 Table X.2 Percentages of persons who have heard of the mediation centers213

Executive Summary

The present report is the product of a study of the political culture of El Salvador carried out through a public opinion survey done in June and July, 2006. The investigation was based on a representative sample of 1,729 adult Salvadorans with a reliability of 95% and a sample error of $\pm 2.4\%$. The survey is part of a wider study on political culture in Latin American countries coordinated by the Latin American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University, directed by Professor Mitchell A. Seligson.

The study, entitled “The Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador, 2006”, is comprised of ten chapters. In the first chapter the national context is introduced. In the second chapter the methodology of the survey is explained.

The third chapter focuses on the concepts of democracy. The Salvadoran people have diverse ideas about democracy, but most (51.4%) define it from normative perspectives, such as freedom of expression, of association, and the like. Survey results also show that for a significant portion of the population (43.1%), democracy has no meaning. It is interesting to note that other expressions of democracy, such as utilitarianism, which views democracy as useful in obtaining economic well-being or security, and negative views are not popular among Salvadorans. In fact, less than 6% of the citizens expressed a preference for them.

With respect to the evaluations of democracy, 14.8% think that the country is very democratic; 36.8% somewhat democratic; 36.4% not very democratic; and 11.9% not at all democratic. In addition, it was found that 4% feel very satisfied, 42.6% satisfied, 43.2% unsatisfied, and 10.2% very unsatisfied with the performance of democracy.

The study found strong support for democracy as a form of government: 87.6% prefer electoral democracy versus 12.4% that would support a strongman; and 72.7% prefer democracy as government form as opposed to 12.4% that would prefer an authoritarian government; and 14.7% for whom it does not matter whether the government is democratic or authoritarian.

Nevertheless, the support for democracy as the preferred regime as well as the preference of the electoral democracy versus rule by a strongman showed a decline 2004. Although the majority of the citizens continue consistently to support the idea of a democratic regime, it is clear that there has been an upswing in attitudes that favor the authoritarian evaluations.

The study also found a consistent relation between notions of democracy and the levels of support for the system and satisfaction with democracy itself. Those who clearly conceive of democracy in standard ways tend to show more support for a democratic regime than the rest of the population, particularly those whose ideas about democracy are unclear. Nevertheless, the results show that those with standard concepts show less support for the system than those with vague ideas about democracy, a fact which suggests critical attitudes toward democracy and its performance.

In the fourth chapter support for the political system is approached. The scale of support for the system seeks to measure the level of support that the citizens grant to their system of government, without focusing on the country's current administration. In the literature of political science this is known as "diffuse support" or "support for the system." This scale has been constructed from the average obtained for each one of the five questions used, and to make the results more comprehensible, they were converted to a ranking of 0-100. The average obtained for each one of the questions was: courts (45.1), basic rights (45.1), pride (52.7), support (63.5) and institutions (70.2), and the scale of support for the system averaged, 55.

Because data from national surveys done in 1995, 1999, 2004 and 2006 were available, it is possible to see the evolution of the levels of support for the system for the period 1995-2006. Support for the system increased significantly between 1995 and 2004: the averages are 53 in 1995; 57 in 1999; and 60 in 2004; nevertheless, there is a noticeable decline in 2006 (55).

When comparing trust in specific institutions for 2004 and 2006, there was a generalized drop in the confidence of the Salvadorans in their public institutions.

The scale of political tolerance is based on four questions that refer to four basic rights: the right to vote, the right to demonstrate peacefully, the right to run for public office, and the right to freedom of expression. This scale was constructed from the averages obtained for the four used questions, and the results were converted to a ranking of 0-100. The average obtained for each one of the questions was: run for public office (50.1), give a speech (55.8), vote (55.3) and demonstrate peacefully (62.4); the average for political tolerance was 56.

Political tolerance has shown the following trend in El Salvador: it rises from 53 in 1995 to 58 in 1999; in 2004 it drops to 51, and then rises to 56 in 2006.

For the analysis of support for stable democracy, the relationship has been explored between the scale of support for the system and the scale of tolerance, for which each was divided in low and high levels. Thus, four possible combinations were created. The distribution of the individuals surveyed in 2006 in these four categories is as follows: 32% are located in the category of stable democracy, 27% in authoritarian stability, 25% in unstable democracy, and 16% in the category of democracy at risk.

In the fifth chapter the subject of corruption is analyzed. Forty-three and one tenth percent of Salvadorans consider that the corruption is widespread among government officials of the country; 28.6% think that it is "somewhat" widespread; and 28.3% think that the corruption is not very or not at all widespread in the country.

The data show that about 13% of people have been victimized by corruption over the course of a year, and that this percentage is slightly lower than that of 2004. These results would suggest that the incidence of corruption, at least as it is measured in this study, has declined in the past two years. The most frequent incidents of bribery occur in hospitals or clinics in attempts to obtain access to health services (6.7%) and among those which seek favors from police officers (6.6%). The most common victims of corruption are those who are economically better off.

One of the most salient results of the present study is that a high level of tolerance exists toward corruption among some sectors of the population. According to the data, about 17% of those surveyed justify acts of corruption. These percentages are higher among men, young people and, peculiarly, among those who themselves have been victims of corruption. This raises a question with respect to the cultural conditioning behind corruption and requires an examination of the social justifications that support the prevalence of the corruption.

The results indicate that the subject of corruption is important for the legitimacy of the institutional system and for the political system as well. The people who have been victimized by acts of corruption exhibit lower levels of confidence in the institutions and lower support for the system.

In the sixth chapter the subjects of crime and the rule of law are examined. The data of the present study show that 15.6% of Salvadorans have been direct victims of crime in the last year, and that the majority of people (almost 70%) do not file complaints regarding violent acts because essentially they think that it does no good or because they are afraid to do so. This influences the levels of trust that the Salvadorans have in their institutions, and their confidence is seriously affected by the continuing violence and insecurity, creating a vicious circle that only widens the separation between Salvadorans and their institutions.

The results indicate that only the 22.4% of those surveyed feel very safe in the face of possibly becoming personally involved in a criminal event; 30.5% feel somewhat safe whereas 47.1% feel very unsafe or not safe at all as a result of the prevalence of crime in El Salvador. In addition, the data indicate that the perception of lack of public safety has not lessened with respect to the 2004 data.

The problems of crime and insecurity contribute to the erosion in the confidence of Salvadorans in their institutions, the legitimacy of the political system, as well as the value assigned to the operation of the democracy.

In the seventh chapter the subject of local governments is analyzed. The study identified a closer connection of the citizenry with local governments in terms of having asked for assistance in solving their problems.

The survey data show low levels of citizen participation in the administration of the municipal governments through two mechanisms under consideration: attendance to open town hall meetings or municipal sessions during the last twelve months (10.7) or requests for assistance or presentation of petitions (20).

With regard to citizen satisfaction with municipal services, 4.4% consider them to be very good; 33.8% good; 40.9% neither good nor bad; 17% bad; and 3.8% very bad.

Those surveyed expressed satisfaction with the treatment received from city halls; 1.4% think that they have been treated very well; 9.2% well; 52.6% neither well nor badly; 27.1% badly; and 9.7% very badly.

In general terms, some level of trust in the municipality is apparent. Nevertheless, a slight drop in this trust is observed between 2004 and 2006.

In the eighth chapter electoral behavior is examined. In relation to the evaluation as to whether the results of legislative and municipal elections in March, 2006 reflect the will of the people, 28.5% think that they did so very much; 22.5% somewhat; 38.5% little and 10.4% not at all.

There are main determinants of the intention to vote: the residence stratum of the population, the evaluation of president's job performance; working for a candidate or party in the past election; interest in public policy, age, alignment with a political party; evaluation of the results of the past elections as a reflection of the will of the people, and the individual's political knowledge.

The study has identified low levels of citizen trust in political parties (an average of 35.1 on a scale of 0-100), and this has declined in the last two years.

Of those surveyed, 9.2% consider that political parties are very democratic in their internal operations; 34% somewhat democratic; 43.7% not very democratic; and 13.1% not at all democratic.

Seventy-one and six tenths percent of those surveyed highly approve of passing legislation to require that political parties render accounts of the public and private funds that they receive, as well how these funds are spent; 20% approve somewhat; 5.3% disapprove somewhat; and 3% highly disapprove.. Almost nine out of ten of those surveyed support passing legislation that regulates the finances of political parties.

Of those surveyed, 31.3% expressed an inclination to sympathize with a particular political party. Of this group, 28.8% feel closely connected to the party of their choice; 34.3% feel somewhat connected; 30.6% not very connected; 6.3% not at all connected; and 43% consider that their party highly represents their interests; 28.7% somewhat; 24.3% little; and 4% not at all.

The ninth chapter examines social capital. The data reveal that Salvadoran citizens have average levels of interpersonal trust, that their trust in institutions has diminished, and that the civic participation is generally low and has been declining in the last two years.

As with other political attitudes, social capital is affected by the prevalence of crime and insecurity in the country. The greater the crime and insecurity, the more people tend to distrust each other, distance themselves from their institutions and, consequently, to abandon the networks of cooperation and coexistence that make progress possible. As a result, low levels of social capital translate to low levels of support for the system and in dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy in the country.

The attitudes toward the institutions, toward others and toward citizen participation make a difference when attempting to construct a stable democracy. Democracy in El Salvador faces diverse challenges, but civic participation, trust in others, and the commitment to public institutions cannot be taken lightly while the country is trying to develop and implement programs of democratic governability.

The tenth chapter examines conflict resolution and mediation centers. Survey data show that in dealing with conflicts, people tend to seek mechanisms of private but non-violent resolution of conflicts: hiring a lawyer (23.5%) and coming to an agreement (22.6%); on the other hand, 21.8% go to the authorities.

Thirty percent of the people have heard about the mediation centers promoted by the Judge Advocate General of the Republic. Of the people who know about or who have heard about the mediation centers, 38.4% consider that the amount of information related to them is adequate, while 61.6% think that it is inadequate.

Most people who know about the mediation centers consider them important and have favorable opinions of them. Thus, a quite favorable evaluation in relation to the mediation centers is observed: 33% are very much for them; 59.9% are somewhat for them; 4.9% are against them; and 2.2% are very much against them, whereas 22.6% consider them very important, 57.4% important; 17.6% not very important; and 2.3% not at all important.

Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) democracy and governance surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean over the past two decades. LAPOP findings have been a crucial tool to USAID missions in diagnosing the nature of the democratic challenge; sparking policy dialogue and debate within Latin American countries; monitoring on-going USAID programs; and evaluating and measuring USAID performance in supporting democracy and good governance in the region. The reports have often served as the “voice” of citizens on the quality of democracy. We hope that this 2006 study also proves to be useful to policy-makers, democracy advocates, donors and practitioners.

The decision to undertake democracy surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean emerged from the USAID country missions, where field democracy officers have increasingly depended on them as a management and policy tool. The depth and breadth of the questionnaire allows us to look beyond simple questions and examine complex relationships related to gender, ethnicity, geography, economic well-being, and other conditions, and delve deeply into specific practices and cultures to identify where our assistance might be most fruitful in promoting democracy. The surveys represent a unique USAID resource, as a comparative, consistent, and high quality source of information over time. USAID is grateful for the leadership of Dr. Mitchell Seligson at Vanderbilt University, his outstanding Latin American graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and the participation and expertise of the many regional academic and expert institutions that have been involved in this project.

Two recent trends in these surveys have made them even more useful. One is the addition of more countries to the survey base, using a core of common questions, which allows valid comparisons across systems and over time. The second, and even more important, is the introduction of geographically or project-based “over-sampling” in some of the countries where USAID has democracy programs. The result is a new capability for USAID missions to examine the impact of their programs in statistically valid ways by comparing the “before and after” of our work, and also comparing changes in the areas where we have programs to changes in areas where we do not have them. These methodologies should provide one of the most rigorous tests of program effectiveness of donor interventions in any field.

Promoting democracy and good governance is a US government foreign policy priority, and our investment of both effort and money is a substantial one. Democratic development is a relatively new field of development, however, and our knowledge of basic political relationships and the impact of donor assistance are still at an early phase. It is critical that we be able to determine which programs work and under what circumstances they work best, learning from our experience and constantly improving our programs. To meet this challenge, USAID has undertaken a new initiative, the Strategic and Operational Research Agenda, (SORA). With the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences, SORA has already incorporated the insights of numerous experts in political science and research methodology into our work. The LAPOP democracy surveys are a critical component of this evaluation effort. We hope their findings will

stimulate a dialogue among governments, NGOs, scholars and the public that will help, in the long run, to solidify democracy in Latin America.

Dr. Margaret Sarles
Division Chief, Strategic Planning and Research
Office of Democracy and Governance
U.S. Agency for International Development

Prologue

The AmericasBarometer, 2006: Background to the Study

By Mitchell A. Seligson

Centennial Professor of Political Science

And Director, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

Vanderbilt University

I am very pleased to introduce to you the 2006 round of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviours in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. The first effort was in 2004, when eleven countries were included, and all of those studies are already available on the LAPOP web site. The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating 20 countries. For the first time, through the generosity of a grant from the Center for the Americas, it was possible to include the United States and Canada. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the core funding to enable to study to incorporate much of Latin America and the Caribbean, so that in 2006, as of this writing, the following countries have been included: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica. The sample and questionnaire designs for all studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analysis within each country. The 2006 series involves a total of publications, one for each of the countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Foreword, member of the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and other collaborators. We embarked on the 2006 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study could not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, it would also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what was becoming the "UNDP Democracy Support Index." The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

The UNDP-sponsored event was then followed by a meeting of the country teams in Heredia, Costa Rica, in May, 2006. Key democracy officers from USAID were present at the meeting, as well as staffers from LAPOP at Vanderbilt. With the background of the 2004 series

and the UNDP workshop input, it became fairly easy for the teams to agree to common core questionnaire. The common core allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such issues as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behaviour. Each country study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviours. In some cases we find striking similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to coming to Costa Rica, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Costa Rica meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country publication.

The Costa Rica meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual.

Another agreement we struck in Costa Rica was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared by LAPOP for SPSS 14). Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All senior investigators in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deidentified, thus protecting the right of

anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau's CPro software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, in very few cases did that happen in the 2006 **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2006 round is that we used handheld computers (Personal Digital Assistants, or PDAs) to collect the data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2006 survey. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaire was pretested extensively in each country. In many cases we were able to send LAPOP staffers to the countries that were new to the **AmericasBarometer** to assist in the pretests. Suggestions from each country were then transmitted to LAPOP at Vanderbilt and revisions were made. In most countries this meant no fewer than 20 version revisions. The common standard was to finalize the questionnaire on version 23. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyze their data sets and write their studies. When the drafts were ready, the next step in our effort to maximize quality of the overall project was for the teams to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Santo Domingo, Costa Rica. In preparation for that meeting, held in November 2006, teams of researchers were

assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over a two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project, who read and critiqued each draft study. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID democracy officers for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labour of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 27,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

Acknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Margaret Sarles in the Global Bureau of USAID, assisted by Eric Kite, Maria Barrón and Elizabeth Ramirez in the Latin American Bureau, secured the funding and made possible the entire project thanks to their unceasing support. All of the participants in the study are grateful to them. At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. Vanderbilt’s Dean of Arts and Science, Richard MacCarty provided financial support for many critical aspects of the research. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Provost and Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs generously offered LAPOP a suite of offices and conference space, and had it entirely reconditioned and equipped for the project. Vera Kutzenski, Director of the Center for the Americas has strongly supported the project administratively and financially, and contributed key funding to enable the inclusion of the United States and Canada in this round of the **AmericasBarometer**. Her administrative assistant, Janelle Lees made lots of things happen efficiently. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt has been a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, Vanderbilt University performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve my special appreciation for their efforts.

At LAPOP Central, the burden of the project fell on Pierre Martin Dominique Zéphyr, our LAPOP Research Coordinator and Data Analyst. Dominique worked tirelessly, almost always seven days a week, on virtually every aspect of the studies, from their design through their implementation and analysis. He also had central responsibility for preparing the training material for the teams for the data analysis and for handling the data audits and merging of the

data bases. Dominique also served as Regional coordinator of the Caribbean countries, and personally did the pretesting and interviewer training in each of them. Finally, he worked as co-collaborator on the Haiti study. Julio Carrión of the University of Delaware served as Regional Coordinator for Mexico, Central America and the Andes. He managed this while also serving as co-collaborator of the Peru study. The members of the LAPOP graduate research team were involved in every aspect of the studies, from questionnaire design, data audits and overall quality control. I would like to thank them all: María Fernanda Boidi, Abby Córdova Guillén, José Miguel Cruz, Juan Carlos Donoso, Jorge Daniel Montalvo, Daniel Moreno Morales, Diana Orces, and Vivian Schwarz-Blum. Their Ph.D. programs at Vanderbilt are being supported by USAID, the Vanderbilt University Center for Latin American and Iberian Studies and the Department of Political Science. My colleague Jon Hiskey participated in our weekly meetings on the surveys, adding his own important expertise and encouragement. Our web master, María Clara Bertini, made sure that our efforts were transparent, and has done an outstanding job managing the ever-growing web page of LAPOP and the AmericasBarometer. Héctor Lardé and Roberto Ortiz were responsible for cover design and text formatting, and did so with great attention to detail.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied who worked tirelessly to meet what at times seemed impossible deadlines. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below:

Country	Researchers
Summary Report	Prof. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University (Project Director)
Mexico and Central America Group	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Kenneth M. Coleman, University of Michigan, and Senior Research Analyst at Market Strategies, Inc. ●Pablo Parás García, President of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University ●Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES, Guatemala
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Ricardo Córdova (Salvadoran national), Executive Director of FundaUngo, El Salvador ●Prof. Miguel Cruz, Director of IUDOP (Public Opinion Institute) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Prof. Miguel Cruz, Director of IUDOP (Public Opinion Institute) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA) ●José Rene Argueta, Ph.D. candidate, University of Pittsburgh
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Prof. Manuel Ortega-Hegg, Director of the Centro de Análisis Socio-Cultural (CASC) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA), Managua, Nicaragua ●Marcelina Castillo Venerio, Centro de Análisis Socio-cultural (CASC), Universidad Centroamericana. (UCA)
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Luis Rosero, Director of Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP, and Professor at the Universidad de Costa Rica. ●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación project, United Nations
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Associate Professor of Political Science at Central Michigan University
Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jana Morgan Kelly Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee ●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology Science at Temple University

Country	Researchers
Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Mark Bynoe, Director, School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Guyana ● Ms. Talia Choy, Lecturer, Department of Government and International Affairs, University of Guyana.
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dominique Zephyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University ● Yves François Pierre, Groupe de Recherche en Sciences Sociales (GRESS)
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Ian Boxill, Professor of Comparative Sociology, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona. ● Balford Lewis, Lecturer in research methods, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona. ● Roy Russell, Lecturer in statistics, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona. ● Arlene Bailey, Information Systems specialist, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona. ● Dr. Lloyd Waller, Lecturer in research methods, Department of Government, UWI, Mona Dr Paul Martin, Lecturer, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Lance Gibbs and Caryl James, Lecturers/Research Assistants, Dept. of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work
Andean/Southern Cone Group	
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Prof. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor at the Universidad de los Andes
Ecuador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University ● Juan Carlos Donoso, Ph.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University ● Daniel Moreno, Ph.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University ● Diana Orcés, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University ● Vivian Schwarz-Blum, Ph.D student, Vanderbilt University
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Julio Carrión, Professor at the University of Delaware in the US, and Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos ● Patricia Zárate Ardelá, Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Mitchell Seligson Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University ● Abby B. Córdova, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University ● Juan Carlos Donoso, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University ● Daniel Moreno, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University ● Diana Orcés, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University ● Vivian Schwarz-Blum, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University
Paraguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Manuel Orrego, CIRDA, Paraguay
Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Denise Pavia, Universidade Federal de Goiás, Goiás, Brazil ● Simon Bohn, York University ● Rachael Meneguello, Brazil, Director of the Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública (CESOP) and Professor of Political Science, University of Campinas, Brazil ● David Samules, University of Minnesota ● Luicio Renno, University of Arizona

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 27,000 individuals in these countries who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
December, 2006

Introduction

“Democracy requires a culture that will sustain it, which means the acceptance of citizens and the political elite of certain principles expressed in the freedom of expression, information, religion, in the rights of opposition parties, in the rule of law, and human rights, among others. Such norms, nevertheless, do not evolve overnight.”¹

This quotation summarizes the importance of political culture as it is understood in terms of citizen values, norms, and attitudes in the processes of building a country’s democracy. The present report is the outcome of a research project on the political culture of democracy in El Salvador carried out in 2006. The project is a part of a regional effort coordinated by the Latin American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University, directed by Professor Mitchell A. Seligson and funded by the United States Agency for International Development for the purpose of studying political cultures in Latin America.

In El Salvador, the research was conducted by the “Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo” (FUNDAUNGO) and the “Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública” (IUDOP) of the Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas” (UCA). Locally, the project is a part of a series of studies on political culture which began in 1991 with the publication of *Perspectivas para una democracia estable* and continued with the publication of three additional studies: *El Salvador: de la guerra a la paz. Una cultura política en transición*, in 1995, *Auditoría de la democracia, El Salvador 1999*, Publisher in 2000, and *La Cultura Política de la Democracia en El Salvador, 2004*, published in 2005. This study is thus a continuation of the previous studies and helps visualize the progress and roadblocks in the building of a political culture favorable to a democratic government.

This report is divided into ten chapters. The first chapter reviews the political and socioeconomic situations at the time the study was done. The second chapter describes the study methodology. From the third chapter forward, the research results are presented by topic. The third chapter approaches the topic of concepts of democracy; the fourth analyzes support for democracy; the fifth deals with corruption; the sixth presents the results regarding crime and the Rule of Law; the seventh examines the results regarding the study of local governments; the eighth looks at Salvadoran voting behavior; the ninth examines social capital; and the tenth chapter discusses conflict resolution and mediation centers.

The concerted efforts of several people from IUDOP and FUNDAUNGO have made possible the publication of this study. Rubí Esmeralda Arana and Bessy Morán from IUDOP were the cornerstones of the planning and research process. From FUNDAUNGO, Leslie Quiñonez contributed to the section on economic context, and Loida Pineda helped edit this document. Lastly, our thanks to Professor Mitchell A. Seligson for his valuable comments and suggestions.

Ricardo Córdova Macías
José Miguel Cruz

¹ Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1996). Repensando los requisitos sociales de la democracia. *La Política. Revista de estudios sobre el Estado y la sociedad.* 2, p. 51-88.

I. The national context

In this chapter, the primary aspects of the national context in recent years are presented regarding the following three aspects: first, the socioeconomic context is examined, for which human development trends, Salvadoran economic behavior, and Salvadorans' evaluation of these will be reviewed. Second, the political context will be discussed, for which electoral processes in the recent past will be analyzed. Third, recent studies on political culture in El Salvador will be identified.

1.1 The socioeconomic context

In this section four topics are discussed. First, a regional view of human development in El Salvador is presented; second, the subject of poverty is reviewed; third, Salvadoran economic behavior is identified; and fourth, citizen evaluation of the economic situation is presented.

1.1.1 A regional view of human development in El Salvador

The Index of Human Development (IHD)² of Central American countries over the last decade continues to show a positive trend which allows the region to be classified in two groups: a) countries that have reached a high level of human development (Costa Rica and Panama); and b) countries that have achieved a moderate level of human development (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala).

Figure I.1 shows that Costa Rica has the highest IHD in the region (0.838 for 2003) and that Panama has a sustained an IHD growth level that has allowed it to achieve a high level of human development (0.804) beginning in 2003. El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala also show positive trends for the period of 1997-2003, with the exception of Honduras which shows a drop in 2002, leaving it at the same IHD value as it has in 2001. In 2003, El Salvador had an IHD of 0.722.

This positive growth shown by Central American countries does not necessarily imply an improvement in ranking relative to the 177 countries appearing in the world Report on Human Development from 2003. Costa Rica's rank rose (47), followed by Panama (56), El Salvador (104), Nicaragua (112), Honduras (116), and Guatemala (117).

² The IHD is a synoptic method of evaluating human development. It measures the average of progress of development in a specific country or region in three dimensions: health, education and income. This means being able to enjoy a long, healthy life, have access education, and having human dignity. The IHD can have a value between 0 and 1. Countries have been classified in three categories: low human development (IHD less than 0.500); moderate human development (IHD between 0.500 and 0.799); and high human development (IHD greater that 0.800). Measurement indicators in El Salvador are: for health, live births; for education, the gross combined rate of registering for elementary, secondary and tertiary schools and the adult literacy rate; and for income, the estimated per capita income level adjusted to the PPA. See: United Nations Development Program [UNDP]. (2003). *Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano, El Salvador*. San Salvador: PNUD.




Figure I.1 Central America: Index of Human Development, 1997-2003.

Source: Authors' product based on PNUD, Informes Mundiales sobre Desarrollo Humano: 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005.

In El Salvador, the national IHD continues to show an upward trend in recent years. In Table I.1 the IHD value rose steadily between 1995–2003, moving from 0.604 en 1995, to 0.706 in 2000, to 0.722 in 2003. On a world scale, its ranking rose (relative indicator of human development) during the same period, in spite of ups and downs, from 114 in 1995 (out of 174 countries), to 104 in 2000 (out of 173), and 104 in 2003 (out of 177).³

Año	Posición	Total de países	IDH
1995	114	174	0.604
1996	ND	ND	ND
1997	107	174	0.674
1998	104	174	0.696
1999	95	162	0.701
2000	104	173	0.706
2001	105	175	0.719
2002	103	177	0.720
2003	104	177	0.722

Table I.1 World ranking regarding human development and IHD of El Salvador.

Source: Authors' product based on PNUD, Informes Mundiales de Desarrollo Humano: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 y 2005.

Nota: ND: información no disponible.

³ UNDP. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 y 2005). *Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano Mundial*. United States: UNDP.

Despite the progress made in the national IHD, the differences among the various Salvadoran counties continues to be high. In Table I.2 it can be seen that between 1999-2004, only San Salvador (0.765, 0.783 y 0.788) and La Libertad (0.727, 0.752 y 0.741), have higher IHDs than the national average (0.704, 0.726 and 0.732) respectively.

Departamento	IDH			Indicadores del IDH, 2004			
	1999	2002	2004	Esperanza de vida al nacer	Tasa de alfabetismo adulto (%)	Matriculación combinada (%)	Ingreso per cápita (US\$ PPA)
Ahuachapán	0.626	0.652	0.682	69.4	76.7	61.3	3,437.00
Santa Ana	0.687	0.708	0.707	71.9	77.9	59.9	4,112.00
Sonsonate	0.669	0.696	0.716	71.0	79.7	64.5	4,490.00
Chalatenango	0.642	0.663	0.680	67.2	76.3	63.5	4,045.00
La Libertad	0.727	0.752	0.741	71.3	84.7	65.8	5,463.00
San Salvador	0.765	0.783	0.788	72.4	92.4	74.0	7,073.00
Cuscatlán	0.697	0.713	0.714	70.4	83.0	70.6	3,557.00
La Paz	0.668	0.687	0.701	69.2	82.3	64.9	3,683.00
Cabañas	0.609	0.637	0.656	66.6	72.2	64.0	3,222.00
San Vicente	0.647	0.669	0.683	68.0	78.9	67.3	3,297.00
Usulután	0.655	0.689	0.697	70.7	75.8	66.3	3,709.00
San Miguel	0.689	0.704	0.709	71.0	76.6	64.3	4,482.00
Morazán	0.619	0.646	0.624	67.2	61.6	56.3	3,040.00
La Unión	0.628	0.661	0.673	69.6	71.3	57.8	3,802.00
<i>Promedio nacional</i>	0.704	0.726	0.732	70.9	83.0	66.6	5,091.00

Table I.2 El Salvador: Index of Human Development by municipality 1999-2004 and its dimensions in 2004.

Source: Author's product: PNUD. Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano El Salvador: 2001, 2003 y 2005.

Nota: The date in Table I.2 do not coincide with those in Table I.1 because the latter uses the World Human Development Report (which uses sources from international organs) and for the former uses reports from El Salvador Human Development 2001, 2003 y 2005.

The table also indicates the four dimensions of the IHD by country in 2004, which reflect important differences among the 14 counties. Regarding life expectancy in 2004, the national average was 70.9 years, with San Salvador in the upper range with 72.9 years, and Cabañas in the lower range with 66.6 years. These data show that only 5 of the 14 counties show life expectancies higher than the national average: San Salvador (72.4), Santa Ana (71.9), La Libertad (71.3), Sonsonate (71.0) and San Miguel (71.0).

In the educational column, the municipality with the lowest rate of adult literacy can be found in the eastern zone of El Salvador. Morazán has 62.6% whereas the country with the highest rate of adult literacy is San Salvador with 92.4%, further widening the gap with regard to 2000. The data show that only 3 of the 14 counties have an adult literacy rate higher than the national average of 83.0%. San Salvador has the highest combined rate of school registration; the lowest is Morazán with 53.3%. Moreover, San Salvador and Morazán also show the largest difference in income level (measured in US\$PPP),⁴ with 7,073 (US\$PPP) for the former and 3,040 (US\$PPP).

1.1.2 Poverty in El Salvador

According to the “*Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano El Salvador 2005*”, El Salvador has shown progress in reducing poverty⁵ during the latest period with an additional improvement in the principal social indicators.

At the national level, “12.6% of homes (. . .) experience extreme poverty while another 22% survive in relative poverty, which is a total of 34.6% of poverty stricken homes, according to EHPM 2004. As shown in previous reports on human development in El Salvador, poverty is significantly more severe in rural areas.”⁶ Poverty in the country would be even more critical were it not for remittances from outside the country. Even if most of these remittances are not received by the poorest homes in the country, but by lower-middle and low income families, they constitute a determining factor in the relief of poverty.”⁷

1.1.3 Economic performance

The 1990s and the start of a new century have been a period of important changes in El Salvador, in both the political and economic sectors. From 1992 when the peace accords were signed, a process of political reform to demilitarize and democratize the country has been ongoing. Alongside this process, in 1989 an important process of economic reform began, bringing about a change in the economic model of the country which cast aside the model of import substitution and driving forward reforms involving stabilization and structural adjustment inspired by the “Washington Consensus”⁸, in which the market, rather than the public sector, plays a principal role in the economy.⁹

⁴ The PPP or parity of purchasing power is an adjustment in the type of nominal exchange that allows the type of real exchange to remain constant; to do this, the average of a week’s shopping basket of homogeneous goods is calculated and the buying power is measured in all currencies. Calculation of the PPP allows a currency to have the same purchasing power anywhere in the world.

⁵ In El Salvador the calculation of poverty (according to official data given by DIGESTYC) is done by measuring the number of homes that live below the poverty line, determined by a set of goods and basic services. Two poverty levels are set: one for dire poverty and the other for relative poverty. Dire poverty indicates the number of persons whose income is less than the cost of a basic nutritional basket (BNB). Relative poverty indicates the number of persons whose income allows for the purchase of the BNB but is not enough to meet other needs such as education, health, housing, etc..

⁶ UNDP. *Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano El Salvador 2005*. p 79.

⁷ *Ibid.* Pp 79-80.

⁸ The “Washington Consensus” promoted the following ten guidelines for economic policies: i) fiscal discipline, ii) reordering of public spending by priorities; iii) tax reform; iv) liberalization of interest rates; v) competitive change; vi) direct foreign

This process of economic reform promoted in El Salvador since 1989—including the “dollarization” of the economy in January 2001—seems not to have produced the hoped for results. Figure I.2 shows the behavior of the economy between 1995 and 2005, which indicates a slowdown in the growth of the economy which deepened between 2000 and 2004 with a slight rebound in 2005. However, the debate revolves around the explanatory factors of the economy’s behavior, both structural and short term, but also around internal and external factors.

According to the “Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano El Salvador 2005”, poor economic performance in recent years has been caused by a variety of adverse factors, among which are natural disasters in 2001; lack of jurisdiction and weak regulation in some key economic sectors; strategic commitments to economic sectors with weak production links, and low fiscal performance; and incompatibility of the model with the new characteristics of a national economy dedicated to providing services and heavily dependent on migration and remittances. On the other hand, the economy has been affected by external factors such as the slowing of the global economy, the drop in coffee prices, and the rise in oil prices.




Figure I.2 Real GNP growth rate (in colons 1990).

Source: Authors’ product base on data from the Departamento de Cuentas Macroeconómicas, Banco Central de Reserva.

As previously mentioned, family remittances from outside the country are an important factor in the Salvadoran economy. At the macroeconomic level, the flow of remittances has been a key

investment, vii) commercial liberalization, viii) privatization ix) deregulation; and x) a legal system that ensures property rights. See also: Williamson, John. (2003). From Reform Agenda. A short history of the Washington Consensus and suggestions for what to do next. *Finance & Development*, September.

⁹ Regarding political and economic reform processes in El Salvador, see: Córdova Macías, Ricardo; William Pleitez y Carlos Guillermo Ramos (1998). *Reforma Política y Reforma Económica: los retos de la gobernabilidad democrática*. Documento de Trabajo, Serie Análisis de la Realidad Nacional 98-1. San Salvador, FUNDAUNGO.

economic support which has helped to fill the gap resulting from a substantial reduction in external aid in recent years.¹⁰

In Figure I.3, it can be seen that from 1995 to 2005 the upward trend of remittances has remained steady and that these remittances are an important percentage of the GNP, moving from 11.2% in 1995 to 16.7% in 2005, an increase of 5.5 percentage points for the period.




Figure I.3 Remittances as a percentage of the GNP, 1995-2005.

Source: Authors' product based on data obtained from the Banco Central de Reserva.

During the last few years, business policies have acquired greater relevance, a fact which has appeared in negotiations leading to the signing of Free Trade Agreements with various other countries. Table I.3 shows the five signed and ratified agreements currently in force in El Salvador.

¹⁰ Government of El Salvador. (2004). *El Salvador. Primer informe de país. Avance de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio*. San Salvador. p 36.

No.	País	Ratificación en El Salvador	Vigente a partir de
1	República Dominicana	29 de abril de 1999	4 de octubre de 2001
2	México	7 de diciembre de 2000	15 de marzo de 2001
3	Chile	4 de octubre de 2001	3 de junio de 2002
4	Panamá	3 de octubre de 2002	11 de abril de 2003
5	Estados Unidos	17 de diciembre de 2004	1 de Marzo de 2006

Table I.3 Existing Free Trade Agreements in El Salvador.

Source: Authors' product based on data from the website of the Ministerio de Economía de El Salvador.

The agreement that has become the most important is that of Central America, the Dominican Republic and the United States. After negotiations beginning in January, 2003, the agreement was ratified on December 17, 2004 by the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador and on the July 28, 2005 by the U.S. House of Representatives, taking effect on March 1, 2006. At the present time, El Salvador has initiated discussions with Taiwan, Colombia, Canada, and the European Union. If a free trade agreement can be made with Europe, some special situations will need to be addressed, such as an adjustment of customs policies and the establishment of a unique Central American tariff, both of which are required by the European Union in order to begin negotiations..

1.1.4 Citizen evaluation of economic performance

This section presents the citizens' opinions about the economic situation in El Salvador. These opinions reflect the impact that economic stagnation has had on the population.

Figure I.4 indicates that 0.3% of those interviewed perceive the Salvadoran economy as very good; 6% good; 24.6% neither good nor bad; 43.2% bad; and 25.8% very bad. The data from the figure highlights the fact that 69% see the country's economy as bad or very bad while 24.6% see it as neither good nor bad, and only 6.4% see it as good or very good.




Figure I.4. Evaluation of the national economy, 2006.

When asked how they would evaluate the current economic situation in the country in relation to the past twelve months, 68.5% of respondents said that it was worse than it was a year ago while 25.2% felt that it was the same, and only 6.3% thought that the country's economy was better than it was a year ago.




Figure I.5. Evaluation of the national economy compared one year ago, 2006.

1.2 The political-electoral panorama

In this section the results of the elections of 2004 and 2006 will be described briefly.

In the presidential election of March, 2004, three parties (ARENA, FMLN y PCN) and a coalition party (CDU-PDC) participated. The election was highly polarized.¹¹ Some analysts described it as the most irregular post-war era election, marked by frequent incidents of violence, failure to observe electoral rules, and the use of inappropriate propaganda.¹² However, in spite of these problems, many population segments turned out to vote, and the results, in large measure, reflect the will of the people. Until 2004, participation in post-war elections has been poor;¹³ however, in the 2004 presidential election there was a significant increase in voting—from 1,182,248 certified votes in 1999 to 2,277,473 in 2004, a 66% increase in the number of registered voters.

Of the contenders in the 2004 election, the two dominant groups were the right wing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) [Nationalist Republican Alliance], and the left wing Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) [Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation], converted to a political party by former guerrilla forces. In the March, 2004 elections, both ARENA and the FMLN garnered a considerable number of votes and doubled their electoral rolls compared to the 1999 presidential election. ARENA, jumped from 614,268 votes in 1999 to 1,314,436 in 2004 while the FMLN went from 343,472 votes in 1999 to 812,519 in 2004. The percentage of ARENA votes rose from 51.96% in 1999 to 57.71% in 2004; the FMLN votes rose from 29.05% in 1999 to 35.68% in 2004. ARENA's win gave the party its fourth consecutive term in office.

The two major parties received 93.39% of the vote; the number of votes cast for the remaining parties, thus, was very low. The CDU-PDC coalition and the PCN received 3.9% and 2.71% respectively. By law, these organizations should have lost their electoral franchise because they did not receive the minimum number of votes required to keep it. Nevertheless, because of appeals made by PCN and PDC to the Supreme Court of Justice as well as a resolution from the TSE, neither party lost its electoral franchise. CDU did lose its electoral franchise and then founded a new party.

¹¹ For a view of the 2004 electoral process, see; Cruz, José Miguel. (2004). "Las elecciones presidenciales desde el comportamiento de la opinión pública", Revista *Estudios Centroamericanos*, No. 665-666.

¹² See: Consejo de Redacción (2004). Elecciones sin alternabilidad. Editorial. Revista *Estudios Centroamericanos*, 665-666, pp 209-225.

¹³ Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Cruz, José Miguel. (2005). La cultura política de la democracia en El Salvador, 2004. San Salvador, FUNDAUNGO, IUDOP, Vanderbilt University, ARD and CREA Internacional.

Partido	Elección 1999		Elección 2004	
	Votos	%	Votos	%
ARENA	614,268	51.96	1,314,436	57.71
FMLN	343,472 (a)	29.05	812,519	35.68
PCN	45,140	3.82	61,781	2.71
PDC	67,207	5.68	---	---
CDU	88,640	7.50	---	---
Coalición PDC-CDU	---	---	88,737	3.90
Otros	23,521 (b)	1.99	---	---
Votos válidos	1,182,248	100	2,277,473	100

Table I.4. Presidential election results, 1999-2004.

Source: CIDAI (2004). "Las elecciones presidenciales. Un triunfo del bloque hegemónico de derecha". *Revista Estudios Centroamericanos*, No. 665-666, p 228.

(a) El FMLN en coalición con el USC.

(b) Se refiere a los partidos LIDER y PUNTO.

In general, post-war legislative and municipal elections have been more competitive than presidential elections. It has also been observed that there has been an increase in voting in legislative elections: in 2000, 1,210,269 certified votes were cast; 1,398,726 in 2003; and 1,998,014 in 2006.

In elections for the national legislature, the gap between votes cast for ARENA and the FMLN has become increasingly narrow: in 2000, ARENA got only 0.9% more votes than the FMLN; in 2003, the FMLN, with 34% of the vote, moved ahead of ARENA, which got 32.9%; and in 2006, the FMLN edged out ARENA by 0.1% of the vote.

In 2006, PCN garnered 11.4% of the vote; PDC 6.9%; CDU-CD 3.1%; and the Partido Nacional Liberal (PNL) [Nacional Liberal Party] 0.1%.

Partido Político	Elección 2000		Elección 2003		Elección 2006	
	Votos válidos	%	Votos válidos	%	Votos válidos	%
ARENA	436,169	36.1	446,279	31.9	783,230	39.2
FMLN	426,289	35.2	475,130	34.0	785,072	39.3
PCN	106,802	8.8	181,167	13.0	228,196	11.4
PDC	87,074	7.2	101,854	7.3	138,538	6.9
CDU/CD	65,070	5.4	89,090	6.4	61,022	3.1
Otros	88,865	7.3	105,206	7.5	1,956	0.1
Total	1,210,269	100	1,398,726	100	1,998,014	100

Table I.5 Legislative election results (2000-2006).

Source: CIDAI (2006). "Las elecciones legislativas y municipales de 2006: polarización sociopolítica y erosión institucional". *Revista Estudios Centroamericanos*, No. 688-689, p 213.

By reason of current electoral system regulations, ARENA won the largest number of seats, 34, in the most recent elections, followed by the FMLN with 32; PCN 10, PDC 6, and CDU-CD 2. Although ARENA has the largest number of representatives, it did not achieve a simple majority,

which made it necessary for ARENA to join forces with other political groups. On the other hand, the number of seats won by the FMLN has allowed it to maintain its status as the qualified majority in Legislative Assembly voting.

A review of the number of seats won in the Legislative Assembly by competing parties in the last three elections indicates that ARENA won 29 in 2000, lost two seats in 2003, and won back seven in 2006. The FMLN won 31 seats in both 2000 and 2003, and gained one more in 2006. PCN won 14 seats in 2000, two more in 2003, and lost six in 2006. PDC won 5 seats in 2000, lost one in 2003, and won back two in 2006. CD-CDU won three seats in 2000, gained two more in 2003, and lost three in 2006.

Partidos	Año de la elección		
	2000	2003	2006
ARENA	29	27	34
FMLN	31	31	32
PCN	14	16	10
PDC	5	4	6
CD/CDU	3	5	2
PNL	--- (a)	--- (a)	0
Otros	2	1	---
Total	84	84	84

Table I.6 Number of representatives elected, by party, 2000-2006.

Source: CIDAI (2006). “Las elecciones legislativas y municipales de 2006: polarización sociopolítica y erosión institucional”. Revista Estudios Centroamericanos, No. 688-689, p 212.

(a) Did not participate

In the March, 2006 elections, an increase in voting was observed; from 1,217,996 certified votes cast in 2000, to 1,383,174 in 2003, and 2,000,900 in 2006. In municipal elections in 2006, ARENA received the highest number of votes (791,371) followed by the FMLN (670,515 votes). As percentages of the vote, the distribution is as follows: ARENA 39.6%, FMLN 33.5%, PCN 15.4%, PDC 8.7%, CDU/CD 1.5% and others 1.3%.

Partido Político	Elección 2000		Elección 2003		Elección 2006	
	Votos válidos	%	Votos válidos	%	Votos válidos	%
ARENA	438,859	36.0	483,120	34.9	791,361	39.6
FMLN	338,950	27.8	465,970	33.7	670,711	33.5
PCN	123,945	10.2	205,804	14.9	307,330	15.4
PDC	95,509	7.8	103,567	7.5	173,982	8.7
CDU/CD	41,549	3.4	37,392	2.7	30,778	1.5
Otros	40,060	3.3	37,498	2.7	26,738	1.3
Total	1,217,996	100	1,383,174	100	2,000,900	100

Table I.7 Municipal election results, 2000-2006.

Source: CIDAI (2006). “Las elecciones legislativas y municipales de 2006: polarización sociopolítica y erosión institucional”. Revista Estudios Centroamericanos, No. 688-689, p 210.

Because of current electoral rules, the distribution of mayoralties by party in 2006 was as follows: ARENA won 147, the FMLN 59, PCN 39, PDC 14, and CD/CDU 3.

A look at the number of mayoralties won by the competing parties in the last three elections shows that ARENA won 127 in 2000, lost 16 of these in 2003, and won back 36 in 2006. The FMLN won 79 in 2000, lost five in 2003, and lost fifteen more in 2006 although it retained the capital city, several municipalities in the metropolitan area, and some agency directors. PCN won 33 in 2000, 20 more in 2003, and lost 14 in 2006. PDC won 16 in 2000, two more in 2003, and lost 4 in 2006. CD/CDU won 4 in both 2000 and 2003 and lost one in 2006.

Partido Político	Año de la elección		
	2000	2003	2006
ARENA	127	111	147
FMLN	79 (a)	74 (a)	59 (b)
PCN	33	53	39
PDC	16	18(c)	14
CD/CDU	4	4	3(d)
Otros partidos	3	2	---
Total	262	262	262

Table I.8 Number of mayoralties won , by party Elections 2000-2006.

Source: CIDAI (2006). “Las elecciones legislativas y municipales de 2006: polarización sociopolítica y erosión institucional”. Revista Estudios Centroamericanos, No. 688-689, p 209.

- 12 coalition mayoralties.
- 5 coalition mayoralties.
- 4 coalition mayoralties.
- 1 coalition mayoralty.

1.2 The study of political culture in El Salvador

The study of political culture is relatively new in El Salvador. The first study undertaken was in the middle of 1989 when the war was ongoing. At that time, the director of the Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública, Ignacio Martín-Baró, did a study based on a national survey regarding Salvadorans’ political values. That study, which was not able to be published due to the sudden passing of the author, was the first systematic effort to study the norms and values that determine the political behavior of the population.

In 1991, the first attempt was made at gathering data about Salvadoran political culture and studying them, even in the midst of the ongoing civil war. This study took shape in the book entitled *Perspectivas para una democracia estable en El Salvador*, published by Seligson and Córdova in 1992. This tome became part of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) coordinated by Professor Seligson which produced three reports on the status of political culture in El Salvador in 1995, 1999, and 2004.

Throughout the 1990s and at the beginning of this decade, other institutions joined in the efforts to study post-war political culture in El Salvador. Among them are the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales Programa El Salvador, the Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo and the Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública de la Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas. The following is a partial list of studies done by these institutions:

Berrocal, E. y González, Luis Armando. (2000). La democracia y su cultura política. *Estudios Centroamericanos (ECA)*, 527-536, p. 619-620.

Briones, Carlos y Ramos, Carlos Guillermo. (1999). Las elites: percepciones y actitudes sobre los procesos de cambio y de transformación institucional en El Salvador. San Salvador: FLACSO.

Coleman, Kenneth; Cruz, José Miguel y Moore, Peter. (1996). Retos para consolidar la democracia en El Salvador. *Estudios Centroamericanos (ECA)*, 571-572, p 415-440.

CIDAI. (2006). Democratización y cultura política en El Salvador. *Estudios Centroamericanos (ECA)*, 688-689, pp 309-313.

Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (2000). El problema del abstencionismo en El Salvador. Ponencia presentada en el XXII Congreso de LASA, Miami, 15-19 de marzo de 2000.

Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (1999). Una aproximación teórico-metodológica para el estudio sobre la cultura política en torno a la descentralización en Centroamérica. San Salvador: mimeo.

Córdova, Ricardo. (1998). Las bases empíricas de la democracia y la cultura política en El Salvador. En: F. Rodríguez; S. Castro y R. Espinosa (eds.). *El sentir democrático. Estudios sobre cultura política centroamericana*. San José: Editorial Fundación UNA.

Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Orellana, Víctor Antonio. (2001). *Cultura política, gobierno local y descentralización. El Salvador. Volumen III*. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO y FLACSO-Programa El Salvador.

Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Seligson, Mitchell. (2001). *Cultura política, gobierno local y descentralización. América Central. Volumen I*. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO y FLACSO-Programa El Salvador.

Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Cruz, José Miguel. (2005). *La Cultura Política de la Democracia en El Salvador, 2004*. San Salvador, FUNDAUNGO, IUDOP, Universidad de Vanderbilt, ARD y CREA International.

Cruz, José Miguel. (2003). Violencia y democratización en Centroamérica: el impacto del crimen en la legitimidad de los regímenes de posguerra. *América Latina Hoy*, 35, p 19-59.

Cruz, José Miguel. (2002). ¿Para qué sirve la democracia? La cultura política de los jóvenes del Área Metropolitana de San Salvador. En: F. Rodríguez; S. Castro y J. Madrigal (eds.). *Con la*

herencia de la paz. Cultura política de la juventud centroamericana. San José: Editorial Fundación UNA.

Cruz, José Miguel. (2001). *¿Elecciones para qué? El impacto de la cultura política salvadoreña en el ciclo electoral 1999-2000.* San Salvador: FLACSO-Programa El Salvador.

Cruz, José Miguel. (2001). *Cultura política y consolidación de la democracia en El Salvador: capital social y confianza institucional a finales de los noventa.* Trabajo preparado para el Informe de Desarrollo Humano 2001. San Salvador: mimeo.

Cruz, José Miguel. (1999). *El autoritarismo en la posguerra: un estudio de las actitudes de los salvadoreños. Estudios Centroamericanos (ECA), 603, p 95-106.*

Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública. [IUDOP]. (1999). *Encuesta de valores. Serie de informes 80.* San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA.

Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública. [IUDOP]. (1998). *Encuesta sobre cultura política. Serie de informes 71.* San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA.

Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública. [IUDOP]. (1997). *Encuesta sobre gobernabilidad y expectativas hacia las nuevas autoridades municipales. Serie de informes 64.* San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA.

PNUD. (2003). *Estado de la gobernabilidad democrática en El Salvador. (Capítulo 9).* En: *Informe sobre desarrollo humano. El Salvador 2003.* San Salvador: PNUD.

Roggenbuck, Stefan. (ed.). (1995). *Cultura política en El Salvador.* San Salvador: Fundación Konrad Adenauer.

Santacruz Giralt, María. (2003). *Estudio sobre las clases medias y su comportamiento político.* San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA, FUNDAUNGO, Fundación Friedrich Ebert.

Seligson, Mitchell; Cruz, José Miguel y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (2000). *Auditoría de la democracia El Salvador 1999.* San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO, IUDOP y Universidad de Pittsburgh.

Seligson, Mitchell y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (1995). *El Salvador: de la guerra a la paz. Una cultura política en transición.* San Salvador: IDELA, Universidad de Pittsburgh y FUNDAUNGO.

Seligson, Mitchell y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (1992). *Perspectivas para una democracia estable en El Salvador.* San Salvador: IDELA.

These studies have demonstrated a slow but sustained growth in support for the system since the end of the civil war. However, the numbers from 2006 show significant declines. The studies report advances in levels of civic participation in local recreational areas, but they also contain

opinions regarding democracy and satisfaction with its performance that suggest that despite the advances, El Salvador still faces many challenges in the process of strengthening its democracy. In fact, according to the report on human development in El Salvador published by the PNUD in 2003, the level of democratic political culture is still low, which constitutes a challenge to democratic governance in the country. The PNUD adds that “the deficit of democratic civic culture existing in El Salvador makes one think that the eventual return of a reformulated authoritarian government might find fertile ground for rapid development and expansion. At the same time, this is linked to the low levels of trust in political parties and their performance, as has been clearly expressed in the Legislative Assembly.”¹⁴

Beyond the acceptance or rejection of these assertions, the persistence of low levels of trust in national institutions, the presence of certain authoritarian attitudes, and the ambiguity of a segment of the population in its support of democracy all constitute challenges for the strengthening of democracy in El Salvador.

The purpose of this new study is to enhance understanding of the development of the political culture of democracy in El Salvador. In its favor, it not only constitutes one of the largest, most inclusive studies on this topic but also is the fifth in a national series, which allows for a view of the times in which citizens’ political attitudes have evolved during El Salvador’s post-war years.

¹⁴ Op. Cit., p 280.

II. Survey methodology

Between June 27 and July 22, 2006 the University Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP) of the Central American University “Jose Simeón Cañas” (UCA), carried out the fieldwork for the study “The Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador, 2006”. For the development of this survey, the data was gathered using PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants), commonly called “Palm Pilots.”

The survey is part of the studies on political culture developed in El Salvador by the Latin American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University which, as explained in the previous chapter, began in 1991 with the aim of obtaining knowledge about the political culture in El Salvador. In this section, the characteristics of the final sample obtained from the present study are described and compared to the characteristics of the adult population in 2006.¹⁵

2.1 Characteristics of the final sample

The final sample obtained contains 1,729 certified interviews and is representative of the adult population over age 18 of El Salvador. The margin of error is estimated at ± 0.024 (or 2.4%). Of those interviewed, 47.8% are men and 52.2% are women; 59.4% live in urban areas while 40.6% live in rural areas. These data correspond to the national distribution of the adult population, according to projections from the Statistics and Census Bureau which affirm that 48% of adults over age 18 in El Salvador are male and 52% are female, and that 62% of the population lives in urban areas while 38% live in rural areas. Table II.1 at the end of this section presents some comparisons between the distribution of demographic variables of the population and the sample taken for the survey.

¹⁵ For more details concerning methodological aspects of the research, see Appendix A: Descripción metodológica del estudio.




Figure II.1. Distribution of survey respondents, by gender.

Slightly more than a quarter (28.7%) of those surveyed are young people between 18 and 25 years old. A similar number (25.6%) are individuals between 26 and 35; the rest are individuals over age 35.




Figure II.2 Distribution of survey subjects by age.

Three out of ten of those surveyed have finished elementary school (32.2%) while 42.5% have attended high school. The differences between the percentages of persons who have been able to go to college (14.5%) and those who have had no formal education (10.8%) does not represent a large difference in comparative terms.




Figure II.3 Distribution of survey subjects by level of education.

Most (almost 50%) of the population surveyed have a family income of less than 144 dollars per month. About one third of those surveyed (39%) have a family income between 144 and 576 dollars per month. The monthly income of a little more than 10% of those surveyed exceeds 576 dollars.




Figure II.4 Distribution of survey subjects by monthly family income

Only a quarter of those surveyed live in the capital city (26.4%). One in ten live in large cities and a similar number live in small cities. Fourteen and nine-tenths percent live in medium sized cities while the rest of those surveyed (40.6%) live in rural areas.




Figure II.5 Distribution of survey subject by city size.

2.2 Comparison of sample characteristics with population characteristics

The following is a comparison of the characteristics of the sample with those of the country's population. This comparison was done for the purpose of confirming that the sample obtained is truly representative of the populational universe. For this purpose, data obtained from the Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EHPM)¹⁶ [Multi-purpose Home Survey] from 2004, the most recent data available, and from the Proyección de Población de la Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTYC) [Population Projection of the Statistics and Census Bureau].

Características	Datos de la población	Muestra
N	4,123,308	1,729
Sexo (%)		
Hombre	48.0	47.8
Mujer	52.0	52.2
Edad (%)		
18-34 años	47.5	51.6
35 años y más	52.5	48.4
Nivel educativo (%)		
Ninguno	21.2	10.8
Primaria	38.0	32.2
Plan básico	15.9	17.9
Bachillerato	16.2	24.6
Superior	8.7	14.5
Área (%)		
Urbana	62.0	59.4
Rural	38.0	40.6
Departamento (%)		
Ahuachapán	4.74	6.5
Santa Ana	8.96	12.2
Sonsonate	6.96	11.7
Chalatenango	2.59	2.9
La Libertad	11.41	7.9
San Salvador	34.68	29.4
Cuscatlán	2.89	2.6
La Paz	4.26	2.2
Cabañas	1.97	1.6
San Vicente	2.34	1.3
Usulután	4.98	4.5

¹⁶ Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos [DIGESTYC]. (2004). *Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples 2004 (EHPM)*. San Salvador: Ministerio de Economía.

San Miguel	7.78	9.1
Morazán	2.33	2.3
La Unión	4.12	5.6
Agua potable dentro de la vivienda (%)	57.94	65.2

Table II.1 Characteristics obtained from the sample and the population according to EHPM data and the DIGESTYC population projection.

Table II.1, shows that the distribution of the sample taken from the study corresponds almost exactly with some of the demographic data from the distribution reported by the DIGESTYC'S population projection. Nevertheless, in the category of educational level, there are several differences between the group of persons with no formal education (“none”) and the group of persons who have high school and college education. The final sample underestimates the first group (no formal education) and overestimates the second group (high school and college). Regarding the distribution by municipality, the resulting sample differs notably in two counties: San Salvador and Sonsonete. In the first, the true weight of the country is underestimated while in the second it is overestimated.

III. Concepts of democracy

In recent years there has been an ongoing debate regarding the meaning of the word “democracy” for the citizens in El Salvador. This debate arose in large part from the fact that numerous studies of political culture and public opinion surveys have made inquiries as to the level of citizen support for democracy, satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance, and their level of commitment to so-called democratic values. The questions are designed and then posed to survey subjects without knowing exactly what citizens understand by “democracy” or “democratic attitudes.”

In practice, as some scholars have suggested,¹⁷ democracy can have a variety of meanings and interpretations. In one study on the political culture of youth in Central America done by Rodríguez and Madrigal at the beginning of this decade, it was found that not all young people had the same definition of democracy and that the most common definitions varied from one country to another. Thus, for example, while in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua the most frequent response was that democracy means freedom of expression, with percentages ranging from 11% to 22 %, in Costa Rica about one third of young people surveyed defined democracy as the chance to be free; and 15.4% of young Salvadorans conceptualize democracy as freedom of expression.¹⁸ However, this study found that the majority of Central American youth was unable to define “democracy.” Other studies had similar results even among adult citizens. While widely spoken of, there is no consensus in the general population regarding what democracy truly is.

Thus, in this new edition of the ongoing research on political culture in El Salvador, we opted to begin the analysis of the results by exploring Salvadoran citizens’ concepts of democracy. This chapter is divided in four sections: the first presents the results of concepts of democracy among the Salvadoran population; in the second, the results regarding the opinions about democracy, its performance, and support for democracy among the populace are presented; in the third section we attempt to link the notion of democracy to the key variables of support for the system and tolerance; and finally, we offer our conclusions.

3.1 Salvadorans’ definitions of democracy

The basic issue addressed in this section is what democracy means to the citizens of this small Central American country. For this purpose, a small battery of questions was designed for the survey to gather the ideas that Salvadorans have of democracy. There are two main questions, and the inquiry into the meaning of democracy was initiated with the following question:

¹⁷ See: Bratton, Michael. (2002). “Wide but Shallow: Popular Support for Democracy in Africa”. Afrobarometer Paper No. 19. Michigan: Michigan State University.

¹⁸ See: Rodríguez, Florisabel y Madrigal, Johnny. (2003). “Los hijos y las hijas de la democracia: estudio comparativo”. Cuadernos de trabajo 2003-10. San José: Procesos. See also for El Salvador: Cruz, José Miguel. (2002). *¿Para qué sirve la democracia? La cultura política de los jóvenes del Área Metropolitana de San Salvador*. Cuadernos de trabajo 2002-02. San José: Procesos.

“DEM13 (a, b, and c). Briefly, what does democracy mean to you? [NOTE: Do not read choices. After the first and second responses, ask, “Does it mean anything else?”] Accept three answers.”

Given the breadth of the question, the survey had a wide range of possible answers that were not suggested to the respondents. The survey taker had to listen to the answer given and mark the corresponding answer choice; if there was no corresponding choice, the surveyor had to mark the alternative answers. As the question itself indicated, the survey subject could write three different meanings in order to get a wide scope of opinions regarding what the idea of democracy evokes. Nevertheless, for the purposes of analysis, the survey itself asked respondents to select the most important ideas among those s/he had indicated. To this end, the following question was asked:

“DEM13D. Of these meanings of democracy that you have given, in your opinion which one is the most important? [Ask only if two or three answers were given for the previous question. Write the code.] 88. NS 99. INAP [One answer or no response].”

The analysis of what Salvadoran citizens understand by democracy is done on the basis of question DEM13D, taking into account the meanings judged most important by the survey subjects. These individuals offered a wide array of opinions of democracy. Table III.1 shows the results of the responses as they were given to the survey taker from the choices offered. The most frequent responses at 21.6% (representing about one fifth of the Salvadoran population) was “freedom of expression, of choice, and the right to vote.” On the other hand for 17.9% of the respondents, democracy has no meaning; in other words, it is incomprehensible for the citizens. Ten and eight tenths percent of respondents said that democracy meant freedom without specifying what kind of freedom; 8.9% said that democracy meant living in peace, without war, while 6.5% asserted that democracy means equality. A small percentage, 2.7% said that democracy was the same as well being, economic progress, and growth. However, these were not the only answers given; the rest of the survey respondents gave a wide array of answers to define democracy: independence, employment, various kinds of equality, various kinds of liberty, rights, participation, justice, human rights, and others. Ten and six tenths percent was grouped as an “others” response.

	Frecuencia	Porcentaje válido
Libertad de expresión/voto/elegir/derechos humanos	297	21.6
No tiene ningún significado	246	17.9
Libertad (sin decir de qué tipo)	149	10.8
Otra respuesta	146	10.6
Vivir en paz, sin guerra	122	8.9
Igualdad (sin especificar)	90	6.5
Bienestar, progreso económico, crecimiento	37	2.7
Participación (sin decir qué tipo)	32	2.3
Poder del pueblo	31	2.3
Libertad económica	22	1.6
Derechos humanos, respeto a los derechos	20	1.5
Igualdad de género	19	1.4
Elecciones, voto	18	1.3
Derecho de escoger líderes	15	1.1
Igualdad frente a las leyes	15	1.1
Ser independientes	13	.9
Igualdad económica, de clases	13	.9
Libertad de movimiento	12	.9
Obedecer la ley, menos corrupción	10	.7
Elecciones libres	9	.7
Participación de las minorías	9	.7
Libertad, falta de	8	.6
Trabajo, más oportunidad de	8	.6
Justicia	8	.6
Desorden, falta de justicia, corrupción	7	.5
Igualdad, falta de, desigualdad	6	.4
Igualdad de razas o étnica	5	.4
Bienestar, falta de, no hay progreso económico	3	.2
Trabajo, falta de	2	.1
Gobierno no militar	2	.1
Capitalismo	1	.1
Limitaciones de participación	1	.1
Total	1376	100

Table III.1. What does democracy mean to you?

Note: Individuals who did not answer the question were not included, which represents 20.4% of the total population.

The scope of the responses indicates a lack of consensus among the public regarding the meaning of democracy for Salvadoran citizens and in some ways is a signal of the challenge that

understanding democracy represents. Thus, for the purpose of analysis and to organize the answers and convert them into a more understandable representation, the answers given were categorized using a plan proposed by Seligson and Sarsfield¹⁹ by which citizen responses can be grouped in four distinct categories. In Table III.2, the various meanings assigned to each of the four categories can be seen. The first are what could be termed practical or utilitarian definitions of democracy. These are based on opinions concerning political or economic performance of systems; for example, responses that pointed to job opportunities or economic well being would be placed in this category. The second refers to standard or axiomatic definitions of democracy; these allude to notions that are not linked to practical aspects but rather to principles such as “equality,” “human rights,” and elections. The third is called the negative or pejorative category, meaning unfavorable definitions of democracy such as disorder, injustice, corruption, war, and others. The fourth category contains, as can be seen in the previous table, answers that indicate that democracy has no meaning for a sizable number of respondents.

Categoría	Significados
Negativa	Falta de libertad
	Falta de bienestar, no hay progreso económico
	Falta de trabajo
	Desorden, falta de justicia
	Guerra, invasiones
	Falta de igualdad
	Elecciones fraudulentas
	Limitaciones de participación
Vacía	No tiene ningún significado
	Otras respuestas
	No sabe, no responde
Utilitaria	Libertad económica
	Bienestar, progreso económico, crecimiento
	Capitalismo
	Libre comercio, libre negocio
	Más trabajo, más oportunidades
Normativa	Libertad
	Libertad de expresión
	Libertad de movimiento
	Ser independientes

¹⁹ Seligson, Mitchell A. y Sarsfield, Rodolfo. (2006). CAM/Democracy Study: Outline of Required Chapters. (Mimeo).

	Derecho de escoger líderes
	Elecciones, votar
	Elecciones libres
	Igualdad
	Igualdad económica, de clases
	Igualdad de género
	Igualdad frente a las leyes
	Igualdad étnica
	Participación
	Participación de las minorías
	Poder del pueblo
	Respeto a los derechos humanos
	Justicia
	Obedecer la ley
	Vivir en paz

Table III.2 The meaning of democracy, by category.

Classified in this manner, the results show that over half of Salvadoran citizens (51.4%) define democracy in standard terms such as freedom, equality, justice, and human rights. On the other hand, only 3.9% offered utilitarian definitions such as jobs and economic progress. Interestingly, close to half of the population (43.1%) has no clear definition of democracy, which may mean that this segment of the population does not know what democracy is or that they are not interested in defining it.




Figure III.1 Alternate concepts of democracy in El Salvador, 2006.

It is interesting to compare the results from El Salvador to the rest of the countries included in the 2006 studies. Figure III.2 shows that El Salvador has a higher percentage of citizens who are unable to define democracy, and for this reason, they gave standard answers less frequently. From this it might be inferred that it is more difficult for Salvadorans to understand what democracy is than for citizens of other nationalities.




Figure III.2 A comparative view of alternative concepts of democracy, 2006.

How, then, are these notions about democracy distributed among the Salvadoran population? This report is based on the premise that the distribution of the definitions of democracy is not equal for all Salvadoran social groups and that it is possible to find different ways to conceptualize democracy. Indeed, an analysis of the responses concerning the definition of democracy as a function of the demographic variables found that some of them—gender, educational level, urban/rural residence, and ideology—are related to the definitions given. Other variables such as age and income level are not as closely related. Thus, it can be said the various social groups all showed a very similar distribution in their opinions about democracy.




Figure III.3. Concepts of democracy according to gender, 2006.

With regard to gender, however, the results reveal important differences, above all concerning the standard definitions of democracy as well as in the frequency of the response that democracy has no meaning. The figure above shows that men tend to give standard definitions more frequently than women, 60% and 44%, respectively. Although these are the definitions most frequently offered, the results indicate that the differences are statistically significant. The other important difference is in the responses indicating that the citizens could not define democracy or said it had no meaning. Here, women responded this way more frequently (50.7%) than men (34.8%). Compared to the male respondents, the women more frequently did not respond to the question about what they understand by “democracy.”

Regarding the utilitarian and negative definitions, the results do not reveal important differences between men and women since the frequency of responses is so small that important comparisons cannot be made. In sum, this first analysis indicates that Salvadoran men tend to conceive of democracy in standard ways more frequently than do women; on the other hand, women tend not to have definitions of democracy.

The explanation for this phenomenon can probably be found in the educational level of the respondents. The study of political culture in El Salvador, 2006 reveals that what citizens understand by “democracy” is strongly linked to their levels of formal education. As can be observed in Figure III.4, as educational levels rise, the number of responses indicating no definition or no meaning for democracy decreases. For example, more than 64% of those with no formal education could offer no definition of democracy, but only 12.4% among those with college studies could not define it. On the other hand, level of education is also linked to standard definitions of democracy as well; as educational level rises, so do the number of standard definitions given by those with college studies. Only 33% of those without formal

education gave standard definitions while 81% of college educated subjects gave this type of definition.




Figure III.4 Concepts of democracy by educational level, 2006.

Among the remainder of the definitions of democracy, the differences are so small that it is not possible to draw any conclusions about them. In El Salvador, the conceptualization of democracy is actually one of two options: a standard response or a response of no concept. In either case, this factor would explain in part the differences between men and women described earlier. On average, Salvadoran women have less access to education and have lower levels of education than men. This might explain why women do not or cannot offer more responses about the meaning of democracy.

This same explanation applies when the results are cross-referenced with areas of residence—urban or rural. Figure III.5 shows that individuals who live in rural areas tend not to be able to answer this item (54%) or offer standard responses (slightly more than 40%) while slightly more than 60% of individuals from urban areas offered standard responses, and less than 40% could not respond. Although the differences are less marked when compared with levels of education, it is clear that there are ample differences among the ways urban and rural residents define democracy.

An even sharper difference can be seen when the results are cross-referenced with city and community size where survey subjects live. For example in metropolitan San Salvador and in other large cities, standard responses are approximately 60% while failure or inability to answer was about 33%. On the other hand, in medium and small sized cities, about 53% gave standard responses, and failure or inability to answer was 39%. In rural areas, the highest number of responses were that democracy had no meaning.




Figure III.5 Concepts of democracy by urban or rural zones, 2006.

A variable that is found to be linked to the manner in which citizens define democracy, however, is political ideology, that is, an individual’s perception of where s/he falls on the left-right scale²⁰ Figure III.6 demonstrates that the standard definitions of democracy were given significantly more often among Salvadorans who place themselves on the left side of the scale (62.9%); the percentage drops to 53.3% for those who place themselves in the center and drops even further for those who place themselves on the right (46.5%). For failure or inability to answer, the tendency is reversed. Forty-nine percent of those on the right do not offer clear definitions of democracy whereas 38.2% of those in the center and 31.9% of those on the left do not either. In general, this may suggest that among those on the right, the term “democracy” does not have as clear a meaning as it does for the rest; those on the left, on the other hand, seem to be anchored to standard concepts of democracy.

²⁰ Question L1 on the questionnaire.




Figure III.6 Concepts of democracy according to ideology, 2006.

Finally, as previously mentioned, other variables do not seem to be linked to the definitions of democracy, and aside from the variables discussed above, most individuals tend to define democracy either in standard ways or are unable to offer a clear definition. The critical variable in the differentiation of citizen opinion is education. Practical or negative definitions are not common among Salvadorans; the predominant view of democracy among them, when offered, is an ideal such as liberty, justice, or equality.

The following question is, then: Is the conceptualization of democracy more closely linked to individuals’ opinions about the performance of democratic governance or to their preference for democracy over other types of government? This relevant issue will be discussed in the next section.

3.2 Opinions of democracy

The study of political culture in El Salvador 2006 asked citizens about various aspects related to democracy and its performance in El Salvador. First, opinions were gathered regarding how satisfied citizens feel with democracy in their country. They were asked: “PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied with the performance of democratic governance in El Salvador?”

The results reveal that only 4% of the population feel very satisfied with the performance of democracy; 42.6% satisfied; 43.2% unsatisfied; and 10.2% very unsatisfied. This means that that the population is about evenly split on this issue.




Figure III.7 Satisfaction with democracy in El Salvador, 2006.

A comparison of these results with those of 2004 indicates that lack of satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance has risen. In 2004, 38% said that they were unsatisfied or very unsatisfied, meaning that the remaining 62% of the population was satisfied or very satisfied. In Figure III.7 satisfaction shows a drop of 16 percentage points.

The analysis of these responses as a function of the concepts of democracy shows that there are important differences regarding satisfaction with its performance. In Table III.3, those who do not have a clear idea about what democracy is, meaning those who left the item blank, tend to say that they are more satisfied with the performance of democratic governance in El Salvador (53.4%) than those who gave standard answers (41.3% expressed satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance). These differences are statistically significant, at least with regard to the comparison between individuals who gave standard answers and those who left the item blank.

These results could be influenced by the fact that those who give standard definitions of democracy tend to have more education and thus are more demanding in their expectations regarding the political performance of government. In any case, the results indicate that having a standard notion of democracy makes educated citizens have somewhat higher expectations than those who have no notion about democracy.

Concepciones alternativas de la democracia	Satisfacción con la democracia				Total
	Muy satisfecho	Satisfecho	Insatisfecho	Muy insatisfecho	
Negativo	12.5%	25.0%	54.2%	8.3%	100.0%
Vacío	5.2%	48.2%	38.3%	8.3%	100.0%
Utilitario	3.0%	45.5%	40.9%	10.6%	100.0%
Normativo	3.0%	38.3%	47.0%	11.7%	100.0%
Todos	4.0%	42.6%	43.2%	10.2%	100.0%

Table III.3 Satisfaction with democracy in El Salvador according to concept of democracy, 2006.

From another perspective, when citizens were asked their opinion about how democratic they think the country is, the highest number answered that they think that El Salvador is somewhat democratic (36.8%), followed by a similar percentage (36.4%) that see the country as not very democratic; a relatively small percentage (11.9%) think the country is not at all democratic while 14.8% feel that it is very democratic. Although this last group is far from being the majority, it shows that almost one in six has a very positive view of democracy in El Salvador




Figure III.8 Opinion of how democratic El Salvador is, 2006.

A comparison of these results with those of 2004 reveals that fundamental differences are tied to the percentages of persons who think that the country is very democratic. In 2004, 21% responded that El Salvador is a very democratic country compared to 14.8% in 2006. Also, in 2004, 43% of the population thought that the country was not very democratic or not at all democratic while in 2006 the percentage rises to 47.3%. Although the comparison shows that

the results are close to the limits of statistical significance, it also shows a shift toward being more critical of how democratic the country is.

This question was also tied to the results of the categorization of responses to question DEM13D, regarding the definitions of democracy in an attempt to determine whether citizens' concepts of democracy are related to the opinions of how democratic El Salvador is. The respective cross references did not yield any overwhelming evidence of significant differences between how democracy is understood and citizen opinions of how democratic the country is.²¹ Whether their concepts of democracy are standard, utilitarian, negative, or null, the results are divided on how democratic the country is.

The survey also explored Salvadorans' preferences regarding the type of political regime that they think the country should have. To this end, a series of questions was asked among which two were presented as very relevant: The first was posed as follows: "DEM2. With which of the following two sentences do you agree more? (1) For persons like yourself, one form of government is as good as another; and (2) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic government. The second question was posed as follows: "AUT1. There are those who say that we need a strongman who does not need to be elected by popular vote. Others say that even though things are not going well, an electoral democracy, in other words elections by popular vote, is always best. What do you think about this? (1) We need a strongman who does not need to be elected; (2) Electoral democracy is the best type of government."

The results of the first question reveal that 72% prefer a democracy while only 12.4% would prefer an authoritarian government; 14.9% that it made no difference to them whether the government is democratic or authoritarian.

These results become even more interesting when compared to the results of the 2004 study. Figure III.9 shows that support for a democratic regime is 75.4% while support for an authoritarian government or indifference to regime type are 13.5% and 11% respectively. This shows that support for democracy diminished slightly over a two-year period although not enough to be considered statistically significant. However, the percentage of people expressing indifference as to regime type did rise significantly over that period. This indicates that some Salvadorans feel more indifferent about democracy than in the past, but in general terms, the majority continues to favor democracy as the preferred type of regime.

All of this means that public assertions favoring democracy declined over a two-year period although not enough to be statistically significant. Nonetheless, what has indeed risen significantly from 2004 is the percentage of persons who don't care whether the government is democratic or not. In any case, the data seem to show that if Salvadorans have become more

²¹ In fact, a Chi-square test proved a significance of less than .05, but the differences between the two main categories were narrow, and the high intervals of confidence produced by the lack of cases in the "negative" and "utilitarian" categories of the definitions of democracy made it impossible to say with any certainty that the definitions of democracy divide the population regarding their opinions about the democratic character of El Salvador.

indifferent to democracy than in the past, overall, the majority continues to favor democracy as the preferred regime type.




Figure III.9. Preferred regime type by survey year, 2004 y 2006.

How does this tie in with the definitions of democracy? The results show that those who have no clear idea of what democracy is, or left the response blank, are much less likely to favor a democratic regime than persons who offer standard, practical, or even negative definitions. Sixty-three and three tenths percent of those who were unable to define democracy chose it as the preferred type of government versus 79.9% who defined democracy in standard terms; in the same way, more than 20% of those who left the item blank said that they do not care what type of government the country has while only 19% who gave standard or practical answers opted for that choice. Comparisons to the rest of the groups that defined democracy negatively or practically do not make much sense because the number of cases is so small as to make them statistically insignificant.

In any event, it has been noted that support for democratic government varies as a function of people’s concepts of democracy. In spite of the preference for democracy, independently of their definitions of democracy, this preference is much stronger among those who offer standard definitions—liberty, equality, and justice, among others—than those who do not have a clear idea of the meaning of democracy

Concepción de democracia	Le da lo mismo	La democracia es preferible	Gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible
Negativa	7.4%	85.2%	7.4%
Vacia	21.6%	63.3%	15.1%
Utilitaria	13.6%	71.2%	15.2%
Normativa	9.9%	79.9%	10.2%

Table III.4 Preferred type of regime according to concepts of democracy, 2006.

The second question, which asked participants to express their preference for an unelected strongman or an electoral democracy, the results also show two aspects discussed earlier: on one hand, most Salvadorans continue to support electoral democracy; on the other, this support has decreased between 2004 and 2006. While this does not mean that Salvadorans have stopped supporting electoral democracy, it does indicate that support for an authoritarian figure as leader of the country has increased. Indeed, in 2004, 94.5% preferred electoral democracy; in 2006 this percentage dropped to 87.6%. In contrast, support for authoritarian government in 2004 was 5.5%, and in 2006 it was 12.4%, more than twice as much.




Figure III.10 Preference for a strongman or an electoral democracy by survey year, 2006.

In this instance, analysis of the responses regarding electoral support in conjunction with definitions of democracy also showed significant differences. In Table III.5, among those with an unclear idea of democracy, support reached 82%, much lower than the 97.1% for those who

offered standard definitions. Among the remaining responses, the confidence intervals are so wide that it is not possible to establish a statistically significant relationship. These results seem to confirm the tendency of stronger support for democracy as the preferred type of government from individuals who have standard concepts of democracy, while those who do not understand democracy tend to support it less.

Definiciones sobre democracia	Líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido	Democracia electoral es lo mejor
Negativa	11.1%	88.9%
Vacía	18.0%	82.0%
Utilitaria	6.0%	94.0%
Normativa	8.3%	97.1%

Table III.5 Preference for a strongman or an electoral democracy according to definitions of democracy, 2006.

3.3 Definitions of democracy and support for the system

In this section we will discuss the relation between the ideas Salvadoran citizens have about democracy and their attitudes concerning support for the system and tolerance. Although these attitude variables regarding support for the system and tolerance will be explored in more detail in the next chapter, this section will present the relationship between these variables and the definition of democracy.

In Figure III.11, support for the system is shown as a function of citizens' ideas about democracy. Even though some comparisons overlap due to the high level of variability among the categories with few cases, it is possible to find an important difference between two conceptual categories: the standard responses and the blank items. Salvadorans with standard ideas—liberty, equality, and justice—tend to show, among other things, somewhat less support for the system than the rest of the population, especially compared to those who are unable to define democracy. Indeed, those who cannot define it, generally tend to support the system. These results seem to contradict the tendencies found in previous analyses, according to which individuals who offer standard definitions of democracy support democratic government more than those who cannot define democracy.




Figure III.11 Support for the system according to concepts of democracy, 2006.

The answer to this apparent contradiction can be found in the notion that support for the system does not necessarily mean support of democracy. The support for the system variable refers to the system as it is constituted, democratic or not. When the results show that Salvadorans with standard ideas about democracy tend to express less support for the system, it probably means that they are critical of its performance with regard to their idealistic expressions of support for democratic government, as can be seen in previous data. Support for the system is, without a doubt, an important element within the attitudes of support for democracy, but in and of itself, it does not reflect support for democracy; rather, it reflects support for the institutional order established by the regime, beyond the democratic quality of the regime.

An analysis of the concepts of democracy as they relate to tolerance is shown in Figure III.12. Here, the results seem to confirm the reported tendencies: Salvadorans with standard concepts of democracy are higher on the scale of tolerance, meaning that they are more tolerant than the rest of the Salvadorans, and, in particular, than those who are unable to define democracy. Apparently, attitudes regarding political tolerance, which are essential to the performance of a democratic government, are anchored in standard ideas about democracy in El Salvador.




Figure III.12 Tolerance according to concepts of democracy, 2006.

All of the aforementioned suggests that Salvadorans' concepts of democracy are important not only for support for democratic government but also for the expression of basic attitudes about its performance, such as tolerance. It also suggests that those with standard concepts of democracy can be more critical of the system and may demand a much more democratic performance from it.

3.4 Conclusions

The results of this chapter have shown that although Salvadorans have diverse concepts of democracy, the standard concept prevails. However, they also indicate that an important segment of the population has no notion of the meaning of democracy. The standard definitions of democracy are most commonly associated with ideas about freedom—freedom of expression, association, and the like, and, indeed, peace, equality, and justice.

It is interesting to note that other expressions about democracy, such as practical and negative definitions, are not popular among Salvadorans. In fact, less than six percent offered this type of definition.

This chapter has also demonstrated that, in general, support for democracy, as much for a preferred regime type as for favoring an electoral democracy over a strongman, has decreased since 2004. Although most citizens continue consistently to support the idea of a democratic government, it is clear that there has been an increase in attitudes favoring the value of an authoritarian government. This development may have something to do with the slight but noticeable increase in levels of dissatisfaction with the performance of democratic governance.

In the end, all of this means that Salvadorans currently continue to support democracy strongly, but performance problems have made them more critical.

The survey also found a consistent relation between ideas about democracy and levels of support and with satisfaction. Individuals with standard concepts of democracy clearly tend to indicate more support for democratic government than the rest of the population, in particular individuals who are unclear about the meaning of democracy. The support of these persons for democracy as a preferred type of government, on the contrary, tends to be less solid. However, the results show that persons with standard concepts support the system less than those with no idea of the meaning of democracy, which suggests critical attitudes toward it and its performance. In the area of tolerance, the data presented support the hypothesis that those with standard ideas about democracy are more tolerant.

IV. Support for democracy

This chapter introduces the topic of how Salvadoran political attitudes support democratic political stability. First, the level of support for the system is examined; in the next section, the level of political tolerance is discussed. Then, the relationship between the level of support for the political system and the level of political tolerance is examined. Finally, the conclusions are presented.

4.1 Support for the system

The stability of a political system and its ability to overcome crises have been directly linked to legitimacy of the political system itself.²² Seymour Martin Lipset defined legitimacy as “the capacity of a system to generate and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate for society.”²³ Lipset’s hypothesis is that political systems viewed by citizens as legitimate can survive the worst crisis of effectivity while systems with low levels of legitimacy may collapse under the pressure of an economic crisis.

Lipset recognized that “once a system reaches a high degree of legitimacy, there is no guarantee that it cannot eventually be lost. Just as political systems can undergo a crisis of effectivity, they can undergo a legitimacy crisis as well.” Lipset asserted that effectivity crises in the long run “can erode legitimacy because legitimacy itself depends on the ability of a system to ‘fulfill the expectations of important groups.’ As a result, ‘repeated or long term disruptions in effectivity will threaten stability, even that of a legitimate system,’”²⁴

In order to analyze the belief in the legitimacy of the Salvadoran political system, a legitimacy scale called “Political Support/Alignment” will be used. This scale was developed by the Latin

²² This section is based on the conceptual framework developed in:

Seligson, Mitchell A. y Córdova, Ricardo. (1995). *El Salvador: De la guerra a la paz, una cultura política en transición*. San Salvador: Universidad de Pittsburgh, IDELA y FUNDAUNGO.

Seligson, Mitchell A. (1996). *Political Culture in Nicaragua: Transitions, 1991-1995*. Managua: mimeo, United States Agency for International Development.

Seligson, Mitchell A. y Córdova, Ricardo. (1995). Nicaragua 1991-1995: Una cultura política en transición. En: Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Maihold, Günther (compiladores). *Cultura política y transición democrática en Nicaragua*. Managua: Fundación Friedrich Ebert, FUNDAUNGO, Instituto de Estudios Nicaragüenses y Centro de Análisis Socio Cultural de la UCA-Managua.

Seligson, Mitchell A.; Cruz, José Miguel y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (2000). *Auditoría de la Democracia. El Salvador 1999*. San Salvador: Universidad de Pittsburgh, IUDOP y FUNDAUNGO.

Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Seligson, Mitchell A. (2001). *Cultura Política, gobierno local y descentralización. América Central. Volumen I*. San Salvador: FLACSO-Programa El Salvador. (In particular, Chapter 2: Valoraciones sobre la democracia y el sistema político).

Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Cruz, José Miguel. (2005). La cultura política de la democracia en El Salvador, 2004. San Salvador, USAID, IUDOP, FUNDAUNGO, Vanderbilt University, ARD y CREA International.

Seligson, Mitchell A. (2005). The political culture of democracy in Mexico, Central America and Colombia, 2004. Vanderbilt University.

²³ See: Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1981). *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1994). The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited. *American Sociological Review*, 5. Pp. 1-22.

²⁴ Seligson, Mitchell A.; Cruz, José Miguel y Córdova Macías, Ricardo (2000). Op. Cit. pp. 55-56.

American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University and has been used in several international comparative studies.²⁵ It measures the level of citizens' support for their system of government without regard to its current administration. In the literature of political science, this phenomenon is called "diffuse support" or "support for the system."²⁶ The scale is based on five items, each measured on a six point scale from "not at all" to "very much." The questions are as follows:

- "B1. To what extent do you believe that the courts in El Salvador guarantee fair trials?
- B2. To what extent do you respect El Salvador's political institutions?
- B3. To what extent do you believe that basic citizen rights are well protected by the Salvadoran political system?
- B4. How proud are you to live under the Salvadoran political system?
- B6. To what extent do you think the Salvadoran political system should be supported?²⁷

The coding system of these variables was originally based on a 1-7 scale, but to make the results more understandable, they have been converted to a more familiar 0-100 metric scale.²⁸

The figure that follows presents the averages obtained for each question: courts (45.1) and fundamental rights (45.1) are the lowest while pride averaged 52.7, followed by support (63.5); institutions averaged highest at 70.2.

²⁵ See: Seligson, Mitchell A. (1983). On the Measurement of Diffuse Support: Some Evidence from Mexico. *Social Indicators Research*, 12. Pp. 1-24.

Seligson, Mitchell A. y Muller, Edward N. (1987). *Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica 1978-1983*. International Studies Quarterly. Pp. 301-326.

Muller, Edward N.; Jukam, Thomas O. y Seligson, Mitchell A. (1982). Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A comparative Analysis. *American Journal of Political Science* 26. Pp. 240-264.

Booth, John A. y Seligson, Mitchell A. (1993). Political Culture and Democratization: Evidence from México, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, en: L. Diamond (ed.). *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Pp. 107-138.

Finkel, Steven; Muller, Edward. y Seligson, Mitchell A. (1989). Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica. *British Journal of Political Science*, 19. Pp. 560-551.

Seligson, Mitchell A. (2002). Trouble in Paradise: The Impact of the Erosion of System Support in Costa Rica, 1978-1999. *Latin American Research Review*, 37, No. 1.

Seligson, Mitchell A. (2005). Opus Cit.

²⁶ Easton, David. (1975). A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support. *British Journal of Political Science*, 5, Pp. 435-457.

²⁷ Series B1, B2, B3, B4 y B6 on the questionnaire.

²⁸ A measure of 1 point was subtracted from each variable to give all of them a range from 0-6; the resulting number was divided by 6 to give the scale a range of 0-1, which multiplied by 100 produced a range of 0-100.




Figure IV.1 Averages from questions constituting the scale of support for the system, 2006.

4.1.1 Levels of support for the system (1995-2006)

The availability of the data from the national surveys of 1995, 1999, and 2004 allowed us to present the evolution of levels of support for the system for the period 1995-2006. In the following figure, it can be seen how the five questions used to construct the scale of support for the system evolved. In general, two aspects stood out: (a) an incremental tendency showing support in four questions (courts, basic rights, pride, and support) between 1995 and 2004 and a decline between 1999 and 2004 for the question on institutions; and (b) a drop in four questions (courts, basic rights, pride, and support) in 2006 and an increase between 2004 and 2006 for the question on institutions.




Figure IV.2 Averages of questions that constitute the scale of support for the system, 1995-2006.

From the five questions, a scale was devised to measure support for the system. The scale is the average of the five items shown previously.^{29/30} In Figure IV.3 the results of national surveys done between 1995 and 2006 are shown. The figure illustrates that support for the system increased significantly between 1995 and 2006; in 1995 the average was 53; in 1999, 57; and 60 in 2004. However, in 2006, the average dropped to 55.




Figure IV.3 Support for the system in El Salvador (1995-2006):Main items scale.

²⁹ So as not to lose a significant number of respondents in the tallying system, if the participant answered three or more of the items, an average is taken of those items. If s/he answers less than three items, he/she is eliminated from the analysis.

³⁰ For the 2004 survey, the reliability alpha for the support for the system scale is .681; for the 2006 survey, it is .747.

4.1.2 A comparative view of support for the system

Analysis of the data from El Salvador within the framework of the study of Latin American countries in 2006, shows that El Salvador falls in the group of countries with the highest levels of support for the system—ranked fifth below Costa Rica, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Colombia.




Figure IV.4. A comparative view of support for the system.

4.1.3 An explanation for levels of support for the system in El Salvador

In this chapter it has been shown that support for the system declined in El Salvador between 2004 and 2006. However, not all participants responded to the questions in the same way since some Salvadorans expressed much higher support for the system than others. What is the reason for the differences of opinion? In the following chapter, the statistically significant findings for multiple regression analysis are discussed, after which the findings of the bivariate analysis carried out for a set of sociodemographic variables on attitudes and various evaluations of the current national situation will be presented.

4.1.4 Support for the system model

In Table IV.1.a (see Appendix B) the results are given of the model containing statistically significant predictors of support for the system when each of the other variables remains constant. The ten basic predictors of support for the system are: educational level, age, family income, evaluation of the country’s economic situation, ideology (on a left to right scale),

evaluation of the president’s job performance, opinion of how democratic the country is, satisfaction with the performance of democracy, trust that the judicial system will punish those found guilty of crimes, and evaluation of treatment received at municipal government offices when services are requested. The gender variable is kept in the model even though it is not statistically significant.

4.1.5 Age and support for the system

In Figure IV.5 the tendency can be seen for support for the system to drop as age increases.




Figure IV.5 Support for the system, by age, 2006.

4.1.6 Income levels and support for the system

Income level is a factor associated with level of support for the system; the higher the income, the lower the level of support.³¹

³¹ The income variable (Q10) was recoded to a new variable (income) for low, medium and high categories..




Figure IV.6 Support for the system by income level, 2006.

4.1.7 Education and support for the system

It can be seen in Figure IV.7 that among those with no formal education or elementary school support for the system is high, after which support for the system drops at educational levels rise.




Figure IV.7 Support for the system by educational level, 2006.

After controlling for gender, Figure IV.8 shows that the tendency is for support for the system to drop as educational levels rise, but with several differences. Men with no formal education show higher levels of support than women in the same category while women show higher support than men having attended primary and secondary school; in the category of college educated individuals, men show higher support than women.




Figure IV.8 Support for the system according to educational level, by gender, 2006.

4.1.8 Evaluation of the president’s job performance and support for the system

The evaluation of the job performance of President Saca is found to be a factor associated with support for the system. The survey asked: “M1. Speaking in general terms of the current administration, would you say that the job President Saca is doing is: (1) very good, (2) good, (3) neither good nor bad, (4) bad, (5) very bad, (8) don’t know”. In Figure IV.9 it can be seen that support for the system rises as the president’s job approval ratings rise.




Figure IV.9 Support for the system according to the president's job approval rating, 2006.

4.1.9 Ideology and support for the system

Political ideology was found to be a factor associated with support for the system. In the questionnaire, we included a left-to-right 10 point scale to measure ideology.³² In El Salvador, left and right ideologies have clashed for years; thus, it is not surprising that ideology is relevant to support for the system. In Figure IV.10, it can be seen that the left side of the scale shows the lowest support for the system, and as the scale moves to the right, support for the system increases.

³² Question L1 on the questionnaire.




Figure IV.10 Support for the system according to ideology, 2006.

4.1.10 Political preferences and support for the system

Another way to incorporate the political factor into the analysis is to use the question regarding party voted for in the legislative elections of March, 2006.³³ The response options were recoded into three choices: the party of the current administration (ARENA, a right wing party), the main opposition party (FMLN, a left wing party), and a grouping of other parties (CD, PDC, PCN, and PLN) in an “others” choice. In Figure IV.11 it can be seen that ARENA sympathizers have a higher level of support for the system (64.8) while sympathizers of “others” show lower support (54.5); FMLN sympathizers show the lowest support for the system at 46.1.

³³ Question elsvb7 on the questionnaire.




Figure IV.11 Support for the system according to political preference, 2006.

4.1.11 Satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance and support for the system

Another part of the analysis of political factors was the respondents' evaluation of two aspects of democracy: opinions regarding the democratic character of the country and satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance. The item in the questionnaire was as follows: "PN5. In your opinion is El Salvador very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic, or not at all democratic? In Figure IV.12 a clear tendency can be seen: support for the system increases as positive opinions about the democratic character of the country increase. Support for the system is higher among those who think that the country is very democratic.




Figure IV.12 Support for the system according to opinions of the democratic character of the country, 2006.

The other question posed was: “PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied with the performance of democratic governance in El Salvador?” In Figure IV.13 support for the system rises as satisfaction with the performance of democracy rises. The data indicates a clear link between the perception of satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance and the degree of legitimacy granted to the political system.




Figure IV.13. Support for the system according to satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance, 2006.

4.1.12 The country's economic situation and support for the system

Another question posed to survey subjects was their evaluation of the economic picture of the country.³⁴ The Salvadoran economy has become stagnant during the last few years, and an analysis of the data demonstrates that this situation has had an effect on public opinion. In Figure IV.14 the levels of support for the system tend to decline as the economic picture worsens; conversely, support for the system rises as the perception of the economy becomes more positive. The data indicate a clear link between the state of the national economy and the legitimacy granted to the political system.

³⁴ Item SOCT1 on the questionnaire.




Figure IV.14 Support for the system according to the country's economic situation, 2006.

4.1.13 Trust in the judicial system and support for the system

Another contributor to support for the system is trust in the judicial system. Question: “AOJ12. If you were a victim of theft or assault, how much would you trust the judicial system to punish the guilty party (parties)? (1) very much, (2) somewhat, (3) not much, (4) not at all, (8) don't know.” Figure IV.15 shows that the tendency is increased support for the system as trust in the judicial system to punish the guilty increases.




Figure IV.15 Support for the system according to level of trust in the judicial system, 2006.

4.1.14 Treatment received from municipalities and support for the system

Studies done in 1995, 1999, and 2004³⁵ found a clear connection between satisfaction with municipal governments and support for the system at the national level. This points to the idea that a way to improve the possibilities of a stable democracy is to increase citizen satisfaction with municipal governments.

Survey subjects were asked: “SGL2. How do you feel you or your neighbors have been treated by the municipal government when you have gone there for assistance? Have you been treated very well, well, neither well nor badly, badly, or very badly? Figure IV.16 reveals that, in general, as satisfaction with treatment received from the municipal government increases, so do levels of support for the system at the national level.

³⁵ Seligson, Mitchell A. y Córdova Macías, Ricardo (1995). Op. Cit.
 Seligson, Mitchell A.; Cruz, José Miguel y Córdova Macías, Ricardo (2000). Op. Cit.
 Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Cruz, José Miguel (2005). Op. Cit.




Figure IV.16 Support for the system according to satisfaction with treatment by local governments, 2006.

4.1.15 Population stratum and support for the system

Although location of residence was not a significant factor in the regression model, it was a significant factor associated with support for the system in the bivariate analysis. These results can be seen in Figures IV.17 and IV.18. In the first figure, low levels of support can be observed; the tendency is for support for the system to rise as city size diminishes, with the exception that for small cities, a decline in support is observed. This support later rises, with the highest level of support shown by people in rural areas.




Figure IV.17 Support for the system according to size of residence, 2006.

In the next figure, it can be observed that inhabitants of less populated municipalities show higher levels of support; as municipal population increases, support for the system decreases. Municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants show the lowest levels of support for the system.




Figure IV.18 Support for the system according to population stratum, 2006.

4.1.16 Extended factors of support for the system

A series of additional items were included as part of the extended series on support for the system. Figure IV.19 shows the results of the 2006 survey. First, it must be pointed out that the Catholic Church is included among the institutions despite the fact that it is not a component of the democratic political system. This was done so that the comparison among the political institutions would have the Catholic Church as a reference since the Church enjoys high levels of trust among the population in Latin America. The institutions having the highest levels of support are the Office for the Defense of Human Rights (64.6), followed by the Catholic Church (63) and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (62.7). A second group of trusted institutions includes the Armed Forces (60.4), the media (59.6) and municipalities (59.6). In the third group are the National Government (52.3), the National Civil Police (52.3), electoral trust (51.3) and the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Republic (51.1). The fourth group includes the Supreme Electoral Court (49.8), the Legislative Assembly (48.7), the *Corte de Cuentas* (48.4), the judicial system (48.2), and the Supreme Court of Justice (48.1). Political parties rated lowest at 35.1.




Figure IV.19 Trust in institutions, 2006.

The next figure presents a comparison between institutional trust in 2004 and 2006. The most outstanding element is the general decline in trust between 2004 and 2006, although with some nuances: the decline in trust of the Office for the Defense of Human Rights and the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Republic is small; then there is a drop of between four and eight points for most institutions. Trust in elections drops 13.8 points, 12.3 points for the National Civil Police, and 10.1 points for the Supreme Electoral Court.




Figure IV.20 Comparison of 2004 and 2006 data on institutional trust.

4.2 Tolerance

In this section, the topic of political tolerance in El Salvador is explored based on previous empirical studies in political science.³⁶ Stouffer and McCloskey's research on the willingness of North American survey subjects to extend civil rights to those who support unpopular causes is the foundation of quantitative studies on political tolerance.³⁷ Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus argue that tolerance is a critical element in a democratic political culture because of the fact that intolerant attitudes, in time, can produce intolerant behavior that put the targets of intolerance at risk.³⁸ Other researchers have extended their studies beyond the United States.³⁹

To analyze the levels of political tolerance in El Salvador, a scale developed by the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project is used. In the survey, there are four questions regarding the four basic civil liberties: the right to vote, to demonstrate peacefully, to run for public office, and to express oneself freely. Respondents were given a card with a ten-step ladder. A 10-point response format which moves from strong disapproval (value of 1) to strong approval (value of 10). The following are the items on the questionnaire:

“D1. There are people who always speak negatively about the government in El Salvador, not only the current administration, but the form of government itself. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these people's **right to vote**?

D2. How strongly to you approve or disapprove of these people's **right to demonstrate peacefully** to express their points of view?

D3. How strongly to you approve or disapprove that such people have the **right to run for public office**?

D4. How strongly to you approve or disapprove of the right of such persons to go on television and **give a speech**?”⁴⁰

³⁶ The conceptual framework for this section is based on those developed in:

Seligson, Mitchell A. y Córdova Macías, Ricardo (1995). Op. Cit.

Seligson, Mitchell A. (1996). Op. Cit.

Seligson, Mitchell A. y Córdova Macías, Ricardo (1995). Op. Cit.

Seligson, Mitchell A.; Cruz, José Miguel y Córdova Macías, Ricardo (2000). Op Cit.

Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Seligson, Mitchell A. (2001). Op. Cit.

Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Cruz, José Miguel (2005). Op. Cit.

³⁷ See:

Stouffer, Samuel A. (1955). *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*. New York: Doubleday.

McClosky, Herbert (1964). Consensus and Ideology in American Politics. *American Political Science Review*, 58, p. 361-382.

McClosky, Herbert y Brill, Alida (1983). *Dimensions of Tolerance: What Americans Believe about Civil Liberties*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

³⁸ Sullivan, John L.; Piereson, James y Marcus, George E. (1982). *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

³⁹ Sullivan, John L.; Shamir, Michael; Walsh, Patrick y Roberts, Nigel S. (1985). *Political Tolerance in Context: Support for Unpopular Minorities in Israel, New Zealand, and the United States*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Seligson, Mitchell A. y Caspi, Dan (1983). Arabs in Israel: Political Tolerance and Ethnic Conflict. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 19, p 55-66.

Seligson, Mitchell A. y Caspi, Dan (1983). Toward an Empirical Theory of Tolerance: Radical Groups in Israel and Costa Rica. *Comparative Political Studies*, 15, p 385-404.

Seligson, Mitchell A. (2005). Opus Cit.

⁴⁰ Question series D1, D2, D3 y D4 on the survey.

The coding system for these variables was based on a 0-10 format, but to make these results more understandable, they were converted to a metric scale of 0-100. Figure IV.21 shows the average obtained in each of the 2006 survey questions: run for office (50.1), vote (55.3), freedom of expression (55.8), and demonstrate peacefully (62.4).




Figure IV.21 Averages of questions that constitute the scale of political tolerance, 2006.

4.2.1 Levels of political tolerance (1995-2006)

Since data from the 1995, 1999, and 2004 surveys were available, we were able to plot the evolution of the levels of political tolerance for the period of 1995-2006. In the next figure, the change in responses to the four questions used to create the political tolerance scale can be seen. Generally, between 1995 and 1999 tolerance in all four question responses increased; in 1999 and 2004, however, it decreases in all four, falling close to 1999 levels; in 2006 the levels increase beyond the 2004 levels, but for three of the questions the average was below that of 1999.




Figure IV.22 Averages of questions constituting the political tolerance scale, 1995-2006.

From the four questions a scale was created to measure political tolerance.⁴¹ This scale is an average of the items shown earlier.⁴² Figure IV.23 presents the results of national surveys done between 1995 and 2006. As can be seen, tolerance increases from 53 in 1995 to 58 in 1999; it decreases to 51 in 2004 and rises again in 2006 to 56.




Figure IV.23 Political tolerance in El Salvador, 1995-2006.

⁴¹ So as not to lose a significant number of respondents in the counting process, if two or more of the four items are answered by the respondent, an average is taken of the responses to those items. If the subject answered less than two items, s/he is eliminated from the analysis.

⁴² For the 2004 survey the confidence alpha for the support for the system scale is .795; for 2006 it is .804.

4.2.2 A comparative view of political tolerance

In the analysis of the data from El Salvador within the framework of the Latin American countries studied in 2006, we find that El Salvador is among the countries showing an intermediate level of political tolerance, above Bolivia, Honduras, Ecuador, Panama, Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua y Peru.




Figure IV.24 A comparative view of political tolerance

4.2.3 An explanation of political tolerance in El Salvador

While it has been pointed out that between 1999 and 2004 political tolerance decreased, it must also be said that not all subjects responded equally. What explains the differences of opinion? In the following sections, we report first the statistically significant findings used in the multiple regression analysis and later the results used in the bivariate analysis carried out with a set of sociodemographic variables on attitudes toward and evaluations of various aspect of Salvadoran life.

4.2.4 Political tolerance model

In Table IV.2.a (see Appendix B) we present results of the multiple regression model with the statistically significant predictors of political tolerance when each one of the variables remains constant. There are six basic predictors of tolerance: educational level, gender, ideology (on a left-to-right scale), evaluation of President Saca's job performance, satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance, and the index of wealth as measured by the possession of material goods. The age variable has been kept in the model despite its not being statistically significant.

4.2.5 Education and tolerance

Education is found to be a factor associated with tolerance. Figure IV.25 shows that among people with no formal education, tolerance is low; however, tolerance tends to rise as level of education rises.




Figure IV.25 Tolerance by educational level, 2006.

By controlling for gender, a continuous growth in levels of tolerance can be seen as educational level rises, which is greater for men than for women at the various levels of education.




Figure IV.26. Tolerance by educational level and gender, 2006.

4.2.6 Gender and tolerance

Figure IV.27 shows that men have higher levels of political tolerance than women.




Figure IV.27. Tolerance by gender, 2006.

4.2.7 Home furnishings and tolerance

Figure IV.28 indicates that levels of tolerance are lower in sectors in which homes have fewer furnishings; levels of tolerance rise as home furnishings increase.




Figure IV.28 Tolerance according to home furnishings, 2006.

4.2.8 Evaluation of the president’s job performance and tolerance

Figure IV.29 shows lower tolerance among those who rate President Saca’s job performance higher; conversely, lower ratings for the President translate into higher levels of tolerance.




Figure IV.29 Tolerance according to the president's job performance rating, 2006.

4.2.9 Ideology and tolerance

Elsewhere in this study, it was reported that the political left and right in El Salvador have clashed for many years; thus, it is not unexpected that ideology is a relevant factor in the measurement of tolerance. Figure IV.30 shows that the political left expresses the highest level of tolerance and that as the scale moves to the right, tolerance declines. A hypothesis to be explored is the fact that although the same rightist party (ARENA) has governed the country for the past 17 years, it is the left, as critics of the party in power that feel that they should be guaranteed the right to vote, demonstrate peacefully, and express themselves freely.




Figure IV.30 Tolerance according to ideology, 2006.

Another political factor to keep in mind is political preference, measured as a function of the party for whom respondents voted in the legislative elections in March, 2006. Figure IV.31 indicates that FMLN sympathizers show a higher level of tolerance (68.9), followed by the other parties (53.5) while ARENA sympathizers, at 48.9, show the lowest level of tolerance.




Figure IV.31 Tolerance according to political preference, 2006.

4.2.10 Satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance and tolerance

We can see in Figure IV.32 that tolerance declines as satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance rises; conversely, as dissatisfaction rises, so does tolerance.




Figure IV.32 Tolerance according to satisfaction with democratic governance, 2006.

4.2.11 Populational stratum and tolerance

Although place of residence is found to be non-significant in the regression model, this factor was a significant factor related to tolerance in the bivariate analysis. Figure IV.33 shows that people who live in less populated areas express lower levels of tolerance and that tolerance increases as the municipal population rises.




Figure IV.33 Tolerance according to population stratum, 2006.

4.3 Support for stable democracy

The theoretical framework for this study establishes that both support for the system and tolerance are vital to the stability of democratic governance over the long term.⁴³ In a democracy, it becomes necessary for citizens to believe in the legitimacy of their system of government and, at the same time, tolerate the political rights of others so that the party of the majority in power can coexist with minority groups and guarantee their rights.

From a theoretical standpoint, we propose to analyze the interrelation between support for the system and tolerance, for which it is necessary to dichotomize both scales into “high” and “low.”⁴⁴ In this analysis, “it should be noted that the relations described here apply only to

⁴³ This section is based on the conceptual framework developed in:: Seligson, Mitchell A. y Córdova Macías, Ricardo (1993). *Perspectivas para una democracia estable en El Salvador*. San Salvador: IDELA.

Seligson, Mitchell A. y Córdova Macías, Ricardo (1995). Op. Cit.

Seligson, Mitchell A. (1996). Op. Cit.

Seligson, Mitchell A. y Córdova Macías, Ricardo (1995). Opus Cit.

Later, the theoretical design will be reintroduced from:

Seligson, Mitchell A. (s/f). *Toward a Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America*. Mimeo.

Seligson, Mitchell A.; Cruz, José Miguel y Córdova Macías, Ricardo (2000). Op. Cit.

Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Cruz, José Miguel (2005). Opus Cit.

Seligson, Mitchell A. (2005). Op Cit.

⁴⁴ Each of these is a 0-100 scale such that the selected midpoint is 50.

systems that are already institutionally democratic, that is, systems in which competitive elections are regularly held and in which wide participation is possible. These attitudes in an authoritarian system would have completely different implications.”⁴⁵

Table IV.1 presents four possible combinations between legitimacy and tolerance. The political systems predominantly populating the cell of high support for the system and high tolerance are those that tend to favor a stable democracy. This establishes the point that in non-cohesive contexts, a high level of legitimacy is required for the system to be stable, and tolerance is needed for it to remain democratic.⁴⁶

When support for the system remains high but tolerance is low (in the authoritarian stability cell) the system tends to remain stable (due to high support) although at some point a democratic government could be in danger.

A situation of low support is seen in the two other cells of the table; both are tied to unstable situations. In the cell of low support and high tolerance, the tendency is toward instability. The cell of low support and low tolerance reflects that democracy is at risk.

Apoyo al sistema	Tolerancia	
	Alto	Bajo
Alto	Democracia estable	Estabilidad autoritaria
Bajo	Democracia inestable	La democracia en riesgo

Table IV.1 Theoretical relationship between support for the system and tolerance in democratic societies.

4.3.1 Empirical relationship between tolerance and support for the system in El Salvador

The first thing to consider is that the scale of support for the system and the tolerance scale are not positively associated with one another ($r = -.068$, $sig < .01$). This means that people who are more tolerant do not necessarily tend to show higher support for the system and vice versa.

Next, we examine in detail how both variables are interrelated. As mentioned earlier, both variables are dichotomized into “high” and “low.” The results of the 2006 survey in El Salvador, shown in Table IV.2, indicate that 32% of respondents fall in the stable democracy cell, the most populated cell in the table; in other words, almost one in three supports the system and is tolerant. Twenty-seven percent fall into the authoritarian stability cell; 25% in the unstable democracy cell, and 16% in the democracy at risk cell.

⁴⁵ Seligson, Mitchell; Cruz, José Miguel y Córdova Macías, Ricardo (2000). Op. Cit.

⁴⁶ See: Dahl, Robert (1971). *Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Apoyo al sistema	Tolerancia	
	Alto	Bajo
Alto	Democracia estable	Estabilidad autoritaria
	32%	27%
Bajo	Democracia inestable	La democracia en riesgo
	25%	16%

Table IV.2 Empirical relationship between support for the system and tolerance in El Salvador, 2006.

A comparative view of these results in time can be made with the data available from the national surveys taken in 1995, 1999 and 2004. Table IV.3 shows the evolution of the four cells in the period from 1995 to 2006. There is a rise in the “stable democracy” cell from 29% to 36% between 1995 and 1999, and then a slight decline to 32% in 2004 and has remained at 32% in 2006. As pointed out earlier, almost a third of survey subjects fall into this cell. In the “unstable democracy” cell, it can be observed that 23% remain there between 1995 and 1999; the percentage then drops to 17% in 2004 and rises to 25% in 2006. The “authoritarian stability” cell falls from 27% to 25% between 1995 and 1999, rises significantly to 35% in 2004, and falls to 27% in 2006. Finally, the “democracy at risk” cell drops from 21% in 1995 to 16% in 1999 and remains at that level in both 2004 and 2006.

Apoyo al sistema	Tolerancia							
	Alto				Bajo			
Alto	Democracia estable				Estabilidad autoritaria			
	1995	1999	2004	2006	1995	1999	2004	2006
	29%	36%	32%	32%	27%	25%	35%	27%
Bajo	Democracia inestable				La democracia en riesgo			
	1995	1999	2004	2006	1995	1999	2004	2006
	23%	23%	17%	25%	21%	16%	16%	16%

Table IV.3 Empirical relationship between support for the system and tolerance in El Salvador, 1995-2006.

4.3.2 A comparative view of democratic stability

For the analysis of the data from El Salvador within the framework of this 2006 comparative study of Latin American countries, the focus must be the “stable democracy” cell.”⁴⁷ Figure IV.34 shows El Salvador in the group of countries with the highest levels of support for the system, located below Costa Rica, Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica.

⁴⁷ On the basis of the data obtained, a new variable called “bar2x2,” was created. This variable eliminates cases in which there are incomplete data on the tolerance scale or on the scale of support for the system. This coding is:

si (psa5r=1 and tolr=1) bar2x2=100.

si (psa5r=1 and tolr=2) bar2x2=0.

si (psa5r=2 and tolr=1) bar2x2=0.

si (psa5r=2 and tolr=2) bar2x2=0.




Figure IV.34 A comparative view of attitudes that favor a stable democracy in El Salvador.

4.4 Conclusions

In this chapter we have examined support for the system, a fundamental component of political culture linked to political stability which has shown significant and sustained growth in El Salvador between 1995 and 2004, only to drop sharply in 2006. According to the multiple regression analysis, there are ten predictors of support for the system: education level, age, family income, evaluation of the country’s economic condition (left-to-right scale), evaluation of President Saca’s job performance, opinion of how democratic the country is, satisfaction with the performance of democracy, trust that the judicial system will punish individuals found guilty of crimes, and the evaluation of treatment received at municipal offices when services are requested.

In addition, the data have shown that political tolerance increased between 1995 and 1999, decreased between 1999 and 2004, and rose again in 2006. According to the multiple regression analysis, there are six predictors of tolerance: education level, gender, ideology (left-to-right scale), evaluation of President Saca’s job performance, satisfaction with the performance of democracy, and the index of wealth as measured by the possession of material goods.

Following the theoretical framework, we have sought to explore the interrelation of support for the system and political tolerance, for which both variables were dichotomized, and four possible combinations were created. The distribution of respondents in 2006 in the four cells is as follows: 32% in stable democracy; 27% in authoritarian stability; 25% in unstable democracy; and 16% in the cell of democracy at risk. The stable democracy cell shows no change in the past few year--32% in both 2004 and 2006.

V. Corruption and democracy

Corruption, together with criminal violence, is one of the most serious problems faced by Latin American democracies today. The growing concern over the effects of corruption in the region have spurred the promotion of important initiatives. At the end of 2003, under the auspices of the United Nations, 95 nations signed the United Nations International Convention Against Corruption. Every Latin American country, with the exception of Honduras, signed the treaty. This convention condemns offenses such as bribery, misappropriation of government funds, influence peddling, fraud, money laundering, and concealment, among others. It also stipulates that not only will the aforementioned specific acts of corruption be considered offenses, but also any support for corrupt acts, such as obstruction of justice in the investigation of such offenses. The convention is the first instrument of its kind designed to stand up to the scourge of corruption and will complement other international efforts in this direction, such as those of the Organization of American States.

Recent initiatives to fight corruption have linked corruption closely with poverty. Huguette Labelle, president of Transparency International, speaking on the publication of the “Índice de Percepción de la Corrupción 2006 [Index of Perception of Corruption 2006], affirms that “corruption traps millions of people in poverty. . . . In spite of a decade of progress in creating anti-corruption laws and standards, the results presented today indicate that there is still much to be done before we can declare a significant improvement in the lives of the poorest citizens of the world.”

El Salvador is by no means exempt from problems with corruption. According to the Index mentioned above, El Salvador has a rating of 4 on a 10 point scale in which 10 indicates the highest level of transparency and 1 the highest level of corruption. This places El Salvador at number 61 out of 163 countries in the world ranking of transparency, lower than other Latin American countries such as Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, but above most of the countries in the Latin American region and ahead of the remaining Central American nations.⁴⁸ Indeed, neighboring countries Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua all have ratings below 3. However, a comparison to the Index published in 2003 reveals that El Salvador has advanced very little between then and 2006. In 2003, El Salvador’s rating was 3.7,⁴⁹ and the difference in perception of corruption in the international community between then and 2006 is only three tenths of a point.

The problem of corruption is not perceived as a serious matter for most Salvadoran citizens. Numerous public opinion polls reveal that corruption is perceived as a problem of lesser importance than issues such as crime and the economy.⁵⁰ Furthermore, a recent study of corruption in El Salvador found that a sizable portion of the population, mainly those with less

⁴⁸ Information found in: Transparency International Latinoamérica y el Caribe. (2006). *Índice de percepción de corrupción*. Available at: http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/cpi_2006/cpi_table.

⁴⁹ Can be found in: Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Cruz, José Miguel. (2005). *La cultura política de la democracia en El Salvador, 2004*. San Salvador, USAID, IUDOP, FUNDAUNGO, Vanderbilt University, ARD y CREA International.

⁵⁰ See, for example, Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública. [IUDOP]. (2006). *Encuesta de evaluación del año 2006*. Serie de informes 112. San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA.

formal education and fewer resources, do not even have a clear idea of what corruption or the lack of transparency in public proceedings means.⁵¹ When asked what corruption means, more than 25% of the respondents said that corruption is linked to criminality, lack of public safety, and gangs. Some respondents went as far as to say that corruption of a problem of sexual morality. Research showed that these notions have important implications for the ways that people deal with corruption and how they evaluate institutional dealings with the problem. It indicates that many citizens highly “value” the government’s efforts regarding transparency because they interpret this as cracking down on corrupt delinquents.”^{52/53}

Corruption impacts not only State efficiency, but also, as the president of Transparency International pointed out, other areas, which in the end affects a country’s development and increases poverty. Along this line of thought, corruption has been identified as an obstacle for the consolidation of democratic governance. Disappointment with democratic governance can produce a variety of outcomes, among them damage to the political party system, threats to governance, the return of authoritarianism and an insecure, fragile, and violent social scene.

All of these contexts, in one form or another, have appeared in the last decade in various Latin American countries, and they have usually been identified as products of poverty, underdevelopment, traditional authoritarian culture and socioeconomic inequality. It was not until recently that corruption has been discovered to be a threat to democracy.⁵⁴

The objective of this chapter is to examine the chronic effects of corruption on the development of a political culture and support for democracy. The foundational idea behind this exercise is that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in the political system and other important conditions for the seeding and growth of democracy. This is not the first study of corruption done in El Salvador. Other studies have examined the problem of lack of transparency in this Central American country, some with innovative and engaging perspectives such as the 2003 study on national fiscal and budgetary transparency,⁵⁵ and another study on the perceptions among economic elites of transparency in the State.⁵⁶ The research appearing in these pages is added to the efforts to empirically link corruption, measured as victimization by bribery and illegal payments, to democratic stability.⁵⁷ This comes from Seligson’s findings using Vanderbilt University’s Public

⁵¹ See: Cruz, José Miguel y Martín de Vega, Álvaro. (2004). *La percepción sobre la corrupción en las instituciones públicas de El Salvador. Los ciudadanos hablan sobre la corrupción*. San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA.

⁵² Cruz y Martín (2004).

⁵³ Actually, they referred to the fact that at the time the research took place, the government had just set in motion its crackdown plan against juvenile gangs. Many people’s answers made reference to that plan, which had nothing to do with corruption among government officials.

⁵⁴ Seligson, Mitchell. (2002). The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries. *Journal of Politics* 64 (2): 408-433.

⁵⁵ See: PROBIDAD. (2003). *Índice Latinoamericano de Transparencia Presupuestaria. Informe de El Salvador*. San Salvador: PROBIDAD.

⁵⁶ See: Escobar, Marcela. (2005). *La transparencia en el Estado salvadoreño. La perspectiva de los empresarios*. San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA.

⁵⁷ The first study on this topic is published under the name: Seligson, Mitchell A.; Cruz, José Miguel y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (2000). *Auditoría de la democracia El Salvador 1999*. San Salvador. See also: Cruz, José Miguel y Martín de Vega,

Opinion Project in various Latin American countries which has determined that victims of corruption tend to show lower levels of support for the system.⁵⁸

This chapter presents the results of the portion of the survey regarding corruption in El Salvador, dividing the information as follows: The first section discusses the results of Salvadoran perceptions of corruption; the second explores the levels of corruption in the country according to the results of the questions regarding victimization by corruption; the third examines justification for corruption; the fourth examines the empirical relationship between legitimacy and corruption; and the fifth section presents the conclusions.

5.1 Perception of the magnitude of corruption

To begin to examine the survey results, it is important to look at Salvadoran perceptions regarding the level of corruption that exists in this country. To do this, the following question was asked: “EXC7. Thinking about your personal experience, do you think that corruption among public officials is very widespread, somewhat widespread, not very widespread, or not at all widespread?” Figure V.1 shows that about 43.1% of the population thinks that corruption is very widespread; another substantial percentage (28.6%) believes it is somewhat widespread. The remaining survey subjects, 28.3%, think that corruption is not very or not at all widespread in the country.

Álvaro. (2004). *La percepción de la corrupción en las instituciones de El Salvador. Los ciudadanos hablan sobre la corrupción*. San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA.

⁵⁸ Seligson, Mitchell A. (2002). Op. Cit.



Figure V.1 Opinion of corruption among public officials, 2006.

A comparison of these results to the 2004 results reveals the perceptions of corruption among public officials rose in 2006. Table V.1 shows that in 2004, 36%, almost seven percentage points less than 2006, felt that corruption was very widespread. On the other hand, in 2004, 32.5% thought that corruption was not very or not at all widespread compared to 28.3% in 2006. This data suggest that the number of critical Salvadoran citizens has risen in 2006.

At this point, it is necessary to add that these results refer the perceptions of corruption and not actual acts of corruption. Therefore, we cannot say that the previous data reflect the real state of corruption or that their comparison with 2004 data suggests a rise in the level of corruption. What the data do suggest is that the perception of the magnitude of corruption in El Salvador has risen, and this is important because much of people’s political behavior is a product of their perceptions first and later of the facts.

Año	¿La corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...?				Total
	Muy generalizada	Algo generalizada	Poco generalizada	Nada generalizada	
2004	36.0%	31.6%	26.5%	6.0%	100.0%
2006	43.1%	28.6%	21.4%	6.9%	100.0%
Promedio 2004-2006	39.7%	30.0%	23.8%	6.5%	100.0%

Table V.1. Opinion of corruption among public officials by year, 2004-2006.

Then, with the purpose of contrasting the opinions concerning how widespread corruption in El Salvador is, a 0-100 scale was devised on the basis of the results of the previous question. On this scale, 0 means that citizens do not perceive corruption to be widespread among government officials while 100 means that they perceive much corruption. The results of this exercise showed that El Salvador’s perception of corruption is 69, the lowest in Central America in a comparative view of the 2006 Latin American studies, seen in Figure V.2.




Figure V.2 A comparative view of the perception of corruption, 2006.

In fact, all of the countries in the region register a high perception of lack of integrity in the performance of the State government, with the exception of Chile and Bolivia. This does not necessarily mean that El Salvador is the least corrupt country in the region. It only points to the fact that this country’s citizens do not perceive the same magnitude of corruption in political affairs as their neighbors in other countries. In Ecuador, Jamaica and Nicaragua, on the contrary, we find the highest perceptions of corruption in the entire region, at least among the countries in the 2006 round of studies.

This may probably be due to the importance given by citizens to the lack of transparency in the State. In fact, when Salvadoran citizens were asked to identify their country’s most pressing problem,⁵⁹ only 0.6% said it was corruption while in Nicaragua, the Central American country with the highest perception of corruption, over 9% said it was corruption. Thus, it can be said

⁵⁹ The item in question was the following: “EA4. To begin with, in your opinion, what is the most serious problem this country faces?”.

that Salvadoran citizens do not seem to be paying much heed to the problem of corruption. However, the aforesaid does not mean that corruption is not a problem in the country or that there is no one who is genuinely worried about this scourge. Comparatively, the results point to the fact that in this country, corruption is perceived as a problem of lesser magnitude than in the other countries where the 2006 survey on political culture was also taken.

Why do citizens' perceptions of corruption differ? The survey results offer clues to understanding this dynamic of public opinion as a function of the variables that establish important differences. First, the results show that the perception of corruption depends in part on how informed citizens are.

The survey asked Salvadoran about the frequency with which they listen to the news on the radio, (A1), read the news in the newspaper (A3), watch the news on television (A2), and get news from the Internet (A4i). The responses to these questions helped to create a variable called "Exposure to media," which incorporates all questions except A1.⁶⁰ The media variable was cross-referenced with the perception of corruption scale, and the results indicate that the more people are exposed to news from the media, the more corruption they perceive. Figure V.3 shows that people with "low" exposure to the media have an average of 64.7 perception of corruption; the average rises to 69.4 among citizens who have medium exposure, and reaches 75.6 among those with high exposure to the media.

Although statistically significant difference are found in both the low and high groups of citizen exposure to the media, Figure V.3 shows that there is a clear trend of growth which is relevant in statistical terms when the extremes are compared. Being very informed about the news seems to generate more critical opinions compared to those who are not well informed.

⁶⁰ The item regarding radio (A1) was eliminated because the results were inconsistent with those from items A2, A3 and A4i.




Figure V.3 Perception of corruption according to media exposure, 2006.

The previous results are very close to common sense notions that if one thinks beyond personal experience of victimization by corruption, which will be explored later, opinions are formed from information one has about public officials' lack of transparency. Such knowledge does not appear in a vacuum. Contributory knowledge comes from a variety of sources, but, as we have seen, the media are a main source.

Thus, one of the conditions that appears to be fundamental to the formation of opinions on corruption among Salvadoran public officials is closely linked to level of education. The results of the 2006 study of political culture in El Salvador reveal that those who have attained a certain level of education tend to perceive more public corruption than any other group.

Figure V.4 shows that citizens with no formal education are at 61.1 on the perception of corruption scale; this average rises to 64.4 among those with elementary education although the difference is not statistically significant. However, people with a high school education reach an average of 69.6, which according to error intervals, already differs statistically from the previous levels. It is persons with college education that make the difference with regard to the rest of the educational levels more noticeable. Judging from the 82.3 average, most citizens with college educations perceive a high degree of corruption among public officials.




Figure V.4 Perception of corruption according to survey participants’ level of education, 2006.

The opinions about corruption in the country are not related to only the level of information from the media and level of education. They are also connected to other factors; for example, the survey results show that gender, age and residence area all play an important part in the perception of corruption in El Salvador.

Figure V.5 shows that men tend to perceive more corruption among state public officials than women do. Although the differences are not large, the confidence intervals expressed on the error bars (at 95%) confirm that the differences are statistically significant. The fact that men have a more critical view of levels of corruption among public officials may have to do with the fact that men have higher levels of education than women and tend to follow the news in the media with more interest.




Figure V.5 Perception of corruption, by gender, 2006.

The same hypothesis could be brought up regarding the relation of age and perception of corruption. According to survey results, as age rises, so does the perception of corruption. Figure V.6 shows that individuals between ages 18 and 25 perceive less corruption than the rest of the population, but perceptions increase along with age; the older an individual is, the higher the perception of corruption. On the scale of 0-100, the youngest age group averages over 63.9; it moves to 72.9 for the 46-55 age group and to 77.9 for persons older than 66.




Figure V.6 Perception of corruption survey participant's age, 2006.

The results also show that Salvadorans who live in cities perceive more corruption than those from rural areas. The first average 73.1 on the 0-100 scale while the second average 62.6, revealing a wide and statistically significant difference.

This probably has to do with the amount of information that circulates in each of these zones. Usually persons who live in urban zones, especially in big cities and the capital, tend to have more access to information as well as higher levels of education. Considering this, it is important to keep in mind the place of residence to understand one's own perception of lack of transparency. For this reason, more than suggesting that corruption is concentrated in urban areas, the data presented up to now suggest that the perception of lack of transparency in state institutions has much to do with the citizen characteristics mentioned here.




Figure V.7 Perception of corruption by urban/rural area, 2006.

5.2 Levels of corruption

As we have already pointed out, the perception of a phenomenon is very different from the phenomenon itself. Although these often go hand in hand, at times they can have diverse dynamics; there can be much corruption and little perception of it because the corruption has been well disguised or because there is no sensitivity to the problem. On the other hand, there can be a strong concern about corruption as a result of intense public debate over the issue, but truly low levels of corruption.

Unlike measurements and studies that focus only on perceptions and opinions, though they be from qualified informants, this survey additionally seeks to investigate the incidence of some

types of corruption which are a part of daily life in El Salvador. This was proposed on the basis of a battery of items designed to gather experiences of bribery or illicit payments that citizens face in their everyday activities. However, it is first necessary to mention that corruption also involves influence peddling, illicit enrichment, improper payments, etc., but for the purposes and scope of a survey of this type, corruption will be measured by victimization, meaning the number of acts of bribery faced by citizens during the last year.

The 2006 survey of political culture in El Salvador included a battery of questions designed to measure direct, personal experiences with acts of corruption. The questions were formulated as follows:

Now we would like to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in life...	No	Yes	Do not know	Does not apply
EXC2. ¿Has any police officer “put the bite” on you (asked for a bribe) during the last year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC6. Has a public employee asked for a bribe in the last year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC11. Have you had business at a municipal office in the last year? [If “no”, mark 9; if “yes,” ask the following question] Have you had to do business with the municipality (such as getting a permit) during the last year?) Have you had to pay any amount of money above what the law requires?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC13. Do you have a job? [If “no”, mark 9; if “yes” ask the following question] At your job has anyone asked for an improper payment in the last year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC14. In the last year, have you had any dealings with the courts? [If no, mark 9; if “yes” ask the following question] Have you had to pay a bribe in court in the last year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC15. Did you use public medical services in the last year? [If “no,” mark 9; if “yes,” ask the following question] To get service at a hospital or clinic during the last year, did you have to pay a bribe??	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC16. Did you have a child in public or private school in the last year? [If “no” mark 9; if “yes,” ask the following question] At your child’s school last year, did you have to pay a bribe?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC17. Did anyone ask you to pay a bribe in order to prevent your electricity from being disconnected?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)

All of these questions and responses refer to acts of bribery, known in the region as “the bite,” that survey respondents may have been involved in the last year, before participating in the survey. However, with the exception of three items (EXC2, EXC6, EXC17), which apply to all

subjects, most of the items (EXC11 to EXC16) will apply only to those having had contact with specific offices and who have accessed certain government services or who have jobs. Thus, the results of these questions and the true incidence of corruption depend partly upon whether or not subjects actually had contact with persons who facilitate services. For example, a person who has no children in school will not be victimized by being approached for an illegal payment in a school; but any person walking along the street and is stopped by a police officer can become the victim of bribery or a false accusation. These considerations should be kept in mind when interpreting the results that will be presented later.




Figure V.8 Acts of corruption experienced during the last year, 2006.

The results indicate that the most common experiences with corruption in El Salvador during the last year were: bribery in hospitals or clinics (6.7%); police demanding a *mordida*, (6.6%), bribery at city hall (6%), bribery at a school (3.4%), bribery as work (3.3%), a public employee demanding a *mordida* (2.5%), a *mordida* demanded in a court (2.4%) and paying a *mordida* to avoid having electricity disconnected (1.7%).

How then do these results compare with those obtained in the 2004 study? In that study, the most common experiences involving corruption are bribery in courts, (8.6%), illicit payments in schools (8.3%), illegal payments at health centers (7.9%), bribery at city hall (7.7%) and bribery at work, (7.3%). Experiences with *mordidas* given to police officers and public employees occurred less frequently (5.6% and 4.3% respectively).

Not all of the differences in percentages are statistically significant. A statistical analysis between the results of the 2004 and 2006 studies revealed that only two type of victimization

showed a substantial change, which should not cause any random effects: *mordidas* or bribes paid to public employees and illicit payments in schools. In both cases, what has happened is that the incidence of victimization by corruption has declined significantly; for public employees from 4.3% to 2.5%, and for illegal payments in schools from 8.3% to 3.4%), a drop of almost five percentage points (see Figure V.9). This means that at least cases of corruption by public employees and illicit payment in schools have dropped in the last two years.

While the data suggests a significant drop in the percentages for bribery in courts for 2004 and 2006, the truth is that the difference here is not statistically significant because the number of real cases is so low that the confidence intervals became too wide. The real number of people victimized versus the number reported is much lower, and their corresponding percentages do not represent substantial differences when statistically contrasted.




Figure V.9 Bribes paid to public employees and in schools, 2004-2006.

Just as in 2004, it is possible to say that the least common form of corruption occurs outside on the streets by the police or other government officials; however, this does not mean that acts of corruption are isolated or do not constitute a problem.

A consolidation of all experiences of corruption measured by the survey reveals that a total of 13.4% of Salvadorans have experienced some type of victimization by corruption over the course of a year, which means that one in ten citizens has been victimized by corruption during the last year. Comparing this number to the data from 2004, it can be seen that the global level of this problem declined slightly but not enough to be statistically significant. The global percentage using these same items at that time reached 15.7%.

A comparison with the other countries in the region included in the 2006 round of studies indicates, however, that El Salvador is not among the countries showing the highest levels of corruption. On the contrary, El Salvador is among the countries where corruption is least prevalent. Only Panama, Colombia, and Chile show lower levels in 2006. The next figure shows that countries form different clusters as a function of the levels of victimization by corruption.




Figure V.10 A comparative view of percentages of victimization by corruption, 2006.

Together with Chile, Colombia and Panama, El Salvador has the lowest incidence of bribery in its daily life; the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Costa Rica have a medium level of public corruption; Peru, Jamaica, Ecuador, Bolivia and Mexico have serious levels of corruption, with over 30% of their populations reporting having been victimized by corruption. With over half of its population reporting victimization by corruption, Haiti's situation in this respect is particularly critical.

5.2.1 Victims of corruption

Who are the most frequent victims of corruption? To answer this question, a binary logistical regression was done which would allow for the identification of conditions which predict whether or not an individual would be victimized by corruption or not. The dependent variable used grouped the different categories of victimization and reflected the percentages of those who were victims of corruption at least once during the previous 12 months. This variable also differentiated among persons who had not been victims (shown as 0) and those who had (100).

The regression results (see Table V2.a in Appendix B) indicate that only the variables referring to the financial situation of the survey subjects served as predictors of victimization by corruption in the 2006 El Salvador study. The variables are socioeconomic income and level of wealth as measured by furnishings in the home. In Figure V.11, the results are presented. It can be seen that the incidents of corruption rise as the level of wealth rises. Thus, a little over 8% of those who have few or no home appliances were victimized while a little over 11% had moderately equipped homes; the percentage of victimization rises to 20% for those with a high level of wealth.




Figure V.11. Victimization by corruption by level of wealth, 2006.

This signifies a higher level of victimization by public corruption of those who are better off. This same tendency can be observed when victimization is cross-referenced with average family income levels. Here, incidents of corruption rise as monthly income rises.

Interestingly in this case, in the analysis of the 2006 data, the important predictor variables from the 2004 study, such as gender, age, and employment situation of the respondents, were not important predictors in this study. Gender, for example, seems to be related on an individual basis to victimization by corruption since the data show that men are more frequent victims of corruption than women; however, when this variable is included in the regression together with economic circumstances, the significant coefficients disappear.

This suggests that what is truly behind the probabilities of becoming a victim of corruption or not is the individual's financial situation. The apparent association of the gender, age, and occupation variables are only so as a result of those conditions as they are influenced by

economic level. Men tend to be better off than women, just as those with jobs are better off than the unemployed.

Beyond the regression exercise, a variable that turned out to be significant for the understanding of the phenomenon of corruption was people’s perception of the role of the police in the community. The survey included the following question: “AOJ18. Some say that the police in this town protect the people from criminals while others say that the police themselves are involved in crime. What do you think? 1) Police protect the citizens, 2) Police are involved in crime 8) DK.”

Figure V.12 indicates that where police are believed to be involved with crime, individuals reported more incidents of victimization (almost twice as much at 18.7%) than in places where people believe that the police are protectors of the citizenry (9.1%). These data show not only citizens’ perceptions of the police, but also that corrupt police officers in the community could make the difference in the level of corruption that citizens must deal with.




Figure V.12 Victimization by corruption according to opinions of the police, 2006.

5.3 Justification for corruption

Corruption in State institutions is without a doubt a problem of public officials; however, it is also a problem of citizens who participate in, encourage, and often approve of acts of corruption such as bribery, illegal payments, and other types of illicit dealings. Corruption does not only involve the acts themselves but also attitudes and the way in which society interprets them. For

this reason, the 2006 study of Salvadoran political culture incorporated a series of items designed to explore how much citizens justify, and to some degree, approve of corruption in general terms of daily life as well as in concrete daily incidents. Two items were used to measure to what extent citizens justify corruption. They were asked thus: “EXC18. Do you think that because of the way things are sometimes that paying a *mordida* (a bribe) is justified? (1) Yes (0) No.”“EXC19. Do you think that in our society the payment of *mordidas* (bribes) is justifiable because of poor public services, or not?(1) Yes (0) No.”

The percentage of individuals who answered in the affirmative appear in the following figure. As shown, 19.4% of Salvadorans, that is, almost one in five, feel that “given the state of things,” the payment of a bribe is justified. The persons who justified paying a bribe because of poor public services was not much different: 16.2%. This means that a sizable number of citizens justify bribery under the conditions described.




Figure V.13 Opinions on the justification of corruption, 2006.

Before looking at the characteristics of these citizens, it is important to put the attitudes that result in the justification of corruption into perspective. For this purpose, the results from the other countries in the 2006 round of studies will be compared on a single 0-100 scale.⁶¹

⁶¹ The consistency coefficient for items EXC18 y EXC19 based on regional data was .785.

The resulting data, shown in Figure V.14, indicate important differences in the justification of corruption included in the LAPOP survey. First, the figure reveals that in Jamaica there is a strong tendency to justify bribery (54.6), making this country a special case. Second, it can be seen that the average of justification of corruption in the majority of the countries in the study is 25%.⁶² Third, the data indicate that, with the exception of Guatemala, El Salvador shows the lowest levels of approval of corruption. Putting the data in this perspective, it appears that although nearly a fifth of Salvadorans find justification for corruption, such justification is higher in almost all the other study countries.




Figure V.14 A comparative view of justification of corruption, 2006.

Who, then, justifies corruption in El Salvador? According to the results of the regression done to identify the predictors of attitudes that justify corruption (see Table V.3.a Appendix B), three variables play an important role: two are personal sociodemographic conditions, and the third is personal experience with corruption.

The following figures show that men and younger persons tend to justify bribery and illicit payments more than women and older people do. Men’s justification for corruption reaches 22 points on the scale whereas women’s average is 14.1. Young persons average more than 25 on the scale in contrast to 10 points for persons between ages 46 and 55.

⁶² Although the data reflect an average expressed in points on the scale and not percentages, the numbers are in fact an average of the affirmative responses of the items included on the scale




Figure V.15 Justification of corruption by gender, 2006.




Figure V.16. Justification of corruption by age, 2006.

One interesting result that has implications in the theoretical discussion about the generators of corruption is that which indicates that individuals who have experienced corrupt acts are those who most frequently justify them. Figure V.17 shows that Salvadorans who have not been involved in corrupt acts are at 16.2 on the justification scale compared to 28.4 for those who have participated in bribery. The question arises, then, regarding to what extent justification of

corruption does in fact generate more corruption or to what extent corruption is the result of an experience that should be socially legitimized.




Figure V.17 Justification of corruption according to victimization by corruption, 2006.

The aforementioned refers to the question of how responsible citizens are for acts of bribery and corruption they experience. In what measure does corruption occur because citizens feel it is justified in the circumstances in which they live? This discussion warrants a deeper analysis of the data presented here; however, these data serve to pose these questions and to point out the necessity of taking into consideration cultural factors the examination of conditioning factors of corruption in Latin American societies.

On the other hand, the second method used in this research to measure attitudes which help to justify corruption can be found in three items that were included in the survey. The questions were constructed as follows:

I would like you to tell me if you consider the following actions: 1) corrupt and should be punished; 2) corrupt but justified under the circumstances; 3) not corrupt.

DC1. For example: A state representative accepts a bribe of ten thousand dollars from a company. Do you feel that what this representative did is:

- (1) Corrupt and should be punished
- (2) Corrupt but justified
- (3) Not corrupt DK=8

DC10. A mother with several children needs a birth certificate for one of them. To avoid wasting time waiting, she pays 5 dollars more to the municipal employee. Do you think that what the mother did is:

- (1) Corrupt and should be punished
- (2) Corrupt but justified
- (3) Not corrupt DK=8

DC13. An unemployed person is an in-law of an important public official, and this official uses his/her influence to get a government job for the unemployed relative. Do you think that the public official is:

- (1) Corrupt and should be punished
- (2) Corrupt but justified
- (3) Not corrupt
- (8) DK

The first conclusion one reaches upon examining the results of Table V.2 is that not all individuals see acts of corruption the same way; the second is that there are differences between the identification of one behavior as corrupt and not another. The only situation in which there appears to be unanimity of responses is that the state representative who accepts a large sum of money from a company is seen as corrupt; 95% of survey subjects classified the act as corrupt and only 2.4% openly justified it. However, in the other two cases, the line is not as clear; 14.6% felt that it is not corrupt to pay a public employee an additional sum to expedite the issue of a needed document, and for another 24% neither is it corrupt for a relative to use his/her influence to get a job for a family member. Critical attitudes toward making payments for favors or using influence to get jobs for others are not demonstrated by any more than half of the population.

Situación	Corrupto y debe ser castigado	Corrupto pero justificado	No corrupto
Diputado acepta mordida de diez mil dólares	94.4	3.2	2.4
Pagar extra para sacar partida	45.9	39.5	14.6
Usar palanca de familiar en el gobierno para conseguir empleo	40.5	35.5	24.0

Table V.2. Opinions regarding issues of corruption, 2006.

All of this points to the fact that justification of corruption is not unusual among certain sectors of the Salvadoran population. Obviously, it is not our intention to say that Salvadorans justify corruption, but in light of the data, it has been found that under some circumstances, some people see the lack of integrity among many public employees as justified.

5.4 Corruption and democracy

According to the World Bank,⁶³ corruption makes democratic institutions vulnerable when it violates the rules of the game and when corrupt systems spring up and create networks within and outside State institutions. A direct consequence of corruption is the disappointment with democratic governance that it can create among the citizenry. Seligson's work on the impact of corruption on support for political systems in some Central American countries demonstrate that the consideration of these acts, such as paying *mordidas* or bribes to gain access to certain services, of minor importance, can erode fundamental attitudes for the solidification of democracy. In particular, Seligson developed a method of measuring the impact linked with a direct measurement of victimization by corruption with the index of support for the political system on an individual basis. Seligson believes that support for the system, that is, legitimacy, constitutes a basic requirement for democratic stability, especially in Latin America, which has a long history of political instability. The basic hypothesis is that those who have been victimized will tend to support the political system less than those who have not been victimized. In practice, this link has been proven in the Vanderbilt University LAPOP studies.

The 2006 study results confirm that, as in the 2004 study, corruption significantly impacts institutional political system structures. To have been a victim of corruption erodes trust in Salvadoran institutions in general (see Figure V.18) by destroying the credibility of every specific State institution. The same occurs when data on victimization is contrasted with trust in public safety and justice systems (police, the courts, and the Supreme Court of Justice). Persons who have been victimized tend to trust this type of institution less than those who have not been involved in bribery and illegal payments.

⁶³ See World Bank anti-corruption website at: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/EXTANTICORRUPTION/0,,menuPK:384461~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:384455,00.html>




Figure V.18 Trust in institutions according to victimization by corruption, 2006.

More important than the erosion of institutional trust, as grave as this is, is the erosion of diffuse trust in El Salvador’s political system. The 2006 data reveal that support for the system is lower among those who have experienced corruption compared to who were not victimized by corruption during the past year.




Figure V.19 Support for the system according to victimization by corruption, 2006.

With respect to tolerance, the results of the 2004 study show an unexpected relationship between victimization by corruption and political tolerance. This relationship reappears in the 2006 study. Contrary to what happened with the index of support for the system or institutional trust, the relationship is reversed regarding tolerance. Figure V.20 shows that with victimization by corruption, the level of tolerance expressed by citizens rises (62.2 on a scale of 0 to 100); conversely, people who have not experienced an incident of bribery showed lower levels of tolerance (54.8). This aspect should be studied more in depth in future research..




Figure V.20. Tolerance according to victimization by corruption, 2006.

5.5 Conclusions

In this chapter we have presented some of the most relevant results regarding corruption and lack of transparency among public officials. Although the survey is limited to gathering opinions about corruption in the country and measuring the incidence of some acts such as bribery and illegal payments, the data allow for inferences to be made regarding the level of transparency that characterize some relationships of a public nature as well as allow for the configuration of a panorama of how these aspects have evolved in recent years. The 2006 study reveals that although more than 70% of Salvadorans perceive some or a great deal corruption among public officials, El Salvador is not the country with the highest perception of corruption. On the contrary, there are fewer people in this country who perceive corruption in public activity than the rest of the Mesoamerican countries in the study. Of all the countries in the 2006 round of LAPOP studies, only in Chile and Bolivia is the perception of corruption lower than El Salvador. Behind this may be the fact that for the majority of Salvadoran citizens, corruption does not constitute a major problem compared to violence of the country's economic situation. The data show that about 13% of respondents had been victimized by corruption during the last year, and that percentage is slightly lower compared to 2004. It would seem as if the incidence of corruption has declined, at least as measured by this study. The most frequent incidents of

bribery occur in hospitals or clinics to obtain services, and those involving a favor from a police officer. Victims of corruption are often those who are better off financially than others.

A salient result of this study is that there is an important level of tolerance of corruption in some sectors of Salvadoran society. About 17% of survey subjects justify acts of corruption; the percentages are higher among men, youth, and, curiously, among the victims of corruption themselves. This brings up a question with respect to the cultural conditions behind these acts that force us to look back at the social justifications that bolster the prevalence of corruption.

Finally, the results shown here indicate that the topic of corruption is important in connection with the legitimacy of the institutional system and for the political system as well. People who have been victimized by acts of corruption show lower levels institutional trust and support for the system. In this sense, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, corruption is a much graver problem than most Salvadorans tend to think it is.

VI. Crime and the Rule of Law

Criminal violence constitutes a terrible problem in El Salvador. Two elements affirm this: first, the fact that for the large majority of Salvadorans, violence, crime and lack of public safety constitutes one of the country's main problems, surpassed only by the country's combined economic problems. In fact, the results of this study show that of all the problems mentioned by Salvadoran citizens, crime constitutes the single most mentioned problem at 38.7%; the second is the economy with 22.2%; third is poverty with slightly over 12%; fourth is unemployment, at just under 10%. If all problems related to criminal violence, such as gangs, kidnappings, narco-traffic, lack of public safety, and others, are combined, the percentage rises to 44.5%; if all economic problems are combined (poverty, unemployment, inflation, the economy, etc.), the percentage reaches a similar 45.2% (see Figure VI.2). Violence and lack of public safety worry almost half of all Salvadorans (Figure VI.1) while the other half worry about economic issues.




Figure VI.1 Salvadorans' identification of the municipality's major problems, 2006.

The second fact that confirms the information with which we open this chapter comes from information from real life. According to estimates from the National Civil Police, El Salvador's 2005 year end statistics showed 55 murders for every 100,000 inhabitants.⁶⁴ This gives El Salvador the highest murder rate in all of Latin America, above countries such as Honduras, Guatemala and Colombia, which also have very high murder rates.⁶⁵ Furthermore, a review of

⁶⁴ See: "Homicidios aumentan en los últimos siete años". El Diario de Hoy, 14 de febrero de 2006. Puede encontrarse en: [<http://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/2006/02/14/nacional/nac9.asp>].

⁶⁵ See, for example, Wiedlandt, Gonzalo. (2005). "Hacia la construcción de lecciones de posconflicto en América Latina y el Caribe. Una mirada a la violencia juvenil en Centroamérica". *Políticas sociales 115*. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL.

the statistics on violence in El Salvador reveals that the levels of violence, at least in terms of homicides, have been rising in the last few years. Some sources estimate that at the end of 2006 the murder rate will be even higher than that of 2005.

The epidemic of violence in El Salvador is not limited to this country nor even the Central American region. Various studies have noted that violence is a chronic problem in Latin America, and although there are countries that have more serious situations than others, it can be said that Latin America continues to be the most violent region in the world with respect to crime and common violence.⁶⁶

As has been discussed in other studies, the prevalence of violent crime in El Salvador is not isolated from other expressions of violence, nor does it constitute a sudden appearance widespread social conflict. El Salvador is a country with a very serious problem of violence, not only because of the high murder rate, but also because many deaths often occur from unintentional violence—accidents, as defined by the WHO—more frequently than in other countries in the hemisphere.⁶⁷ Moreover, this country is violent not only because the post-war incidence of crime and violence is high, but because from what can be gleaned from available statistics, the country was violent well before the war began.

What does criminal violence have to do with political culture and the political processes behind the consolidation of democracy in the countries of the region? The answer is that the former has much to do with the latter. Usually studies of the variables that influence democratization processed have focused on transition methods and on levels of growth and economic development. Of late, however, new voices calling for attention to be given to other factors such as corruption or violence and lack of public safety within the democratic consolidation process are being heard.⁶⁸ These new factors—corruption and high levels of violence and insecurity—discussed in the previous chapter—affect democracies, particularly emerging ones, by eroding the political culture of support. In the face of these problems, it is tempting to support alternatives of the authoritarian type, which put the exercise of fundamental liberties and rights of democracy at risk. Along the way, citizens lose trust in institutions that are part of the political system. In fact, three independent studies published very close together using the database from the VU Latin American Public Opinion Project⁶⁹ found that direct victimization by crime and the

⁶⁶ See: Londoño, Juan Luis; Gaviria, Alejandro y Guerrero, Rodrigo (eds). (2000). *Asalto al desarrollo. Violencia en América Latina*. Washington, D.C.: BID.

Also: Organización Mundial de la Salud. (2000). Informe mundial sobre la violencia y la salud. Washington, D.C.: OPS.

⁶⁷ See: Organización Panamericana de la Salud. (2006). “Seguridad humana y salud”. Puede encontrarse en: [<http://www.ministeriodesalud.go.cr/desaorga/documentos/modelosysh.pdf>].

⁶⁸ See: Cruz, José Miguel. (1999). “Violencia, cultura política y democracia en América Latina”. *Nueva Sociedad* 132-167.

Also: Holston, James y Caldeira, Teresa P.R. (1998). *Democracy, Law, and Violence. Disjunctures on Brazilian Citizenship*. En:

F. Agüero and J. Stark (eds.) *Fault Lines of democracy in Post-transition Latin America*. Miami: North-South Center Press.

Cruz, José Miguel. (2000). *Violencia, democracia y cultura política. Nueva Sociedad* 167, p 132-146.

⁶⁹ Seligson, Mitchell y Azpuru, Dinorah. “Las dimensiones y el impacto político de la delincuencia en la población guatemalteca”. En Bixby, Luis Rosero (ed). *Población del istmo 2000: Familia, migración, violencia y medio ambiente*. San José: Centro Centroamericano de Población.

Pérez, Orlando. (2003). Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala. *Political Science Quarterly*, 118 (4). Winter 2003-2004.

feeling of lack of public safety affect the political systems of Guatemala and El Salvador. One of the studies also incorporated data from Nicaragua, but in that country, which does not have the levels of violence of their northern neighbors, the effect on support for the system was a direct result of having been affected by the commission of a crime.

Violence and lack of public safety have become a phenomenon that cannot be taken lightly in the study of democratic stability, not only because high levels of insecurity lead to a certain level of social instability, but also, and above all, because high levels of insecurity make the rule of law vulnerable, eroding institutions' ability to maintain order and undermining favorable attitudes toward democracy. In this sense, this chapter presents the 2006 study results on crime and the rule of law, and at the same time seeks to measure the impact of crime—having been a direct victim of a criminal act—and of insecurity over support for the Salvadoran political system.⁷⁰ First, we describe the results that refer to victimization, who are the most frequent victims, the behavior associated with reporting crimes and its link to trust in the system; then the results of the perception of the lack of public safety and its link to support for the system are presented. Finally, we present the conclusions.

6.1 Victimization by crime

The survey asked participants about their experiences with victimization by crime. Specifically, they were asked: “VIC1. Have you been the victim of physical aggression or a crime in the past twelve months?” Sixteen percent of the participants said they had been directly involved in some type of criminal act over the past year. A comparison of these results with those from previous studies, such as “Audit of Democracy in El Salvador, 1999” and “The Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador, 2004,” demonstrate that the general incidence of victimization has diminished slightly in the past few years. In 1999, 22% reported having been a crime victim; in 2004, it was 17.1%.

Although the most significant decline in victimization occurred between 1999 and 2004, the difference cannot be seen as statistically important; nonetheless, when put in perspective, the data seem to contradict the tendency reflected in statistics regarding violence, based on the number of homicides, published by the Salvadoran authorities in recent years. The key is found in the nature of the types of violence measured by the survey. While the number of homicides, the most extreme form of violence, can be found only in official government statistics, surveys are limited to the type of offenses that can be reported by survey informants. Homicides, sex crimes, or serious injuries that have disabled victims, in general, do not appear in the survey. For this reason, it must be kept in mind that the most common offenses reported on surveys or this type of instrument are robberies and assaults, as will be seen further ahead. These offenses are different from homicides.

Cruz, José Miguel. (2003). *Violencia y democratización en Centroamérica: el impacto del crimen en la legitimidad de los regímenes de posguerra. América Latina Hoy* 35, p 19-59.

⁷⁰ It must be kept in mind that crime victimization measured in this research refers only to what is possible to obtain through the questionnaire used in this survey. Other types of crimes and victimization are excluded; while important, information regarding offenses such as homicides cannot be gathered by the survey. Thus, this research does not include the entire spectrum of violent crimes that occur in El Salvador.

When all the data on victimization from all the LAPOP surveys for 2006 are compared, however, it can be observed that El Salvador does not have the highest levels of victimization of all the study countries. In fact, the majority of countries have much higher levels than El Salvador, including countries such as Costa Rica, Chile, and Nicaragua, which do not have the same level of criminality as El Salvador. Does this mean that the data presented on victimization are invalid? No, it does not. The data from the El Salvador survey, as previously mentioned, are based on a certain type of offense, which, according to police statistics, has been declining in recent years and which does not follow the same behavioral patterns as homicides. Violent deaths, the most characteristic expression of violence in northern Central America—Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras—are not measured in the survey, and this makes not only El Salvador but also other countries with serious situations regarding violent crime appear below other countries with fewer problems.

In any case, this also demonstrates that the problem of criminality, as least in regard to property crimes, is not a just a Salvadoran problem, but one shared by the greater part of Latin American nations.




Figure VI.2 A comparative view of victimization, 2006.

Indeed, the data from the following question on victimization (VIC2)⁷¹ show a preponderance of property crimes; almost half (49.1%) experienced robberies without assault or physical threats. One third (33.8%) experienced robberies with assault, 12.2% were home invasions, and 4.8% vandalism. On the other hand, 9.7% of the cases we assault without robbery, and 0.4% were rape or other types of sexual assault.




Figure VI.3 Types of offenses suffered by respondents, 2006.

This information helps to create a typology with respect to the gravity of the crime experience. Not all offenses are equal, not only in terms of fact, but also in terms of effects on the victim. Thus, to better understand the relation of victimization with other variables and conditions, a new victimization variable was devised that integrates the results of VIC1 and VIC2 to establish the level of the seriousness of the victimization.⁷² The results can be seen in Figure VI.4.

⁷¹ The question is written as follows: “What type of crime did you experience? (01) Theft without battery or physical threat; (02) Theft and battery or physical threat; (03) Assault and battery without theft; (04) Rape or other sexual assault; (05) Kidnapping; (06) Property damage; (07) Home invasion; (77) Other.”

⁷² To create this seriousness of offense experienced variable, the responses were reclassified in three categories. First, persons who had not experienced crime were kept in the “non-victim” category; those who had been robbed without having been physically assaulted, those whose property was vandalized, or experienced home invasions were placed in the “minor victims” group; and those who were robbed and assaulted, battered or sexually assaulted were placed in the “severe victims” group.




Figure VI.4 Level of victimization by crime, 2006.

Figure VI.4 shows that 84.4% of Salvadorans surveyed do not report having been involved in any type of direct victimization by crime, at least during the past year; 8.7% have been minor victims, and 6.8% reported being severe victims. As with previous exercises, this categorization will be useful in the future to measure the impact of victimization on certain social attitudes.

6.1.1 Reporting crimes

Only 30.9% of Salvadoran crime victims reported the crime they experienced.⁷³ If one considers the crime rate in the country, this is a particularly low percentage. However, the level of reporting is not the same for all crimes. Some crimes, such as assault without robbery and home invasions, are reported more frequently than others (46.2% and 83.3%, respectively). Robbery, however, is reported only 30% of the time; reports of robbery without battery or physical threat reach only 28.8% while robbery with battery is even lower at 26.4%.

⁷³ The question was: “AOJ1. Did you report this act to any institution?” (1) Yes (2) Did not report it (8) DK/NR.”




Figure VI.5 Reporting crimes, 2006.

It is also interesting to see that reporting does not change as a function of the gravity of the crime committed. Cross-referenced results of reporting crime as it relates to the seriousness of the effect on the victim shows no statistically significant differences between persons who have experienced serious and not as serious crimes.

A comparison of the rate of reporting crime obtained from the 2006 study with the rates determined in 1999 and 2004 show that this year's rate is the lowest in seven years. In 1999, the reporting rate was 35.1%; this percentage rose slightly to 37.5% in 2004. The seven point drop to 30.9% in 2006 suggests a drop in the level of trust in institutions in charge of providing public safety and justice.

Another signal of lack of institutional trust is to be found in the reasons why victims do not report crimes or thought about reporting them and decided not to. The 2006 study asks victims of criminal violence who did not report it to give their reasons: "AOJ1B. Why did you not report the crime?" Answer choices were: (1) It does no good; (2) It is dangerous and because I fear retaliation; (3) Did not have proof (4) It was not that serious; (5) Do not know where to go to report a crime. Figure VI.6 contains the distribution of responses.




Figure VI.6 Reasons for not reporting crimes, 2006.

More than half (55.6%) of those who experienced a crime and did not report it expressed that it does not good to do so; 20% said that it is dangerous and that they are afraid of retaliation; 16.7% said they had no proof that a crime had been committed; others said that the crime was not really serious (6.7%) or because they didn't know where or to whom to report the crime (1.1%). To argue that reporting crimes does no good, as half of the victims expressed, raises a red flag regarding the perceptions of institutions of justice and public safety. If the percentage of persons skeptical of the system is added to that of people who fear reprisals, the result is that the large majority of citizens feel that reporting crimes is unlikely to have any positive outcome.

Regarding this last point, another finding of the study is that 65.8% of those surveyed, victims as well as non-victims, have little or no confidence that the judicial system will punish the guilty parties,⁷⁴ while 34.2% is somewhat or very confident that the courts will mete out justice. These opinions among Salvadoran are even more worrisome when compared to the 2004 results of the same question. In 2004 the percentage of confidence in the judicial system was higher; 46.9% believed that the guilty would be punished. In contrast, although over half had little or no confidence in the judicial system (53.1% in the next figure), these percentages are 12% below what they are at the present time, a clear indication that confidence in justice has declined noticeably.

⁷⁴ This result come from question AOJ12, posed thus: "If you were the victim of a robbery or an assault, how confident would you feel that the judicial systems would punish the guilty party (parties)?"




Figure VI.7 Trust that the judicial system will punish those found guilty of having committed crimes, 2006.

This is in keeping with the previously discussed tendency of decline in reporting crimes to the authorities compared to two years ago. Moreover, this confirms the information examined in Chapter IV regarding institutions and support for the system—that overall trust and confidence in institutions of public safety and justice have declined since 2004.⁷⁵ Figure VI.8 show this difference.

⁷⁵ To compare the levels of confidence in judicial and public safety institutions, a variable was created to join items B1 (courts), B10 (justice system), B18 (National Civil Police and B31 (Supreme Court of Justice). This variable was converted into a scale of 0 (no confidence) to 100 (a great deal of confidence).




Figure VI.8. Level of trust in judicial and public safety institutions, 2004-2006.

On the other hand, the problem of the level of confidence regarding the fight against crime is not limited to the justice system. Sometimes even more importantly, it involves the police, those charged with safeguarding the public, maintaining order, and preventing crime. For this reason, the present study again included a question to measure Salvadoran perceptions of the police and how much trust the citizens have in them. Respondents were asked if they think that the police protect local citizens against crime or, on the contrary, if some police officers assigned to their neighborhoods are themselves involved in criminal activity.⁷⁶ The results are eye-opening: 54.9% of respondents feel that the police are participants in criminal activity while 45.1% that the police do their job of protecting citizens.

These results show a sizable, statistically significant increase in negative opinions of the police with respect to the 2004 results. The next figure illustrates that the perception of police as protectors dropped from 60.4% in 2004 to 45.1% in 2006 while critical opinions regarding their involvement in criminal activity, at least on a local level, rose in the same proportion (from 39.6% in 2004 to 54.9% in 2006). These data suggest an increasingly critical evaluation among the citizenry regarding the police. In spite of the fact that an important segment of the population continues to see the police as a trusted institution, as seen in Chapter IV, it is clear that in the public's view, the reputation of the police has suffered in the past two years.

⁷⁶ The question was asked: "AOJ18. Some people say that the police in this neighborhood (town) protect people from from criminals while others say that the police themselves are involved in criminal activity. What do you think? (1) The police protect us; (2) The police are involved in crime."




Figure VI.9 Opinions of the role of the police in the community, 2004-2006.

6.1.2 Victimization and trust in the system

In this section we confirm the hypothesis that victimization is closely related to support for the system, as much from the erosion of fundamental attitudes of upholding the rule of law as in terms of support for specific institutions and the system in general. In the first place, it points to an increase in citizens' contempt for respect for due process and for laws intended to fight crime. Secondly, it involves the impact of victimization on institutional trust.

The survey asked the following: "AOJ8. In order to capture criminals, do you think that the authorities should obey the law or can they sometimes act outside the law?" The purpose of the question was to measure how committed citizens are to respecting the law, and thus upholding the rule of law even in the face of challenges in combating crime. The results show that opinions are divided on this point even though more than half expressed commitment to obeying the law. Indeed, 56% of respondents said that the authorities should always obey the law while 44% said that under some circumstances they can skirt the law.




Figure VI.10 Opinions of authorities' respect for the law, 2006.

The fact that 44% of Salvadorans are willing to approve, in the interest of combating crime, operating outside the law or looking the other way when it occurs, cannot be taken lightly. This becomes even more critical in light of the 2004 data, which shows that this attitude has increased over the last two years. In 2004, 34.7% approved of acting outside the law to fight crime, almost 10% less than the current data indicate. This may be a result of the rise in crime over the same period.

On the other hand, when the impact of victimization by crime on trust in the justice system and institutions in general is analyzed, it is found that the former erodes trust in the latter: crime erodes trust in institutions. Individuals who have not been victimized by crime have more confidence in institutions in general whereas crime victims express much less trust in institutions such as the police, the office of the prosecutor, the courts, and the office of the attorney general as well as institutions in general. Figure VI.11 shows that trust in institutions has declined among crime victims although the differences in opinions between victims and non-victims are not highly relevant. What is important to note is that people who have been victimized by crime in the last year have less trust than those who have not.




Figure VI.11 Institutional trust according to level of victimization, 2006.

However, the most important effect of criminal violence is on diffuse attitudes of support for the system, that is, the attitudes that provide support for the entire system, not just for the presidency or the congress. Individuals who have been victimized by crime tend to mistrust specific institutions and institutions in general more than those who have not experienced a traumatizing criminal event. In addition, crime victims tend more often to think that democracy does not work properly, a fact that can be seen clearly in the next two figures.




Figure VI.12. Support for the system according to level of victimization, 2006.

When support for the system is cross-referenced with levels of crime victimization, it is found that non-victims are at 56.4 on the support for the system scale, minor victims are at 49.3, and severe victims are at 50.5 on the scale. While the differences between the latter two groups are not significant, the basic and statistically valid difference occurs among the non-victims. This allows for the conclusion that personal experience with violence erodes general attitudes of support for the system.

In a similar way, violence appears to affect satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance in the country. Figure VI.13 shows important differences in the opinions among crime victims and non-crime victims regarding the performance of democratic governance.⁷⁷ Individuals who have been involved in criminal events average ten points less than those who have not. Again, while the differences are not significant between the minor and severe victims, just the fact of having been victimized diminishes trust in the performance of democratic governance.

⁷⁷ To perform this analysis, the variable PN4 was recoded as a scale variable. Thus, individuals who said that they are very satisfied with the performance of democratic governance received a point value of 100; somewhat satisfied received 66; not very satisfied, 33, and not at all satisfied, 0.




Figure VI.13 Satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance according to level of victimization, 2006.

One aspect to be further explored is the conditions under which a coup d’etat would be justified in El Salvador. This is a delicate issue. Although coups are a part of the country’s political history, there has not been a coup in almost 30 years, nor are the conditions or motivation ripe for a coup to be in the offing. However, in the interest of gathering knowledge, the following battery of questions was included in the 2006 round of the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project:

Now, speaking of other topics, some people say that certain circumstances would justify that the military take power in a coup d’etat. In your opinion would the military be justified in doing this in light of the following circumstances: **[Read choices after each question]:**

JC1. When unemployment is very high.	(1) It would be justifiable for the military to take power	(2) It would not be justifiable for the military to take power	(8) DK/NR	JC1
JC4. During continuous social protest.	(1) It would be justifiable	(2) It would not be justifiable	(8) DK/NR	JC4
JC10. Under conditions of high crime.	(1) It would be justifiable	(2) It would not be justifiable	(8) DK/NR	JC10
JC12. With high inflation and an excessive rise in prices.	(1) It would be justifiable	(2) It would not be justifiable	(8) DK/NR	JC12
JC13. In a state of rampant corruption.	(1) It would be justifiable	(2) It would not be justifiable	(8) DK/NR	JC13

The results are shown in Figure VI.14. They reveal that the most common situation for which Salvadorans would approve of a government overthrow is under conditions of high crime, with 55% responding to this choice, the highest among the entire battery of questions. It is worth mentioning that the second most frequent justification for a coup was corruption, which corroborates the finding in the previous chapter that corruption impacts support for the system..




Figure VI.14 Justification of a coup d’etat according to various conditions,2006.

This does not mean in any way that Salvadoran citizens are eager to see a government overthrow. The data simply evidences the influence of crime on the legitimacy of the political system. People who worry about crime, and above all, about becoming victims of crime themselves, tend show lower support for the system.

6.2 Perception of insecurity due to crime

In the analysis of the impact of criminal violence on institutionalism in the country, the other important variable of this topic must be considered: citizen perception of safety. Not only is the fact of having been directly involved in a criminal event important, but also the subjective element of the perception of insecurity. More than one question about the topic of insecurity was included in the survey, one of them critical: “AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live, and thinking of the possibility of your becoming a victim of a robbery or an assault, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?” The results of this question indicate that only 22.4% of Salvadorans feel very safe when thinking about the possibility of becoming a crime victim; 30.5% feel somewhat safe while 47.1% feel very unsafe or not safe at all because of the prevalence of crime. Moreover, the data also indicate that the perception of security has diminished slightly since 2004, showing that in 2006 people feel less secure than they did two years ago.




Figure VI.15. Perception of safety, by year, 2004-2006.

These levels of perception of public safety place El Salvador closer to the bottom than the top of the rankings among the study countries when they are ordered as a function of its levels of insecurity that are coherent with other countries included in the 2006 round of studies; that is, this perception is above only that of the Dominican Republic, Bolivia and Peru..




Figure VI.16 A comparative view of the perception of safety, 2006.

This having been said, what are the factors behind the opinions about safety among Salvadorans? As in prior studies, a linear regression was done to establish the main predictors of levels of security (see Table VI.1, Appendix B). The results largely reiterate the previous findings and those of others highly specialized in this topic⁷⁸ by pointing out that the perception of safety depends on gender (men feel more secure than women do), family income (the higher the income, the safer people feel), and level of education (more schooling translates into higher levels of security). Other factors have been pointed out, and in view of their importance in the understanding of the complexity of violence, they will be discussed in this section.

A diversity of factors are involved in the perception of safety. Not all are personal variables. Regression shows the relevant contributions of environmental variables to the degree of security that Salvadoran feel in their daily lives. There are two of these relevant variables in this study: the perception of gang presence in the community and the perception of the role of the police as protectors of the community or as participants in crime.

In the first case, it is necessary to establish the fact the gangs constitute a relevant problem in the country and therefore it was important to gather opinions concerning the influence of these groups in the dynamic of lack of public safety. Figure VI.17 shows that 14% of those surveyed report that their neighborhoods are seriously affected by youth gangs, locally called *maras*; 9.5% indicated that their community was somewhat affected by gangs. A little more than 75% of the population reported little or no effect from gangs. A close look at these numbers reveals that an important sector of the population lives in unsafe conditions.

⁷⁸ See: Cruz, José Miguel y Santacruz Giralt, María. (2004). *La victimización y la percepción de seguridad en El Salvador en 2004*. San Salvador: Ministerio de Gobernación de El Salvador/ IUDOP.




Figure VI.17 Opinions regarding the effects of gangs on neighborhoods, 2006.

The perception of gang presence in the community produces a notable difference in the perception of safety in the population. Figure VI.18 shows that the perception of high security prevails in places where there are no gangs; as people’s feelings that the community is being increasingly affected by gang, levels of perceived safety drop. On a 0-100 scale the average for communities with no gangs was 62 while communities with gangs average less than 30.




Figure VI.18 Perception of safety according to the effects of gang activity, 2006.

According to survey data, the presence of gangs does not only generate a feeling of insecurity, but also victimization. The following figure shows the cross-referencing of percentages reported victims in this survey with gang presence in the community.




Figure VI.19 Victimization according to the effects of gang activity, 2006.

As mentioned earlier, the other variable linked to levels of perception of safety among the population is the opinion of the role of the police as protectors of the people against crime or as participants in crime themselves. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that perceptions of security are higher where people see the police as protectors of the citizenry. A look at Figure VI.20 reveals that perceptions of safety among those who view the police as protectors reach 56.4 points on the 0-100 scale; in contrast, people who think that the police are involved in crime average 40 on the scale, a difference of 10 points.




Figure VI.20 Perception of safety according to opinions about the role of the police, 2006.

Finally, the survey offers clear evidence that, as with victimization, the feeling of safety, or the perception of security, is associated with levels of support for the system and with satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance. Figure VI.21 presents the results of the cross-referencing of both variables. Support for the system as well as satisfaction with democratic governance increase significantly as the feeling of safety increases, as people feel more secure, freer from the possibility of becoming a victim of crime. Conversely, as the feeling of insecurity increases, people are less inclined to support the system and more inclined to believe that democracy does not function well.




Figure VI.21 Support for the system and satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance by level of security, 2006.

6.3 Conclusions

In this chapter, it has been shown that despite the fact that incidence of criminal violence evident from survey responses seems to be lower when compared to previous measurements of this element, violence and lack of public safety is a grave problem for close to half (44.5%) of all Salvadorans. Most survey subjects (86.4%) expressed that “the level of crime that we have in the country now represents a threat to our future wellbeing.”⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Question AOJ11a.




Figure VI.22 Opinions regarding delinquency as a threat to the social wellbeing of the country, 2006.

The data presented in this section show that about 15% of survey respondents have been victims of crime in the last year, and that most people do not report crimes because they believe that it does no good or because they are afraid of retaliation. This points to Salvadorans' trust in their institutions or lack thereof. This trust is seriously affected by violence and lack of public safety, creating a vicious cycle that widens the gap between the people and their institutions.

There are three predictors of the perception of lack of public safety: gender, family income and level of education. The analysis has incorporated two contextual factors: juvenile gang presence in communities, and the perception of the role of the police as the protectors of the community or as participants in crime.

Finally, in this chapter it has been shown that crime and lack of public safety contribute to the erosion of institutional trust, legitimacy of the political system, and evaluation of the performance of democratic governance.

VII. Local governments

In this chapter we will explore the topics of Salvadorans' attitudes and evaluations concerning their local governments. In the first of eight sections, the relation between citizens and various levels of government is examined; in the second, citizen participation in municipal government is analyzed. In the third section, we look at citizen satisfaction with municipal services; in the fourth, satisfaction with treatment received at municipal government offices; and fifth, opinions regarding who should have more duties and more funds. In the sixth section, willingness to pay taxes is examined; in the seventh, trust in municipalities as institutions; and finally, conclusions derived from the data are presented.

7.1 Citizens' relations with various levels of government

In a prior study on the relationship between citizens and the various levels of national and local governments, the closeness of the citizenry's connection to local governments was indicated by the following elements: knowledge of the name of the mayor (51%) or knowledge of terms of office to which members of municipal assemblies are elected (45%), in contrast to "only 20.1% knowing how long the president's term of office is and only 18.1% knowing the exact number of representatives in the national Legislative Assembly."⁸⁰

Since these questions were not included in the questionnaire used in the present study, we will examine citizen closeness to local governments using a battery of three questions designed to explore the relationship or eventual contact of the survey subjects with national government, representatives, and municipalities. Participants were asked:

In order to solve your problems, have you ever asked for assistance or cooperation from. . .

CP2. A representative of the Legislative Assembly?

CP4A. A local (municipal) authority?

CP4. A ministry/department, public institution, or state government office?

Yes, No, DK/NR".

To simplify the analysis, the answer choices were recoded into a 0-100 format.⁸¹ Since these questions appeared on the 2004 survey, the following figure contains the results from both years that the questions were used. Overall, between 2004 and 2006 there was a decline in requests for assistance from the above mentioned three government sectors, the largest being municipal government. On the other hand, the data from 2006 show a tendency toward a closer relationship with municipal governments, in terms of having requested assistance from members of the assembly, continues: 6% of respondents have requested assistance from representatives, 9.1% from the state government, and 24.1% from municipal governments.

⁸⁰ Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Orellana, Víctor A. (2001). *Cultura Política, gobierno local y descentralización. El Salvador*. Volumen III. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO y FLACSO-Programa El Salvador, p 39.

⁸¹ Another question was designed from each original item; thus, CP2 became CP2R, CP4 became CP4R, and CP4A became CP4AR. The new questions were recoded into 1=100 and 2=0, and the "don't know" answer choices were removed. The new answer format is 0-100.




Figure VII.1 From whom have you sought assistance?, 2004 y 2006.

Regarding individuals who sought help from the municipality, it appears that population stratum is an associated factor. As can be seen in Figure VII.2, inhabitants of less populated municipalities (<20,000 and between 20,000 and 50,000 inhabitants) have a higher average of requests for municipal government assistance; however, the average drops for more highly populated municipalities.




Figure VII.2. Requests for municipal government assistance, by populational stratum, 2006.

7.2 Participation municipal government activities

In this section two types of civic participation in local government will be explored: attendance at town hall meetings and presentation of applications for assistance or petitions.

7.2.1 Attendance at town hall meetings

The survey asked participants: “NP1. Have you attended an open town hall meeting or a municipal session during the last twelve months? (1) Yes, (2) No, (8) Don’t know/Don’t remember”. The question was designed to explore levels of civil participation regarding open town hall meetings⁸² as a traditional form of civil participation appearing in the Municipal Code; however, the question design also seeks to determine attendance at other meetings called by the Municipal Council. Figure VII.3 shows that 10.7% attended a town hall meeting in 2006.

⁸² Another study indicated that “the mechanism acquired a great deal of political and institutional legitimacy at the end of the 1980s and became part of a government action strategy aimed at providing basic infrastructure to small communities to foment a closer relationship between municipal authorities and their communities. It was used as a means of putting community members in touch with the local political organ, and in this way channelling community demands to the political system.’ However, this mechanism has shown limitations in format, and in some cases, it became a requirement that had to be fulfilled. Thus, in recent years questions have arisen as to its effectiveness in promoting civil participation in the affairs of local governments.” Córdova y Cruz, (2005).




Figure VII.3 Attendance at a town hall meeting in the last year, 2006.

Consistent with other studies concerning civil participation in local public affairs, Figure VII.4 shows that as municipal populations decrease, attendance at town hall meetings and other municipal meetings increases. The data show higher attendance at meetings in small municipalities.




Figure VII.4 Attendance at a town hall meeting in the last year according to populational stratum, 2006.

Survey participants were asked the following question: “NP1B. How much attention do you think that municipal officials pay to requests that they receive at these meetings?” (1) A great deal, (2) Some, (3) Little, (4) None, (8) Do not know”. Figure VII.5, according to the 2006 data, shows a degree of skepticism about how much attention is paid by municipal officials to community demands at these meetings: 10% said a lot, 21.9% some, 40.3% little, 27.8% none.




Figure VII.5 How much attention do municipal officials pay to citizens' requests at meetings?, 2006.

7.2.2 Determiners of attendance at town hall meetings

Since our dependent variable is dichotomic—yes, I attended, or no, I did not attend—we performed a logistical regression to examine the determinants of attendance at town hall meetings or other types of gatherings.⁸³ There are five principle predictors: gender, populational stratum of place of residence, exposure to the news, perception of how much local government represents citizen interests, and whether a person worked for a candidate or party in the 2004 presidential election. Age and educational level variables were kept in the model despite their being statistically insignificant. (See Table VII.1 in Appendix B).

7.2.3 A comparative view of attendance at town hall meetings

In the analysis of data obtained for El Salvador within the framework of this comparative study in 2006, it is found that El Salvador is in the group of countries showing an intermediate level of attendance at municipal meetings in that last year, below the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Peru, Haiti, Bolivia and Nicaragua.

⁸³ To perform the logistical regression analysis, question NP1 was changed to NP1R. The answer choices were recoded to 0 (no) to 100 (yes) and the “do not know” choice was deleted. Thus the new answer format is 0-100.




Figure VII.6 A comparative view of attendance at town hall meetings in the last year, 2006.

7.2.4 Submission of requests for assistance or petitions

Attendance at meetings can be considered a passive form of political participation, and thus, the questionnaire has an item designed to measure a more active form of political participation: “NP2 Have you requested assistance or presented a petition to any office, official, councilman or municipal trustee in the last 12 months? (1) Yes, (2) No, (8) Do not know/Do not remember.” This question appeared on the 2004 survey, and the results of both years appear in the figure that follows. Figure VII.7 shows a rise in submission of requests or petitions to municipalities in 2006 (20) compared to 12.2 in 2004.




Figure VII.7 Have you requested assistance or presented a petition to the municipality in the last twelve months?, 2004 y 2006.

7.2.5 A comparative view of submission of requests for assistance or petitions to municipal governments

In the analysis of data obtained for El Salvador within the framework of this comparative study in 2006, it is found that El Salvador is in the group of countries showing the highest level of submission of requests for assistance or petitions to municipal governments in the last year, below Peru and Chile.




Figure VII.8 A comparative view of submission of requests for assistance or presentation of petitions, 2006.

7.3 Satisfaction with municipal services

To measure citizen satisfaction with municipal services in general, the following question was included in the questionnaire: “SGL1. Would you say that services provided by the municipality are (1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Neither good nor bad, (4) Bad, (5) Very bad?, (8) Don’t know.” This question was also asked in the 2004 survey, and the following figure presents the results from both years. Figure VII.9 shows a less positive evaluation for municipal services in 2006 than in 2004.




Figure VII.9 Satisfaction with services provided by municipalities, 2006.

7.3.1 Representation of citizen interests and satisfaction with services provided by municipalities

The evaluation of whether local government (city hall and municipal assembly) represents citizen interests⁸⁴ is found to be a factor associated with survey subjects’ satisfaction with services provided by municipalities. Figure VII.10 demonstrates that as evaluations that city hall and the municipal assembly represent citizen interests become more positive, the tendency is for satisfaction with services provided by municipalities to rise.⁸⁵

1.1 ⁸⁴ Question ELSPN3C on the questionnaire was fashioned as follows: “To what extent do you believe that city hall and the municipal assembly where you live represent you interests and helps you as a citizen? (1) Very much, (2) Somewhat, (3) Little, (4) Not al all, and (8) Do not know/No response”.

⁸⁵ To simplify the analysis, a new variable (SGL1R) was created from question SGL1, recoded only to have a 0-100 format. The next analysis uses this recoded question..




Figure VII.10 Satisfaction with services provided by municipalities according to representation of citizen interests by local government, 2006.

7.3.2 Satisfaction with municipal services (1995-2006)

This same question appeared on the 1995, 1999 and 2004 national surveys and thus, we can observe the evolution of the levels of satisfaction with services provided by municipalities during the period of 1995-2006. In 1995 the average was 52; it rises to 56 in 1999, rises one point to 57 in 2004 and falls to 55 in 2006.

7.3.3 Determiners of satisfaction with municipal services

Table VII.2 (see Appendix B) presents the results of the multiple regression analysis with the statistically significant predictors of satisfaction with services provided by municipalities when each of the other variables remains constant. There are six main predictors of satisfaction with municipal services: educational level, interpersonal trust, evaluation of the country's economic picture, treatment received in municipalities, perception that local government represents citizen interests, and exposure to the news. The educational level and gender variables have been kept in the model despite their not being statistically significant.

7.3.4 A comparative view of satisfaction with municipal services

In the analysis of data obtained for El Salvador within the framework of this comparative study in 2006, it is found that El Salvador is in the group of countries showing the highest level of satisfaction with municipal services, below the Dominican Republic and Ecuador. On the other hand, and as mentioned earlier, El Salvador shows a decline in the level of satisfaction with municipal services (from 57.3 in 2004 to 54.5 in 2006).




Figure VII.11 A comparative view of satisfaction with municipal services, 2006.

7.4 Satisfaction with treatment received in municipalities

To measure citizen satisfaction with treatment received in municipalities, the following survey question was asked: “SGL2. How do you feel that you or your neighbors have been treated when you have gone to municipal offices for assistance? Have you been treated (1) very well, (2) well, (3) neither well nor badly, (4) badly or (5) very badly, (8) Do not know.” This question was included on the 2004 survey, and thus the next figure shows results for both years. In Figure VII.12, the evaluation in 2006 is slightly more positive than that of 2004 with respect to treatment received in municipalities.




Figure VII.12. Satisfaction with treatment received in municipalities, 2004 and 2006.

7.4.1 Representation of citizen interest and satisfaction with treatment received in municipalities.

The evaluation of the representation of citizen interests by local government (city hall and municipal assembly) is determined to be a factor associated with satisfaction of survey subjects with treatment received in municipalities. Figure VII.13 shows that as the evaluation of city hall and the municipal assembly representing citizen interest rises, the tendency is for satisfaction with treatment received in municipalities to rise as well.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ To simplify the analysis, a new variable (SGL2R) was created from question SGL2, recoded only to have a 0-100 format. The recoded question is used in the following analysis.




Figure VII.13 Satisfaction with services received in municipalities according to local governments' representation of citizen interests, 2006.

7.4.2 Determiners of treatment received in municipalities

Table VII.3 (see Appendix B) presents the results of the multiple regression analysis with the statistically significant predictors of satisfaction with treatment received in municipalities when each of the other variables remains constant. There are five main predictors of satisfaction with treatment received in municipalities: age, interpersonal confidence, satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance, satisfaction with municipal services, and perception of interests being represented by local governments. The educational level and gender variables have been kept in the model despite their not being statistically significant.

7.5 To whom should more obligations and money be given?

The survey contained a question designed to explore participants' opinions about whether more resources should be assigned to national or local government. They were asked: "LGL2. In your opinion, should more obligations and more money be given to the municipality or should we let the national government assume more obligations and municipal services?" The 2006 data reveal that 50.3% believe that the national government should assume more obligations and municipal services while 36.4% felt that more obligations and funds should be assigned to the municipalities; 2.8% believed that municipalities should undertake more and receive more funds but only on condition that they provide better services. A combined total of 39.2% were favorable toward local government; 5.3% said that they preferred that no change be made and another 5.2% do not know. Figure VII.14 illustrates the responses but does not include the "do not know/no response" choices.




Figure VII.14 Should more obligations and money be given to national or local government?, 2006.

7.5.1 To whom should more obligations and money be given? (1995-2006)

Since data from national surveys taken in 1995, 1999, and 2004 are available, is it possible to see the evolution of the levels of support for national and local government. 34.5% of survey subjects felt that the national government should assume more obligations and municipal services while 26.1% thought that more obligations and funds should be assigned to the municipalities; 17.9% believed that municipalities should undertake more and receive more funds but only on condition that they provide better services. A combined total of 44% favor local government; 15.7% did not know/did not respond, and 5.8% preferred that no change be made.

In 1999, 38.3% of those surveyed felt that national governments should assume responsibilities for more obligations and municipal services while 43.4% said that this should be done through the municipalities, with 3.7% saying that municipalities should undertake more and receive more funds but only on condition that they provide better services. A combined total of 47.1% favor local government; 12.9% did not know/did not respond, and 1.6% preferred that no change be made.

In another study done in 1999, it was reported that opinions on this matter were highly divided: 45.9% favored the municipalities, 43% national government, and 11% did not know/did not respond.⁸⁷

In the 2004 survey a more favorable opinion of the national government's assuming more obligations and municipal services (45.9%) in contrast to 39.5% who said it should be local governments. Ten and nine tenths percent did not know or did not respond, and 3.7% said that they preferred no change. This indicates an important change with respect to the findings reported in previous studies in which strengthening the municipalities was more favored.

The 2006 survey data also indicate a more favorable opinion of the national government's assuming more obligations and municipal services, 50.3%, in contrast to 39.2% favoring local government; 5.2% do not know/no response, and 5.3% preferred no change.

A hypothesis to explore is whether these differences are related to Salvadoran political attitudes at the time of the 2006 elections, in the sense of whether favoring national government or local government is closely tied to survey subjects' political preferences. To measure party preferences, we asked which party participants voted for in the 2006 legislative elections; later the question was recoded into three choices: ARENA, FMLN, and other parties. Figure VII.15 indicates that ARENA sympathizers favor the national government while FMLN sympathizers favor the municipalities; sympathizers of other parties are distributed equally between national and local governments. In the future this topic should be examined more in depth.

⁸⁷ Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Orellana, Víctor A. (2000). *Cultura política en torno a los gobiernos locales y la descentralización en El Salvador. Informe final de la encuesta*. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO y FLACSO-Programa El Salvador, p 19.




Figure VII.15 To whom should more responsibilities and more funds be given, according to political preference, 2006.

7.6 Willingness to pay higher taxes

The survey question was as follows: “LGL3. Would you be willing to pay higher municipal taxes in order to have better municipal services or do you think it is not worth it to pay higher municipal taxes? (1) Willing to pay higher taxes, (2) Not worth it to pay higher taxes, (8) Don’t know.” In Figure VII.16 it can be seen that 80.8% think that it is not worth it to pay higher taxes while 19.2% said that they would be willing to pay higher taxes so that the municipality could provide better services.




Figure VII.16 Willingness to pay higher municipal taxes, 2006.

7.6.1 Willingness to pay higher taxes (1995-2006)

When the results of this question are compared to those of the national surveys taken between 1995 and 2006, the following behavior can be seen: in 1995 20.9% expressed that they were willing to pay higher taxes; this percentage rises to 26.8% in 1999, drops to 22.3% in 2004 and drops again to 19.2% in 2006.⁸⁸

7.7 Trust in municipal governments

Question B32, which seeks to measure the level of trust in the municipality as an institution,⁸⁹ was changed to variable B32R with a 0-100 format. Figure VII.17 indicates a slight decline in trust in municipalities between 2004 and 2006.

⁸⁸ The “do not know” choice was deleted from this question.

⁸⁹ Subjects were asked: To what extent do you trust your municipality? Question B32 has a six-point format which was recoded to a 0-100 format.




Figure VII.17 Trust in municipalities, 2004 y 2006.

7.7.1 Determiners of trust in municipalities

In Table VII.4 (see Appendix B), we present the multiple regression analysis results with the statistically significant predictors of trust in municipalities when each variable remains constant. The five principle predictors of trust in municipalities are: level of education, interpersonal confidence, treatment received at municipal offices, satisfaction with municipal services, and the perception of interests as represented by local government. The variable of gender and age are retained despite their not being statistically significant.

7.8 Conclusions

In this chapter Salvadoran attitudes and evaluations concerning local governments have been presented. The data evidence a greater closeness of the citizenry to local governments in terms of having requested assistance in solving problems although this closeness declined between 2004 and 2006.

In general, we find the same relatively low levels of civic participation regarding two issues asked in the survey: attendance to municipal meetings (10.7) and presentation of requests for help or petitions (20).

Overall, there is trust in municipalities. The data indicate satisfaction with municipal services in general and satisfaction with treatment received at city hall.

When subjects were asked who should have more responsibilities and more funding, 53% said state government; 41.4% local governments; and 5.6% opted for the status quo. This finding shows a change from prior studies in which a more favorable opinion about strengthening the municipalities was expressed. This is a topic that warrants deeper analysis in future studies, and in this report the hypothesis that these differences have to do with Salvadoran political attitudes in the political climate of 2006 is explored.

VIII. Voting behavior

This chapter explores the topic of voting behavior among Salvadoran citizens. The first section examines the characteristics of individuals who voted and individuals who did not vote in recent elections; the second deals with representation of citizen interests; in the third, we analyze the evaluations of political parties. In the fourth section, political ideology is discussed; in the fifth we look at evaluations of the current administration; and in the sixth section we present conclusions.

8.1 Salvadoran voters

Within the processes of establishing peace and democratization in Central America,⁹⁰ free, competitive elections have been becoming institutionalized.⁹¹ Moreover, these processes have been taking place steadily and within pre-established dates.⁹² Although there are still technical problems which must be resolved, in elections held during the last decade in Central America, no accusations of voting fraud have been, losers have accepted defeat, and there have been peaceful transitions between old and new administrations.

Since the signing of the Peace Agreements in 1992, El Salvador has developed a busy electoral calendar. Three presidential elections have taken place (1994, 1999 y 2004), and five legislative and municipal elections (1994, 1997, 2000, 2003 y 2006) in an approximately two year cycle.

Post-war elections have been characterized first by a tendency involving declining voter turnout, calculated on the basis of voting age citizens: 47.3% in the presidential election of 1994, 48% in legislative elections in 1994, 35.3% in the legislative election in 1997, 34.5% in the presidential election in 1999, 34.05% in the legislative elections in 2000, and 36.9% in the legislative elections in 2003.⁹³ Since 2004, turnout has increased: it was 57.5% in the presidential election of 2004.

In the 2003 legislative elections 1.39 million votes were cast, and 2.27 million voted in the presidential election in March, 2004. This represents a highly significant increase in voter

⁹⁰ For a view of the process of democratization in Central America, see:

Maihold, Günther y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (2001). *Democracia y ciudadanía en Centroamérica*. En: R. Córdova Macías, G. Maihold y S. Kurtenbach (compiladores) (2001). *Pasos hacia una nueva convivencia: democracia y participación en Centroamérica*. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO, Instituto de Estudios Iberoamericanos de Hamburgo e Instituto Ibero-Americano de Berlín.

Seligson, Mitchell A. y Booth, John A. (eds.) (1995). *Elections and Democracy in Central America, Revisited*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

⁹¹ Competitive elections must meet at least three criteria: “universal adult suffrage;” fair voting, guaranteed by procedures such as secret vote and public scrutiny as well as the absence of electoral fraud, violence or intimidation; and the right to form political parties and nominate candidates for office, which allows voters to elect from among the candidates clearly distinguishable public policy platforms.” See: Ozbudun, Ergun (1989). *Studies on Comparative Elections. Comparative Politics*, 21, 2, p 238.

⁹² See also: Index of Electoral Democracy prepared by the PNUD in PNUD (2004). *La Democracia en América Latina. Hacia una democracia de ciudadanos y ciudadanas*.

⁹³ See: Córdova Macías, Ricardo (2003). *El Salvador (1982-2003). Una aproximación al abstencionismo electoral*. Mimeo. TSE. Resultados elecciones 2004 y 2006.

turnout. The Electoral Registry reported 3,442,393 registered voters, which translated into a 67.3% turnout for the 2004 presidential election; for the municipal elections in March, 2006 turnout was 54.2%.

In the following pages, voter behavior in the March 2006 election will be analyzed. According to the survey, 94% of subjects reported having a Documento Único de Identidad (DUI) [individual identity card]. In addition, 67.9% of participants said that they had voted in the 2004 presidential election, a percentage that closely matches the number who actually voted. On the other hand, 65.6% said that they had voted in the legislative elections of 2006, slightly higher than the number that actually voted.

The survey contains a battery of questions regarding the 2004 presidential election: “VB2. Did you vote in the last presidential election? (1) Voted (2) Did not vote, (8) DK”. “ELSVB3. For whom did you vote in the last presidential election? Only those who said that they had not voted were asked: “VB4. Why didn’t you vote in the last presidential election? “VB8. When you voted, what was the most important reason for your vote? In Figure VIII.1, the results of this last question are presented; those who did not vote were omitted. Sixty-one and eight tenths percent voted on the basis of the candidate’s platform; 24.2% because of the candidate’s qualities, and 14% because of the candidate’s political party.



Figure VIII.1 Most important reason for vote cast in presidential election, 2004.

The following table shows that for ARENA voters in the 2004 presidential election, 57.9% said that the most important factor was the candidate’s platform, followed by the candidate’s qualities (26.4%), and third, the candidate’s party (15.8%). For those who voted for the FMLN, the candidate’s platform was of even greater importance (67.4%), followed by the candidate’s political party (16.8%), and third the candidate’s qualities (15.8%). Voters for other parties said that platform was the most important factor (57.4%), followed by the candidate’s qualities (37%), and at a distant third, the candidate’s party (5.6%).

		(ELSVB3R) Partido por el que votó presidenciales 2004 a)			Total
		ARENA	FMLN	Otros	
vb8 Cuando votó, ¿cuál fue la razón MÁS IMPORTANTE de su voto?	Las cualidades del candidato	112 (26.4%)	48 (15.8%)	20 (37.0%)	180 (23.0%)
	El partido político del candidato	67 (15.8%)	51 (16.8%)	3 (5.6%)	121 (15.5%)
	El plan de gobierno del candidato	246 (57.9%)	205 (67.4%)	31 (57.4%)	482 (61.6%)
		425 (100.0%)	304 (100.0%)	54 (100.0%)	783 (100.0%)

Table VIII.1. Most important reason for vote cast in 2004 presidential election cross-referenced with party voted for in the 2004 presidential election, recoded.

8.1.1 An educated guess as to why some citizens do not vote

In IUDOP’s experience in taking surveys concerning voting behavior, it has been found that “most Salvadoran’s are reluctant to publicly say that they do not intend to vote. This also applies when they are asked whether they actually voted or not they voted in a previous.”⁹⁴ This presents important challenges in devising research strategies to analyze this type of topic. This is why the survey for this study included two questions: one with the purpose of determining the reasons why some citizens did not vote in the last election and another to explore opinions about why people other than themselves did not vote.

When participants were asked for reasons why they did not vote, they were first asked if they had voted in the March, 2004 election. Then, only those who did not vote were asked: “VB4. Why did you not vote in the last presidential election?” Table VIII.2 lists the reasons offered for not voting. Of the reasons mentioned, the first is being underage (19.3%); lack of identity card (18.4%), lack of interest (17%), illness (13.3%), having to work/lack of time (10.2%) and lack of belief in the system (9.3%). All other reasons given total 12.4%.

⁹⁴ See: Cruz, José Miguel. (1998). Las razones del abstencionismo en El Salvador en 1997. En: R. Córdova Macías (compilador). *El abstencionismo electoral en Nicaragua y El Salvador*. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO, p 31.

		Frecuencia	Porcentaje	Porcentaje válido	Porcentaje acumulado
Válidos	No tener edad necesaria	106	6.1	19.3	19.3
	Falta de cédula de identidad	101	5.8	18.4	37.8
	Falta de interés	93	5.4	17.0	54.7
	Enfermedad	73	4.2	13.3	68.1
	Tener que trabajar / Falta de tiempo	56	3.2	10.2	78.3
	No cree en el sistema	51	2.9	9.3	87.6
	Otra razón	29	1.7	5.3	92.9
	No le gustó ningún candidato	14	.8	2.6	95.4
	Falta de transporte	11	.6	2.0	97.4
	No se encontró en padrón electoral	10	.6	1.8	99.3
	Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado	3	.2	.5	99.8
	Incapacidad física o discapacidad	1	.1	.2	100.0
	Total	548	31.7	100.0	
Perdidos	No aplica	1176	68.0		
	NS/NR	5	.3		
	Total	1181	68.3		
Total		1729	100.0		

Table VIII.2. Reasons for not voting in the 2004 presidential election.

The question regarding why voters thought that those other than themselves did not vote was posed as follows: “ELSVB21. As you know, a important number of people did not vote for representatives and mayors in the 2006 elections. Which of the following reason do you think explains why they did not vote? (1) Lack of transportation, (2) Illness, (3) Lack of interest, (4) Did not like any of the candidates, (5) Do not believe in the system, (6) Lack of identification card, (7) Not listed on voter rolls, (10) Not old enough, (11) Arrived after polls closed, (12) Had to work/lack of time, (13) Physically or mentally disabled, (14) Other, (88) DK/NR”. Table VIII.3 indicates that the most frequently given reason for not voting is lack of interest (34.8%), followed by lack of belief in the system (31.7%), did not like any of the candidates, (8.6%), No DUI [ID card] (6.3%), illness (4.6%) and had to work/lack of time (3.8%). The total of other reasons given is 10.2%.

		Frecuencia	Porcentaje	Porcentaje válido	Porcentaje acumulado
Válidos	Falta de interés	581	33.6	34.8	34.8
	No cree en el sistema	529	30.6	31.7	66.5
	No le gustó ningún candidato	144	8.3	8.6	75.1
	Falta de cédula de identidad	105	6.1	6.3	81.4
	Enfermedad	77	4.5	4.6	86.0
	Tener que trabajar / Falta de tiempo	64	3.7	3.8	89.9
	Otra razón	56	3.2	3.4	93.2
	Falta de transporte	38	2.2	2.3	95.5
	No se encontró en padrón electoral	36	2.1	2.2	97.7
	Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado	15	.9	.9	98.6
	No tener edad necesaria	15	.9	.9	99.5
	Incapacidad física o discapacidad	9	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	1669	96.5	100.0	
	Perdidos	NS/NR	60	3.5	
Total		1729	100.0		

Table VIII.3. Reasons for not voting in the 2006 legislative elections.

To summarize, when asked why they did not vote in the 2004 presidential election, Salvadorans indicated personal problems most frequently (being underage, 19.3%; illness, 13.3%; and having to work, 10.2%) or technical problems (no DUI [ID card], 18.4%); and secondly lack of interest in the election (17%) or lack of belief in the system (9.2%). Reasons for not voting in the 2006 legislative election were, first, lack of interest in going to vote (34.8%), lack of belief in the system (31.7%) or not liking any of the candidates (8.6%); personal and technical problems were second (no DUI [ID card] 6.3%, illness, 4.6%; and having to work, 3.8%).

8.1.2 Evaluation of whether or not recent elections reflect the will of the people

The questionnaire includes a question designed to measure whether subjects felt that recent elections reflect the will of the people.⁹⁵ Figure VIII.2 shows that 28.5% feels that they do very much, 22.5% somewhat, 38.5% little and 10.4% not at all.

⁹⁵ Question ELSVB15.




Figure VIII.2 Evaluation of whether the result of recent elections reflects the will of the people, 2006.

Political preference is a factor associated with whether recent elections reflect the will of the people. Figure VIII.3 shows the evaluation to be higher for those who voted for ARENA (66.4), followed by those who voted for other parties (57.5); the lowest was from those who voted for FMLN(52.5).




Figure VIII.3 Evaluation of whether the result of recent elections reflects the will of the people, according to party voted for in legislative election, 2006.

8.1.3 Voting determiners

Since our dependent variable is dichotomic—did vote/did not vote—we used logistical regression to examine determiners of voting.⁹⁶ Table VIII.4.a (see Appendix B), presents the results of the model with the statistically significant predictors of intention to vote when each of the other variables remain constant. There are eight basic predictors: populational stratum of area of residence, rating of the president's job performance, having worked for a candidate or party in recent elections, interest in politics, age, party sympathies, evaluation of the result of recent elections reflects the will of the people, and political knowledge. Three variables have been kept in the model despite their not being statistically significant: educational level, ownership of material goods, and gender.

8.1.4 Sociodemographic reasons

According to numerous studies on voting behavior in the United States, education, gender, and age are the most important factors in predicting the vote. In the literature it has been indicated that those who vote least are youth and elders.

⁹⁶ For this chapter, VB6 (voted in 2006 legislative elections) was recoded so that those who did not vote were assigned a point value of 0 and 100 to those who did vote. The new variable is called VB6R.

The relation between intention to vote and age resembles an inverted “U;” those who have recently attained voting age are the lowest number of voters; voting increases as age increases until maturity, when interest in voting begins to wane.⁹⁷ The data from the 2006 El Salvador survey were adapted to this pattern, as can be seen in Figure VIII.4.




Figure VIII.4. Voting, by age, 2006.

As for educational level (see Figure VIII.5), those lacking any formal education vote less; voting increases as educational level increases. As indicated earlier, although educational level was not statistically significant in the regression model, it was significant in the bivariate analysis.

⁹⁷ See: Seligson, Mitchell A. et al. (1995). Who Votes in Central America? A Comparative Analysis. En: Seligson, M. A. y Booth, J. (Eds.) *Elections and Democracy in Central America*, Revisited. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.




Figure VIII.5 Voting, by level of educational level, 2006.

In Figure VIII.5, the intention to vote can be seen in light of educational level controlled for gender. There is an important gap between men and women regarding the intention to vote for those who have no formal education; the tendency declines for elementary school, but from secondary forward, the intention to vote is similar between men and women.




Figure VIII.6 Voting according to educational level, by gender, 2006.

8.1.5 Income level and intention to vote

Instead of using the income level variable, we used a scale of home furnishings, which was created from various questions regarding the presence of material goods in the home.⁹⁸ Figure VIII.7 shows that the intention to vote rises as home furnishings rise. The possession of material goods variable was not statistically significant in the regression model, but it was significant in the bivariate analysis.

⁹⁸ The creation of the scale was discussed in Chapter IV. For purposes of the bivariate analysis, this scale is trichotomized into low, medium and high levels of home furnishings.





Figure VIII.7 Voting according to home furnishings, 2006.

8.1.6 Political factors

In prior studies it has been pointed out that there exists a relationship between the intention to vote, and interest in and evaluation of political activities⁹⁹ In the pages that follow, we explore the relationship between the intention to vote using diverse political variables. The item on the questionnaire asked the following: “POL1. How interested are you in politics? A great deal somewhat, not much, not at all. Figure VIII.8 shows that people who are more interested in politics have higher intentions to vote, a tendency that declines as interest in politics declines.




Figure VIII.8 Voting according to interest in politics, 2006.

Survey subjects’ experience with electoral participation is found to be a factor of intention to vote; thus the dimension of involvement is explored. The survey asks: “PP2. Some people work for a party or a candidate during election campaigns. Did you work for a candidate or party during the 2004 presidential election? Figure VIII.9 indicates that people who were politically active show a greater intention to vote than those who were not.

⁹⁹ Seligson, Mitchell A.; Cruz, José Miguel y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (2000). *Auditoría de la democracia*. El Salvador 1999. San Salvador: Universidad de Pittsburgh, IUDOP y FUNDAUNGO. Córdova y Cruz. (2005).




Figure VIII.9 Voting according involvement in political campaigns, 2006.

Another factor associated with the intention to vote is party affiliation. The survey asked: “VB10. At this time, do you sympathize with any political party? (1) Yes, (2) No, (8) DK”. In the following figure the intention to vote is shown to be greater among those who sympathize with a party (78.9) compared to those who do not (59.5).




Figure VIII.10 Voting according to party preference, 2006.

8.2 Representation of citizens' interests

The questionnaire included a battery of three questions designed to measure citizen perceptions with respect to representing their interests in three political contexts in which candidates are elected by popular vote: the national government, the legislative assembly, and local governments.

For the first, the survey subjects were asked: “ELSPN3A. How much do you believe that the national government represents you and helps you as a citizen? (1) a great deal, (2) somewhat, (3) not much, (4) not at all (8) do not know/ no response.” Figure VIII.11 shows that 13.4% said “a great deal,” 20.1% somewhat, 40.4% not much and 26.1% not at all.




Figure VIII.11 National government represents interests, 2006.

In addition, it was asked: “ELSPN3B. How much do you think that representatives in the Legislative Assembly represent your interest and help you as a citizen? (1) a great deal, (2) somewhat, (3) little, (4) not at all, and (8) don’t know/no response.” Figure VIII.12 shows that 7.1% said a great deal, 17% somewhat, 41.6% little, and 34.2% not at all.




Figure VIII.12. Legislative Assembly representative represents interests, 2006.

It was also asked: “ELSPN3C. To what extent do you think that city hall in your town and the municipal council represent your interests and help you as a citizen? (1) a great deal, (2) somewhat, (3) little, (4) not at all, and (8) don’t know/no response.” Figure VIII.13 shows that 17.2% said a great deal, 23% somewhat, 38.7% little, and 21.1% not at all.




Figure VIII.13 City Hall and municipal council represent interests, 2006.

To simplify the comparison of survey subject opinions regarding representation of citizen interests, a scale was devised with the averages of the three questions.¹⁰⁰ Figure VIII.14 presents the citizen opinion average of perceptions on how much these political institutions represent their interests. The integrated scale average of the three questions is 39.4, almost the same level of favorable opinion of national government (40.2); representatives scored lower (32.3), and city halls and municipal councils the lowest (45.4).

¹⁰⁰ This scale is formatted from 0-100.




Figure VIII.14. Comparison of representation of interests, 2006.

8.3 Evaluations of political parties

The questionnaire included a battery of questions designed to explore different aspects related to party politics. First were levels of trust; second, the closeness of the relationship; third, evaluations of party performance; and fourth, opinions about two topics on the agenda of electoral reform.

8.3.1 Levels of trust in parties

The questionnaire included a question designed to measure trust in political parties on a 1-7 point format, as explained earlier. To simplify the analysis, the original question (B21) was reformatted to a 0-100 scale (B21R). Since the same question appeared in the 2004 survey, in Figure VIII.15 it can be seen that levels of trust in political parties in 2004 and 2006 are low. As discussed in Chapter IV, trust in political parties has declined between 2004 (39.9) and 2006 (35.1).




Figure VIII.15 Trust in political parties, 2004 and 2006.

The following figure shows the 2006 measure of trust in political parties by ideology, measured on the left-to-right self-positioning scale.




Figure VIII.16 Trust in political parties by ideology, 2006.

8.3.2 Closeness of relationships with political parties

The survey included several questions with the purpose of measuring the closeness of relationships of survey subjects to political parties. To repeat, first, subjects were asked if they sympathized with any party (VB10); second, how close they felt to the party with which they sympathize (ELSVB12), and third, to what extent do they think that that party represents their interests (ELSVB13).

Figure VIII.17 shows that 31.3% sympathize with a political party.




Figure VIII.17 Do you sympathize with any political party at this time? 2006.

Figure VIII.18 shows, among those who sympathize with a political party,¹⁰¹ how close they feel to that party; 28.8% feel very close, 34.3% somewhat close, 30.6% not very close, and 6.3% do not feel close.

¹⁰¹ El N= 540.




Figure VIII.18 How close do you feel to the party with which you sympathize?, 2006.

Figure VIII.19 shows, among those who sympathize with a political party, to what extent that party represents their interests; 43% very much, 28.7% somewhat, 24.3% not very much, and 4% not at all.




Figure VIII.19 To what extent does that party represent your interests?, 2006.

Here the cross-reference between closeness to a party (ELSVB12) and to what extent that party represents their interests is illustrated (ELSVB13).

		elsvb12 ¿Qué tan cercano se siente usted de ese partido con el cual simpatiza?			Total
		Muy cercano	Algo cercano	Poco cercano	
elsvb13 ¿Qué tanto cree usted que ese partido representa sus intereses?	Mucho	116 (75.3%)	61 (33.3%)	39 (23.6%)	216 (43.0%)
	Algo	18 (11.7%)	84 (45.9%)	42 (25.5%)	144 (28.7%)
	Poco	13 (8.4%)	31 (16.9%)	78 (47.3%)	122 (24.3%)
	Nada	7 (4.5%)	7 (3.8%)	6 (3.6%)	20 (4.0%)
Total		154 (100.0%)	183 (100.0%)	165 (100.0%)	502 (100.0%)

Table VIII.4. How close do you feel to the party with which you sympathize and to what extent does that party represent your interests, cross-referenced, 2006.

In Table VIII.4, we see that people who feel very close to the party with which they sympathize think that their party highly represents their interests (75.3%), followed by those who feel that interests are somewhat represented (11.7%); in third place, poorly represented (8.4%); and in last place not at all (4.5%). Those who feel some closeness to their party think that it represents their interest somewhat (45.9%), followed by well represented (33.3%), poorly represented (16.9%), and not at all represented (3.8%). Finally those who feel little closeness report poor representation (47.3%), followed by somewhat represented (25.5%), well represented (23.6%), and not at all represented (3.6%).

8.3.3 Evaluations of party performance

The questionnaire included two questions designed to measure evaluations of party performance. The first was: “ELSVB17. How democratic do you think internal party performance is? The second was: “ELSVB14. Can political parties that have lost credibility regain it or not?

Figure VIII.20 indicates that in response to the first question 9.2% consider parties very democratic; 34% somewhat democratic; 43.7% not very democratic; and 13.1% not at all democratic. Almost 6 in 10 consider that parties are not very democratic or not at all democratic in their internal performance.




Figure VIII.20 How democratic are parties in their internal performance? 2006.

The following figure presents the opinions on how democratic political parties are; the distribution is done on a left-to-right scale.




Figure VIII.21 Opinions of how democratic political parties are, distributed on a left-to-right scale, 2006.

For the second of the previous questions, Figure VIII.22 shows that 46.7% said that parties could recover lost credibility while 53.3% said that they could not.




Figure VIII.22 Opinions regarding whether parties can recover lost credibility, 2006.

8.3.4 Opinions about two items electoral reform issues

The questionnaire included two questions designed to measure participants' opinions about two items on the political reform agenda. The first inquired about whether the subject would be interested in the process of party candidate selection (question ELSVB19). Second, to what extent would you approve of passing legislation to force political parties to account for public and private funds they receive as well as how the funds are spent? (question ELSVB20).

Figure VIII.23 shows that 30% would be interested in participating in candidate selection while 70% feels that this is an internal party matter.




Figure VIII.23 Interest in participation in the process of party candidate selection. 2006.

Figure VIII.24 shows that 71.6% wants legislation to make parties accountable for money they receive and how they spend it; 20% somewhat approve; 5.3% somewhat disapprove; and 3% highly disapprove. Almost 9 in 10 subjects approve of passing a law to regulate political party finances..




Figure VIII.24 Approval of passing legislation to regulate political party finances 2006.

8.4 Political inclinations

For the analysis of survey participants’ political preferences, they were asked: “ELSVB7. For which party did you vote in the last election?” To simplify the analysis, a new variable (ELSVB7R) in which the none, null vote, blank vote, do not know/no response choices were deleted; also deleted were those which did not apply for not having voted, leaving only those who voted for ARENA, FMLN, and “Others” (included in this category is the CDU-PDC, PCN and PNL coalition). Table VIII.5 shows the results.

		Frecuencia	Porcentaje	Porcentaje válido
Válidos	ARENA	302	17.5	36.2
	FMLN	376	21.7	45.1
	Otros	156	9.0	18.7
	Total	834	48.2	100.0
Perdidos	Sistema	895	51.8	
Total		1729	100.0	

Table VIII.5. Party voted for in the 2006 legislative elections.

The result is reasonably close to that of the legislative elections in which the FMLN received 39.28% of the votes and on the survey 45.1%; ARENA 39.20% and the survey shows 36.2%; other parties (CDU, PDC, PCN y PNL) received 21.49%, and the survey reports 18.7% with intention to vote.

Figure VIII.25 shows self positioning of subject on the left (1) to right (10) scale with an average of 5.74, which ideologically leans slightly right.




Figure VIII.25 Ideology, 2006.

Since this item was included in the 2004 survey, it is possible to show the results of 2004 and 2006 in Figure VIII.26. The left-to-right scale is more heavily weighted to the right in 2004, with an average of 6.91.




Figure VIII.26 Ideology 2004 and 2006.

An interesting aspect appears with the intersection of the ideology variable (left-to-right scale) with party preference. In Table VIII.6 the intersection of the variables can be seen. As mentioned earlier, the average of ideology is 5.74 on a one-to-ten scale, slightly more weighted to the left.

		Partido por el que voto elecciones legislativas 2006 recodificada			Total
		ARENA	FMLN	Otros	
11 Escala izquierda – derecha	1 Izquierda	5 (1.9%)	109 (31.0%)	8 (6.3%)	122 (16.4%)
	2	1 (.4%)	41 (11.6%)	4 (3.2%)	46 (6.2%)
	3	4 (1.5%)	49 (13.9%)	6 (4.8%)	59 (7.9%)
	4	7 (2.6%)	31 (8.8%)	8 (6.3%)	46 (6.2%)
	5	32 (12.0%)	70 (19.9%)	28 (22.2%)	130 (17.4%)
	6	22 (8.2%)	14 (4.0%)	18 (14.3%)	54 (7.2%)
	7	30 (11.2%)	18 (5.1%)	13 (10.3%)	61 (8.2%)
	8	43 (16.1%)	9 (2.6%)	11 (8.7%)	63 (8.5%)
	9	24 (9.0%)	4 (1.1%)	6 (4.8%)	34 (4.6%)
	10 Derecha	99 (37.1%)	7 (2.0%)	24 (19.0%)	130 (17.4%)
Total		267 (100.0%)	352 (100.0%)	126 (100.0%)	745 (100.0%)

Table VIII.6. Ideology and party voted for in the 2006 legislative elections, cross-referenced.

In Figure VIII.27, the average obtained is presented on a left-to-right scale (1-10) for party preferences according to the party for which subjects voted in the legislative elections of 2006. The FMLN has a median of 3.4; other parties 6.2; and ARENA 7.9. The median for all subjects is 5.5.




Figure VIII.27 Average on left-to-right scale according to party voted for in 2006 legislative elections.

In Figure VIII.28 the intersection of the average and standard deviation of each party can be clearly seen. FMLN sympathizers have a median of 3.4 but a fairly limited range. The median for other parties is 6.2 but with a more dispersed range. ARENA sympathizers had a median of 7.9 but with a fairly limited range.




Figure VIII.28 Party preference by ideology, 2006.¹⁰²

8.5 Evaluations of government

The survey contained a question regarding subjects' evaluation of President Saca's performance. They were asked: "M1. And speaking of the current administration, would you say that the job that President Antonio Saca is doing is (1) very good, (2) good, (3) neither good nor bad, (4) bad, (5) very bad, and (8) DK/NR." Figure VIII. 29 shows that 5.9% say the President is doing a very good job; 33.5% good; 36.4% neither good nor bad; 14.8% bad; and 9.4% very bad.

¹⁰² The figure shows the average and the standard deviation for each political party.




Figure VIII.29. Evaluation of President Saca’s job performance, 2006.

Furthermore, the survey included a battery of six questions intended to evaluate government efficiency. On a scale of one to seven points, subjects were asked:

- “N1. To what extent would you say that government combats poverty?
- N3. To what extent would you say that the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles?
- N9. To what extent would you say that the current administration fights corruption in government?
- N10. To what extent would you say that the current administration protects human rights?
- N11. To what extent would you say that the current administration is improving public safety?
- N12. To what extent would you say that the current administration is fighting unemployment?”

To facilitate data interpretation, options are converted to a scale of 0-100, and in Figure VIII.30 the averages are given for each item: 49.4 protects human rights; 48.7 improve public safety; 47.1 protects democratic principles; 40.5 fighting corruption; 38.7 combating poverty; and 36.7 fighting unemployment.




Figure VIII.30 Question series concerning government efficacy, 2006.

An analysis of the data obtain for El Salvador within the framework of this 2006 comparative study reveals that El Salvador falls within the group of countries with current governments perceived to have a higher level of efficacy,¹⁰³ below the Dominican Republic, Chile, Colombia and Mexico.

¹⁰³ The six questions were combined on a scale of 0-100




Figure VIII.31 Efficacy of the current administration, 2006.

8.6 Conclusions

In this chapter we have examined the eight principle determiners of intent to vote: populational stratum of residence, evaluation of the president’s job performance, working for a political candidate’s campaign or a political party during the previous election, general interest in politics, age, party affiliation, evaluation of whether or not the previous election results reflect the will of the people, and knowledge about politics.

When Salvadorans were asked why they themselves did not vote, the most common responses were personal issues (not old enough, 19.3%; illness, 13.3%, and having to go to work, 10.2%); and technical problems (no identification card, 18.4%). The next most common response was lack of interest in the election (17%), or lack of belief in the system (9.2%). Meanwhile, when asked why others did not vote, the most common responses were lack of interest in voting (34.8%), lack of belief in the system (31.7%), or did not like any of the candidates (8.6%). In second place were personal or technical problems (not having an identification card, 6.3%; illness, 4.6%; and having to go to work, 3.8%).

The survey data show a low level of trust in political parties, a factor which dropped between 2004 and 2006. Furthermore, evaluations are presented of survey subject regarding the performance of political parties. Almost six in ten subjects expressed the opinion that political parties are not very democratic or not at all democratic in their internal operations; but 46.7% expressed belief that political parties could recover their lost credibility. Regarding the issue of party funding, almost nine out of ten subjects approve of passing legislation to regulate this.

IX. Social capital and democracy

According to the World Bank, social capital means “institutions, relations, and standards that constitute the quantity and quality of social interactions in a society.” The World Bank adds that the importance of social capital is that “numerous studies have demonstrated that social cohesion is a critical factor needed for societies to prosper economically and so that development is sustainable.”¹⁰⁴ From this and other definitions of social capital, innumerable programs have been initiated to help poorer nations. The primary purpose of such programs is to strengthen community ties and networks in places where the programs are implemented.¹⁰⁵ For example, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has started a program called “Iniciativa Interamericana de Capital Social, Ética y Desarrollo” [Inter-American Initiative for Social Capital, Ethics, and Development] whose purpose is to strengthen ethical values and social capital in the region. The World Bank has a website on poverty which examines the theme of social capital.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, many of the World Bank's programs use the theoretical framework surrounding the idea of social capital.

All of the aforementioned notwithstanding, there is no consensus regard of what social capital is. However, this has not stopped anyone from using social capital not only as an academic way of understanding what makes some communities or societies more economically and socially successful than others, but also to promote public policy. In this vein, many nations are developing policies designed specifically to create, foment, and foster social capital as a foundation for development.¹⁰⁷

In spite of the lack of consensus regarding the meaning of social capital, many researchers and scholars speak of social capital in terms of trust among citizens as well as participation in diverse facets of social life and trust in institutions. Interpersonal trust, trust in institutions and participation in organizations are the axes upon which the present study of Salvadoran political culture revolves.

Few researchers have doubted the importance of the factors that constitute the construct or notion of social capital when examining why some communities or societies are more successful than others in reaching their objectives. Beyond whether social capital is limited to interpersonal trust or if it includes participation in organizations and social networks, or standards of social control, it is clear that for a community to function a certain base level of trust among its members is necessary; it seems obvious that for many reasons it is better that a community be organized and have active citizen participation than be disorganized and lacking coordination of activities among its members.

¹⁰⁴ See: World Bank website, [s/f](#).

¹⁰⁵ See: <http://www.iadb.org/etica>.

¹⁰⁶ See: <http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/index.htm>.

¹⁰⁷ See: Kliksberg, B. (1999). “Capital social y cultura, claves esenciales del desarrollo”. *Revista de la CEPAL* 69, p 85-102. Véase también: Policy Research Initiative (PRI Project). (2003). “Social Capital Workshop. Concepts, Measurement and Policy Implications”. (Mimeo).

There have been some studies done in El Salvador regarding social capital. The 2001 report on human development, for example, was based on the concept of social capital to evaluate advances in development in this country. Later, other studies on social capital and local dynamics published by the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) and the Programa Salvadoreño de Investigación sobre Desarrollo y Medio Ambiente (PRISMA), [Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences and the Salvadoran Development and Environmental Research Program], as well as other studies on violence, gangs, and social capital done by Central American University (UCA), have contributed knowledge to the subject area in the country.¹⁰⁸

The importance of social capital in connection with democracy is to be found in the text of a Honduran project on social capital: in societies where citizens trust and cooperate with one another they produce more responsible and efficient governments with which the capacity to offer better quality public goods increases, and thus, better conditions for an inclusive democracy are created as well as a more accelerated societal development.¹⁰⁹

In this chapter we explore social capital in El Salvador, keeping in mind that social capital is a construct made up of interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and civic participation. The 2006 study results will be examined, and in some instances, comparisons with the 2004 data will be made which will establish the relationship between social capital and the variables of political culture that are important to sustain a democracy. First, we will review the results of interpersonal confidence in the country; in the second section, the same will be done with items concerning institutional trust; in the third section Salvadoran civic participation will be discussed; in the fourth, the relationship between social capital and democracy will be examined; finally, we present our conclusions.

9.1 Interpersonal trust in El Salvador

The topic of interpersonal trust was approached using one basic survey question, formulated thus: “IT1. Now, speaking about people here, would you say that community people are. . .(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Not trustworthy at all (8) DK.”

¹⁰⁸ Pérez Sáinz, Juan Pablo; Andrade Eekoff, Katharine. (2001). *Capital social y artesanía en El Salvador*. San Salvador: FLACSO-Programa El Salvador.

Gómez, Ileana. (2002). *Capital social, estrategias de vida y gestión ambiental en El Salvador: el caso de la mancomunidad La Montañona*. San Salvador: Fundación PRISMA.

Cruz, José Miguel. (2000). Pandillas y capital social. *Revista Estudios Centroamericanos (ECA)* 637-638, 1099-1118.

¹⁰⁹ Lundwall, Jonna María. (2003). *El capital social y su relación con el desempeño de la democracia local y la descentralización exitosa: el caso de Honduras*. Tegucigalpa: PNUD.




Figure IX.1 Trust in people in the community, 2006.

Slightly more than a third of respondents (35.1%) said that people in the community are very trustworthy; 28.3% said somewhat trustworthy; 25.8% not very trustworthy; and only 10.8% not trustworthy at all. The distribution of the responses suggests that, in general, people do not feel that they can trust their own neighbors very much. However, compared to other countries, El Salvador places among the countries with higher levels of interpersonal trust.

To make this comparison, the question was converted to an interpersonal trust scale of 0-100 in order to reflect a general measurement of the trust among citizens. This exercise reveals that Salvadorans trust average is 62.2, almost a quarter higher than all countries included in the 2006 study (see Figure IX.2).




Figure IX.2 A comparative view of interpersonal trust, 2006.

A comparison of the data from the 2004 study did not show any statistically significant difference which indicates that levels of interpersonal have not changed in the last two years. In 2004, the average was 62.8; the present study average is 62.2, a difference of less than one point.

We wanted to determine what type of person in El Salvador expresses the highest levels of interpersonal trust. The data pointed to three demographic variables associated with interpersonal trust: gender, age, and place of residence.

Figure IX.3 shows that Salvadoran men trust others more than women do; men averaged 64.8 on the scale while women averaged 59.8. Confidence intervals show that the difference is large enough to assert that gender groups differ in their trust in others.

With regard to age, the data reveal that as age increases, trust increases. Salvadorans under age 25 have an average of 59 on the 0-100 scale; among those between ages 35 and 45, the average rises to 62; and for persons over age 45, the interpersonal trust average rises over 68.




Figure IX.3 Interpersonal trust, by gender, 2006.

However, one of the variables with interesting results is city size. The data show that the smaller the residence area, the greater the interpersonal trust. Thus, the highest level of interpersonal trust is to be found in small rural villages or sparsely populated areas and the lowest is found in large cities. This points to a clearer difference that can be further discussed with regard to the intersection of residence area and interpersonal trust.¹¹⁰ Based on previous results, it was expected that people who live in rural zones would express much more trust in their neighbors than people who live in cities.¹¹¹ (see Figure IX.4).

¹¹⁰ Instead of having the figure present the data according to city size, we decided to show the differences as a function of urban or rural zones. This was done because the latter presents more clearly the differences related to location than the former. Although the using city size produces statistical significance, most of the bars overlap because of confidence intervals and show that the basic difference appears between urban and rural zones of different sizes.

¹¹¹ It must be kept in mind that most Salvadorans live in the country's major cities. Thirty percent of the total population of the country live in metropolitan San Salvador alone and another 15% live in large cities in the interior.




Figure IX.4. Level of interpersonal trust by urban or rural place of residence, 2006.

While the previously discussed variables constitute a good indicator of the personal situations that affect interpersonal trust among Salvadorans, they are not the only ones that do. Two variables related to lack of personal safety appear as significant in the levels of interpersonal confidence: effect of gang presence on neighborhoods and perceptions on the role of the police in the community.

The next figure shows that the presence of gangs in survey subjects' neighborhoods erodes interpersonal trust. People who live in neighborhoods that are free of gangs or who do not report gang presence average 69.3 on the 0-100 scale, slightly higher than the national average (62.2). These averages begin to drop as subject report a rising presence of gang members in their communities; 60.8 among those with few gang problems, 54.5 for those affected "somewhat" by gangs, and (44.7) for those who report serious effect from gang activity.




Figure IX.5. Interpersonal trust according to effects of gang activity, 2006.

This means that the presence of gangs affects not only trust in institutions and the political system, as discussed in Chapter VI, but also erodes interpersonal trust. With regard to social capital, gang activity has an impact on conditions that favor a democratic political culture. Without interpersonal trust, it is difficult to carry out community projects and initiatives that promote development and facilitate interaction with institutions.

Furthermore, interpersonal confidence is affected by the police, a key institution in the context of trust in the system and among citizens. The subjects' responses to the questions about their perception of the role of the police in the community, when cross referenced with interpersonal trust, indicate that the latter diminishes substantially when there is the perception that the police are involved in criminal activity. Individuals who report that the police in their communities protect them show a higher level of interpersonal trust (68.6) than those who report that the police are involved in crime (56).

In sum, these results suggest that community disorganization coming from lack of public safety and corruption has serious effects interpersonal confidence and the ability of communities to deal with their problems. It is not surprising, then, to find that interpersonal trust is associated with levels of legitimacy of the system, concretely, support for the system and satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance

According to the results shown in Figure IX.6, interpersonal confidence is closely related to support for the system and satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance; higher interpersonal trust means higher approval of the performance of democracy in El Salvador. This highlights the importance of interpersonal trust in building positive attitudes toward democracy.




Figure IX.6 Support for the system and satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance by levels of interpersonal trust, 2006.

9.2 Trust in institutions

Although discussed in Chapter IV of this study, this section will examine institutional trust as a function of the meaning of trust as a component of social capital. A scale created from common responses to questions about institutional trust in all countries participating in the Vanderbilt University 2006 Latin American Public Opinion Project reveal that El Salvador’s trust in its institutions is 53.4 on a 0-100 scale in 2006, which put the country among those in the intermediate group, below Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Chile.




Figure IX.7 A comparative view of trust in institutions, 2006.

The data reveal, however, that institutional trust has declined since 2004. Figure IX.8 shows that Salvadoran trust in their institutions was 59.8 on a 0-100 scale; this number dropped to 53.4 in 2006, which is in line with a similar drop in support for the system reported in Chapter IV.




Figure IX.8 Trust in institutions, by year, 2004 and 2006.

As expected, levels of trust in institutions are strongly tied to support for the political system as well as to satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance. This result may be tautological, considering that trust in institutions is really a more specific type of support for the system. Nevertheless, this is not always the case. As studies in comparative politics have suggested,¹¹² the public can feel extremely disillusioned with the performance of institutions and express low levels of confidence in them and still actively support the most general political order as well as supporting the notion that democracy is important or feel satisfied with its performance in spite of deficiencies in its institutions. With regard to the Salvadoran public, however, the data show that confidence in institutions help maintain trust in the system as a whole and satisfaction with democratic governance.

¹¹² See: Norris, Pippa. 1999. *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.




Figure IX.9 Support for the system and satisfaction with democratic governance according to levels of trust in institutions, 2006.

9.3 Civic participation

The other basic component of social capital is citizen participation. To measure this component, we used various survey questions to determine attendance at meetings, belonging to organizations, or participation in different types of gatherings within the government (City Hall, legislature, ministries). The results are shown in Figure IX.10. It appears that Salvadorans participate more frequently in religious organizations (37.6); take part more often in trying to solve community problems (34.8) and attend parents' meetings at schools (25.8) more than they participate in other community activities. On this point, Salvadorans are much like those in the other countries in the round of 2006 studies. All things considered, Salvadorans' levels of civic participation are not high. Aside from the first three types of participation discussed above, no more than 25% of the adult Salvadoran population participate in other activities. Moreover, participation in activities which are clearly political, such as labor union and party meetings, do not surpass 5% of the adult Salvadoran population. With the notable exception of municipal governments, petitions to government institutions does not exceed 10%.




Figure IX.10 Averages of questions regarding civil participation, 2006.

Using most of these items as a foundation, a scale was created that would reflect the level of Salvadoran civic participation.¹¹³ These items (which do not constitute all those shown in the previous figure) are:¹¹⁴

CP5. In the last year, have you contributed or tried to contribute to solving a community problem or a problem among you neighbors?			
CP8. Do you attend community improvement committee meetings.. once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never?			
CP9. Do you attend meetings of professional associations, business persons, growers, and/or village organizations. . once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, never?			
CP10. Do you attend labor union meetings. . . once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, never?			
CP13. Do you attend political party meetings. . .once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, never?			
To solve your problems, have you ever requested assistance from ...	Yes	No	DK/NR
CP2. A representative in the National Congress?	(1)	(2)	(8)
CP4. A ministry, public institution of a state government office?	(1)	(2)	(8)
CP4A. A local authority (mayor, municipality)?	(1)	(2)	(8)

¹¹³ Cronbach's alpha= 0.654.

¹¹⁴ As can be seen, the items of participation in religious and family gatherings were excluded from the civil participation scale, the reason being that they reduce the reliability quotient by taking away consistency from the scale and suggesting other meanings of religious and school participation.

NP1. Have you attended an open town hall meeting or a general town meeting (called by the mayor) in the last twelve months?

NP2. Have you asked for help from or presented a petition to any office, official or municipal alderman in the last twelve months?

The results show that overall civic participation in El Salvador is indeed low--12.9 on a 0-100 scale. This is especially true considering that the country is much closer to the bottom than the top. However, it must be said that El Salvador's ranking is not the lowest in the region but rather closer to the average, below Honduras, Jamaica, Peru, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic.




Figure IX.11 A comparative view of civic participation, 2006.

In a comparative view, the results indicate that levels of civil participation declined compared to 2004, when a similar analysis of the data was done. According the 2004 results, the average was 15.1; in the 2006 study, 12.9. The difference is not large, but the confidence intervals indicate that it is statistically significant.

Nonetheless, the data does point to the fact that participation among all Salvadorans is uneven; men participate more than women and people who live in medium sized cities are more civically active than their fellow citizens in San Salvador.




Figure IX.12. Civic participation by gender, 2006.

Figure IX.12 shows that men report more participation in civic activities than women (15.9). This does not mean that women do not participate, but rather that their level of involvement (10.9) is lower than men's, at least in matters having to do with contact with institutions or others regarding public business. Nonetheless, it is important to consider that if items regarding religious gatherings and heads of households had been included on the scale of civic participation, the results might have been different.

One piece of interesting information obtained refers to the connection between city size and civic participation. Contrary to expectations that participation would be higher in rural areas than in urban zones, the results indicate that the highest levels of participation are to be found in medium sized cities. However, the biggest difference is between all areas outside metropolitan San Salvador, which shows the lowest level of civic participation.




Figure IX.13 Civic participation according to size of city, 2006.

On the other hand, the data did not reveal any significant statistical relationship between civic participation and support for the political system variable or between civic participation and satisfaction with democracy.

9.4 Social capital and democracy

An indicator of social capital was fashioned from the variables of interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and civic participation. As with other exercises, it must be understood that this is a way of operationalizing a concept whose complexity was only briefly discussed at the beginning of the chapter. First, a comparison of the indices of social capital show that, in the group, El Salvador is among the highest ranking countries in the region, under only Costa Rica and Colombia. This ranking is due to the special combination of the three previously mentioned elements—interpersonal trust, trust in institutions, and civic participation. Although El Salvador shows only intermediate levels in all of these factors, the combination of these and their consistency in comparison with the variability of factors in other countries puts El Salvador at a high level of social capital.




Figure IX.14 A comparative view of social capital, 2006.

In spite of these results, which seem to put Salvadoran attitudes regarding social capital in favorable light, when the data are compared to those from 2004, it can be seen that the indicators of social capital in 2006 are lower. In Figure IX.15, the 2004 average on the social capital scale reached 45.3 (on a 1-100 scale); in 2006 that figure dropped almost three points to 42.6. While this is not a substantial drop, the number of cases included in the analysis makes the drop statistically significant. For this reason, it can be said that the levels of social capital have diminished in El Salvador in the past two years.




Figure IX.15 Social capital, by year, 2004 y 2006.

Which factors, then, affect or make possible social capital? The personal variables—gender, age, size of city of residence, and ideology—have an effect on social capital. With regard to gender, men show more social capital than women; with regard to age, social capital rises as age rises. The data indicate that people who live in rural areas and small cities show more social capital than the rest of the population. Finally, one very interesting analysis was the cross referencing of ideology and social capital. The data showed that persons on the right of the political spectrum tend to indicate higher levels of social capital than those in the center or on the left (see Figure IX.16). This may be due to the fact that interpersonal trust is higher among people on the right, and, above all, that their trust in state institutions is higher than that of citizens in the center or on the left.




Figure IX.16 Social capital according to respondents' ideology, 2006.

On the other hand, which contextual factors seem to be associated with social capital? As a function of what has been seen throughout this report, the relationship among the three variables with social capital have been explored. The first is victimization by corruption; the second, victimization by crime; and the third, perception of public safety.

The first exercise, the relationship between social capital and victimization by corruption, did not reveal any statistical significance, which seems to indicate that there is no clear link between having been a victim of corruption and social capital. The second exercise, victimization by crime and social capital, on the contrary, did produce statistically significant numbers; in other words, individuals who have been victimized by crime tend to show less social capital than those who have not. It can be seen in the next figure that although the difference is not large, the confidence intervals are sufficiently large enough to conclude that victimization has an effect on interpersonal and institutional trust as well as civic participation.




Figure IX.17 Social capital according to victimization by crime, 2006.

These results serve to reaffirm the influence of criminal activity in the scheme of and/or erosion of attitudes associated with the political culture of democracy. For this reason, it is not surprising to find that a factor linked with expressions of social capital is the perception of lack of public safety. People who feel safer tend to show much more social capital than those who feel very unsafe.




Figure IX.18 Social capital according to perception of public safety, 2006.

It is evident that social capital has an important effect on the legitimacy of the political system. In Figure IX.19 it can be seen that the existence of social capital stimulates citizens to support the system and promotes satisfaction with the performance of democracy. In communities where social capital prevails, it is possible to find more support for the system and more satisfaction with democracy. The aforementioned confirms some of the theoretical postulates given in the introduction to the chapter which indicate that social capital not only factors social action but also contributes to the legitimacy of the Salvadoran political system.




Figure IX.19. Support for the system and satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance according to level of social capital, 2006.

9.5 Conclusions

This chapter has shown that social capital is important for the political culture of El Salvador. The data demonstrate that Salvadorans have medium levels of interpersonal trust, that trust in institutions has diminished, and that civic participation, in general, is declining and has dropped over the past two years.

As with other variables, social capital has been affected by crime and lack of public safety that prevail in the country. The higher the incidence of delinquency and insecurity, the higher the lack of interpersonal trust, the more people tend to move away from their institutions, and consequently, the greater the erosion of the networks of cooperation and coexistence that make development possible.

As with other variables, social capital is affected by delinquency and lack of safety prevalent in the country. The higher the delinquency rate, the more people tend to mistrust others, and as a consequence, the networks of cooperation and coexistence that make development possible begin to erode. Thus, low levels of social capital translate into low levels of support for the system and lack of satisfaction with the performance of democracy in the country.

In conclusion, the diverse indicators shown throughout this report demonstrate that attitudes toward institutions, each other, and citizen participation are important when attempting to build a stable democracy. Democracy in El Salvador faces many challenges, but civic participation, interpersonal trust, and commitment of national institutions cannot be taken lightly.

X. Conflict resolution and mediation centers

It is said that conflicts are inherent in any society. Diverse conflicts arise in all social groups, organizations, and institutions whether they are governed by democratic regimes, authoritarian governments, or dictatorships. Thus, the nature of the political regime of a country is determined by the way in which social and political conflicts are resolved. In a democracy, conflicts are channelled through institutions that operate by established norms and procedures which ensure that respect for life, liberty, and equality under the law is observed. In authoritarian regimes, conflicts are resolved by institutions that use as their primary tool force or the threat of force, ignoring basic human rights and laws that regulate inter-institutional relations.

In contemporary societies, conflicts are resolved through agreement, coercion, or a combination of these. The character of political regimes is not always linked to its manner of conflict resolution; that is, agreement is not always the only way to resolve conflicts in a democracy, nor is coercion a tool used exclusively by dictatorships or authoritarian regimes. In practice, the difference resides in respect for human rights, a universal value, the observance of certain procedures that pertain to the rule of law, and the degree to which the principle that no citizen is above the law is observed.

Democracies may have many social conflicts, but what makes them such is not the absence of conflicts nor the absence of occasional coercion to resolve them. It is rather the way procedures are established and the operation of the institutions that deal with conflicts. The justice system, the courts, institutions of public safety, institutions of social finance and others constitute the primary tools to channel and resolve social conflicts between both the State and the individual and between citizens themselves.

However, institutional design, customs of past authoritarian regimes and other factors can erode institutional capability or can prevent them, even in a democratic government, from adequately channelling conflicts, not only the most politically relevant but also and above all, the most frequent conflicts that arise in daily life. Over the long term, this can impede the government's ability to ensure certain levels of law and social harmony, which can become a threat to democratic stability.

The high incidence of crime and social violence can be, for example, an indication that a society is not able to resolve the underlying conflicts with institutional mechanisms and that they are being resolved through alternative mechanisms. As we have seen in previous chapters, criminal violence is a factor which threatens democratic strengthening, but over the long term, cannot be solved if alternate institutional, customary, and cultural mechanisms to resolve conflicts do not exist.

This final chapter of the study on Salvadoran political culture in 2006 focuses on the results of a series of questions asked to determine the mechanisms used by citizens to resolve conflicts and how citizens perceive the performance of the mediation centers promoted by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic. This chapter is divided into two parts: the first shows citizens' opinions regarding conflict resolution mechanisms; the second gives the results of the questions regarding the mediation centers.

10.1 Conflict resolution

The first question in this part of the survey asked about the ways in which Salvadoran citizens resolve conflicts. ELSB52: “When you become involved in a legal, civil, interpersonal, etc. conflict, or if you became involved in this type of problem, you: (1) Do nothing, (2) Reconcile differences with the opposing party, (3) Resolve the problem your own way, (4) Turn to a legal authority (judge, police, district attorney), (5) Hire a lawyer, (9) Use a mediation center to resolve the conflict.”

The results are shown in Figure X.1., which indicates that Salvadorans use a variety of ways to deal with conflicts; 23.5% said they would hire a lawyer; a similar number (22.6%) said they would settle their differences with the opposing party; and 21.8% affirmed that they would turn to the authorities. Others (12.6%) indicated that they would resolve it their own way; 10.9% said they would go to a mediation center; and 8.6% said that they would do nothing. These results underscore three things: first, a good portion of the population seems willing to use private but non-violent mechanisms to resolve conflicts; hiring a lawyer and settling differences do not involve state institutions but neither do they use mechanisms intended to aggravate the conflict. Secondly, the results point to the fact that almost a fifth of the population turns to the authorities. This could be seen as a positive factor if one thinks that it implies that people believe that they can resolve their differences without resorting to institutional arbitration. However, it can also be seen as bad news if one considers that some conflicts never reach government institutions and are not resolved through direct reconciliation, through attorneys, or at mediation centers; they are settled in ways that may not be entirely legal. Thirdly, the data indicate that the mediation centers of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic are becoming a reference point for conflict resolution. One in ten Salvadorans feel that mediation centers are a useful conflict resolution institution.



Figure X.1. Opinions about course of action when facing a conflict, 2006.

The results indicate that there are important differences of opinion among the citizenry regarding how to deal with conflicts. For example, individuals from rural areas tend either to turn to the authorities or do nothing more frequently than those from urban areas. Urban Salvadorans tend to settle their differences with opposing parties significantly more often than those from the countryside. Regarding hiring an attorney, solving conflicts according to personal preference, or turning to a mediation center, the data do not show significant differences among urban or rural dwellers.

When the results are compared by gender, differences appear in only a couple of categories. When trying to deal with a conflict, women, for example, tend not to do anything more frequently than men while men are more likely to seek a settlement than women.




Figure X.2 Opinions regarding conflict resolution by area of residence, urban/rural, 2006.

However, there are two variables that become important as a function of the responses to conflict resolution. The first is level of education. We can see in Table X.1 that the manner in which people deal with conflicts changes according to their level of education. The percentage of persons who settle their differences with the opposing party, for example, increases significantly with educational level; the same occurs, although less frequently, with those who seek help from mediation centers. Conversely, the percentage of Salvadorans who do nothing about conflicts is also related to their level of education. Similarly, individuals who resolve conflicts “their own way” often fall into the lower levels of formal education.

What this means is that education influences people to choose resolution of conflict through mediation. To be more precise, the more formal education citizens have, the more likely they are to try to settle their differences or go to the new mediation centers.

When looking at the results of the question regarding conflict resolution as a function of area of residence, the data also offers some interesting information. First, those who do nothing when facing a conflict are more frequently found in the western area of the country (Ahuachapán, Santa Ana and Sonsonate), compared to other areas. On the other hand, survey participants living in the central part of the country, that is, metropolitan San Salvador and La Libertad and Chalatenango counties, answered significantly more often that they would opt for settling their differences. At the same time, legal aid was the method most frequently chosen in San Vicente, Cuscatlán, Cabañas and La Paz, which surround the metropolitan area. Persons surveyed in these counties most frequently said that they would turn to the authorities for conflict resolution. Finally, the use of mediation centers does not vary much among the different areas of the country. While the counties surrounding the metropolitan area make somewhat more use of the

mediation centers, the difference between this area and the eastern and western zones is very small.

VARIABLES	No hace nada	Concilia con la contraparte	Lo resuelve a su manera	Acude a autoridad	Consigue abogado	Centro de mediación
Escolaridad						
Ninguno	18.7%	11.7%	14.0%	21.6%	26.9%	7.0%
Primaria	11.5%	17.1%	13.4%	27.5%	22.8%	7.7%
Secundaria	5.6%	24.4%	12.7%	19.9%	23.3%	14.2%
Universitaria	4.1%	36.3%	9.8%	15.1%	23.7%	11.0%
Zona del país						
Occidental	10.6%	18.2%	12.2%	25.4%	22.2%	11.4%
Central	7.9%	29.5%	11.4%	16.7%	23.9%	10.7%
Paracentral	6.2%	9.2%	15.4%	27.7%	28.5%	13.1%
Oriental	8.0%	20.5%	14.4%	24.1%	23.0%	10.0%

Table X.1 Responses concerning dealing with conflict according to level of education and area of residence, 2006.

In the portion of the study regarding conflict resolution, the survey on political culture in 2006 also explored what citizens would do in certain situations. For example, subjects were asked to whom they would turn if they had a conflict over property that another person had claimed. The question was as follows: “ELSAY7. Suppose that you had a property that another person has claimed. To whom would you turn to solve this problem? (0) City Hall, (1) A non government assistance organization (NGO), (2) A friend or relative who has government connections (3) A court, (4) the PNC, (5) A government agency in charge of such issued, (6) A friend or relative with experience solving problems on his/her own, (7) An attorney, (8) DK/NR.”

Subjects were also asked to whom they would turn if they had difficulty with their public utilities. The question was asked as follows: “ELSAY8. Suppose that in your community there were a problem with your public utilities. To whom would you turn to solve this problem? 0) City Hall, (1) A non government assistance organization (NGO), (2) A friend or relative who has government connections (3) A court, (4) the PNC, (5) A government agency in charge of such issued, (6) A friend or relative with experience solving problems on his/her own, (7) An attorney, (8) DK/NR.”

The first question concerns a conflict between citizens; the second concerns a conflict between a citizen and a state institution. The results are interesting because they show that citizens differentiate between one type of conflict and another when selecting a satisfactory intermediary. In property conflicts, 43 % of Salvadorans hire an attorney; almost a quarter (23.6%) go to a government office that deals with that type of problem; 14% go directly to the mayor’s office; and 12.2% go to court. Only 6.9% of Salvadorans made use of other alternatives: NGOs and personal friends. When the results were cross-referenced according to several sociographic variables, no significant differences were found among the various social groups. In other

words, individuals tend to turn to the same sources of assistance in the same proportions, regardless of their social group.




Figure X.3 Opinions regarding to whom to turn if a property problem arises, 2006.

In the second question, when an individual becomes involved in a conflict arising from a lack of public services, more than half of Salvadorans (56.1%) would go to City Hall; 31.8% would go to a government office; and 3.9% would seek the help of an attorney. The rest would turn to other mediators: friends, government organizations, and the courts (8.2%). In these results it is worth noting how many responses favored going to City Hall. As seen in the chapter which discusses local government, the mayor’s office is one of the most trusted institutions. Even without identifying the particular problem regarding public utilities, most subjects indicated that they would go to City Hall because it is perceived as closer to the people than other state institutions. When the results are cross-referenced the variable that divides the population in urban and rural, the data indicate that those from urban areas tend to seek help somewhat more frequently from state governmental agencies while those from rural areas tend to prefer City Hall. Similarly, people from the western and suburban areas of the country prefer to go to mayors’ offices to solve a problem regarding public services while people from San Salvador, La Libertad y Chalatenango, the central part of the country, tend to choose state government offices.




Figure X.4 Opinions concerning whom to turn to with a problem regarding provision of public services, 2006.

Finally, in the 2006 survey on political culture, subjects were about the relatively new practice of holding public hearings in criminal proceedings. Concretely, we wanted to determine whether or not public hearings have contributed to reducing crime without punishment. The question was posed thus: “ELSB54. Do you believe that because hearings in criminal proceedings are public they have helped lower crime without punishment? (1) Yes (2) No, (8) NS/NR.”

The results in Figure X.5 show that opinions are evenly divided. Slightly more (56.8%) subjects said that the hearings have not helped to reduce the number of unpunished crimes in Salvadoran criminal proceedings compared to 43.2% who said that they have. Thus, it seems that penal reform has not generated a favorable opinion among the majority of the public.




Figure X.5 Opinions regarding whether public hearings have helped reduce the number of unpunished crimes, 2006.

Nevertheless, the distribution of opinions is not homogeneous in this case. The perception that public hearings have helped to reduce crime without punishment diminishes noticeably with increasing levels of education. As can be seen in Figure X.6, favorable opinions of these public hearings reaches 49% among those with no formal education; the percentage drops to 45.1% and 42.8% respectively among those with elementary and secondary education, and reaches only 36.7% among the college educated. In other words, higher levels of education seem to increase critical opinions regarding the contribution of public hearing in lowering the incidence of unpunished crime in El Salvador.




Figure X.6 Opinions regarding whether public hearings have helped reduce the number of unpunished crimes, according to level of education, 2006.

However, one variable that generated a different outcome was media exposure. According to the results, shown in Figure X.7, as media exposure rises, opinions regarding the new procedure are more favorable. More than half (53%) of the individuals who read or listen to the news frequently felt that public hearing in criminal proceedings reduced the number of unpunished crimes compare to only 40% who do not read or listen frequently to the news. This means that the media influence public opinion regarding the efficacy of criminal proceedings




Figure X.7 Opinions regarding whether public hearings have helped reduce the number of unpunished crimes, according to media exposure, 2006.

10.2 Mediation centers

The survey contains a question intended to measure citizen knowledge of the mediation centers promoted by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic. The question was: “ELSB56. Have you heard about the existence of mediation centers promoted by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic? (1) Yes (2) No.” The following figure shows the results: 30% of the survey subjects had indeed heard about the mediation centers.




Figure X.8. Have you heard about the mediation centers?, 2006.

The survey explores whether knowledge of the mediation centers varies according to the interviewees sociodemographic characteristics. The results are statistically significant for three variables: gender, area of residence, and income level.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ For some variables, the differences in percentages seem ample enough to consider them important. However, they are not statistically significant because the number of cases that fall within the categories is so low that the variance is too wide to reach any type of conclusion.

Variable	Porcentaje
Género (*)	
Masculino	32.8
Femenino	27.5
Area urbano-rural de residencia (**)	
Rural	25.2
Urbano	33.3
Nivel educativo	
Ninguno	29.0
Primaria	27.3
Secundaria	31.2
Universitaria	33.6
Edad	
18-25 años	26.8
26-35 años	28.7
36-45 años	32.0
46-55 años	34.5
56-65 años	37.7
66 años y mas	25.6
Nivel de ingreso (*)	
Bajo	26.3
Medio	31.1
Alto	34.3

Table X.2 Percentages of persons who have heard of the mediation centers by variables, 2006.

(*) Sig.<.05

(**) Sig.<.001

The data from Table X.2 indicate that more men than women have heard about the mediation centers; in addition, more people in urban areas have heard about them than people from rural areas, and the higher the income level, the more people know about the mediation centers. Another variable observed to be associated with knowledge about the media is media exposure of the mediation centers which can be seen in the following figure.




Figure X.9. Knowledge of mediation centers according to media exposure, 2006.

Persons who know about or have heard of the mediation centers were asked if they considered that the information they have is adequate: “ELSB57. Do you consider that the level of your knowledge about the existence of the mediation centers promoted by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic is...? (1) Adequate (2) Not sufficient (8) NS/NR”. The next figure show the results of this question: 38.4% consider the level of their information to be adequate while 61.6% feel that it is not sufficient.




Figure X.10 Level of information about the mediation centers, 2006.

The opinions regarding whether the information about the mediation centers is adequate varies according to the areas of residence of the survey subjects (urban/rural). Urban residents perceive that they do not have sufficient information about the centers in comparison to rural residents.




Figure X.11 Level of information concerning the mediation centers according to area of residence, 2006.

Persons who know about the mediation centers were asked about their opinions as to whether they approved of the existence of these institutions. The question was posed as follows: “ELSB58. Do you highly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove or highly disapprove of the mediation centers promoted by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic?”. The responses were in large measure favorable toward to mediation centers: 92.9% highly or somewhat approve (33% highly and 59.9% somewhat).




Figure X.12 Level of approval of the existence of mediation centers, 2006.

Since this question was also included in the 2004 survey, the results can be compared. The next figure shows that shows a slight reduction in approval for the mediation centers between 2004 and 2006: 48.2% highly approve and 46.4% somewhat approve in 2004; 33% highly approve and 59.9% somewhat approve in 2006.




Figure X.13. Level of approval of mediation centers, 2004 and 2006.

Finally, persons who know about the mediation centers are asked: “ELSB59. In your opinion, are the mediation centers promoted by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic: (1) Not at all important (2) Not very important (3) Important, (4) Very important, (8) DK/NR?” The results show a favorable opinion, although with a little more variation: 22.6% consider them very important; 57.4% important, 17.6% not very important; and 2.3% not important at all.




Figure X.14 Importance of the mediation centers, 2006.

Since this question was also included in the 2004 survey, the results can be compared. The next figure shows that the evaluation is essentially the same regarding the importance of these centers: in 2004, 29.1% considered them very important; 50.9% important; in 2006, 22.6% consider them very important and 57.4% important. Thus, for both years, 80% consider them important or very important.




Figure X.15 Importance of mediation centers, 2004 and 2006.

10.3 Conclusions

Regarding the question of conflict resolution, the survey data indicate that in conflicts with others, people more frequently use private non-violent methods to resolve them: hire an attorney (23.5%) and settle with the opposing party (22.6%); 21.8% turn to the authorities.

Survey data show that 30% of the citizens have heard about the mediation centers promoted by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic. Of those who know about the centers or have heard about them, 38.4% believe that their knowledge of them is adequate while 61.6% think that they do not know enough about them.

Most people who know about the centers consider them important and hold favorable opinions of them: 33% highly approve of them, 59.9% somewhat approve; 4.9% are against them; and 2.2% are very much against them; meanwhile, 22.6% consider them very important; 57.4% important; 17.6% not very important; and 2.3% not important at all.

Bibliografía

- Booth, John A. y Seligson, Mitchell A. (1993). Political Culture and Democratization: Evidence from México, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, en: L. Diamond (ed.). *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner. Pp. 107-138.
- Bratton, Michael. (2002). “Wide but Shallow: Popular Support for Democracy in Africa”. Afrobarometer Paper No. 19. Michigan: Michigan State University.
- Consejo de Redacción. (2004). Elecciones sin alternabilidad. Editorial. Revista *Estudios Centroamericanos*, 665-666, pp 209-225.
- Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Cruz, José Miguel. (2005). La cultura política de la democracia en El Salvador, 2004. San Salvador, USAID, IUDOP, Vanderbilt University y FUNDAUNGO.
- Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (2003). El Salvador (1982-2003). Una aproximación al abstencionismo electoral. Mimeo.
- Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Seligson, Mitchell A. (2001). *Cultura Política, gobierno local y descentralización. América Central. Volumen I*. San Salvador: FLACSO-Programa El Salvador.
- Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Orellana, Víctor A. (2001). *Cultura Política, gobierno local y descentralización. El Salvador. Volumen III*. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO y FLACSO-Programa El Salvador.
- Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Orellana, Víctor A. (2000). *Cultura política en torno a los gobiernos locales y la descentralización en El Salvador. Informe final de la encuesta*. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO y FLACSO-Programa El Salvador.
- Córdova Macías, Ricardo; William Pleitez y Carlos Guillermo Ramos. (1998). Reforma Política y Reforma Económica: los retos de la gobernabilidad democrática. Documento de Trabajo, Serie Análisis de la Realidad Nacional 98-1. San Salvador, FUNDAUNGO.
- Cruz, José Miguel. (2004). “Las elecciones presidenciales desde el comportamiento de la opinión pública”, Revista *Estudios Centroamericanos*, No. 665-666.
- Cruz, José Miguel y Martín de Vega, Álvaro. (2004). *La percepción sobre la corrupción en las instituciones públicas de El Salvador. Los ciudadanos hablan sobre la corrupción*. San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA.
- Cruz, José Miguel y Santacruz Giralt, María. (2004). *La victimización y la percepción de seguridad en El Salvador en 2004*. San Salvador: Ministerio de Gobernación de El Salvador/ IUDOP.

- Cruz, José Miguel. (2003). Violencia y democratización en Centroamérica: el impacto del crimen en la legitimidad de los regímenes de posguerra. *América Latina Hoy* 35, pp 19-59.
- Cruz, José Miguel. (2002). ¿Para qué sirve la democracia? La cultura política de los jóvenes del Área Metropolitana de San Salvador”. Cuadernos de trabajo 2002-01. San José: PROCESOS.
- Cruz, José Miguel. (2000). Pandillas y capital social. *Revista Estudios Centroamericanos (ECA)* 637-638, pp 1099-1118.
- Cruz, José Miguel. (2000). Violencia, democracia y cultura política. *Nueva Sociedad* 167, pp 132-146.
- Cruz, José Miguel. Las razones del abstencionismo en El Salvador en 1997. En: R. Córdova Macías (compilador). (1998). *El abstencionismo electoral en Nicaragua y El Salvador*. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO, p. 31.
- Dahl, Robert. (1971). *Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTYC). (2004). *Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples 2004 (EHPM)*. San Salvador: Ministerio de Economía.
- Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTYC), Fondo de población de las Naciones Unidas (FNUAP) y Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía (CELADE). (1996). *Proyección de la población de El Salvador 1995-2025*. San Salvador: Ministerio de Economía.
- Easton, David. (1975). A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support. *British Journal of Political Science*, 5, Pp. 435-457.
- El Diario de Hoy, 14 de febrero de 2006. “Homicidios aumentan en los últimos siete años”.
- Escobar Nolasco, Marcela. 2005. *La transparencia en el Estado salvadoreño. La perspectiva de los empresarios*. San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA.
- Finkel, Steven; Muller, Edward. y Seligson, Mitchell A. (1989). Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica. *British Journal of Political Science*, 19. Pp. 560-551.
- Gobierno de El Salvador. (2004). *El Salvador. Primer informe de país. Avance de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio*. San Salvador.
- Gómez, Ileana. (2002). *Capital social, estrategias de vida y gestión ambiental en El Salvador: el caso de la mancomunidad La Montañona*. San Salvador: Fundación PRISMA.

- Holston, James y Caldeira, Teresa P.R. (1998). Democracy, Law, and Violence. Disjunctures on Brazilian Citizenship. En: F. Agüero and J. Stark (eds.) *Fault Lines of democracy in Post-transition Latin America*. Miami: North-South Center Press.
- Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP). (2006). *Encuesta de evaluación del año 2006*. Serie de informes 112. San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA.
- Klikberg, B. (1999). "Capital social y cultura, claves esenciales del desarrollo". *Revista de la CEPAL* 69, pp 85- 102.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1996). Repensando los requisitos sociales de la democracia. *La Política. Revista de estudios sobre el Estado y la sociedad*. 2, pp 51-88.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1994). The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited. *American Sociological Review*, 5. Pp. 1-22.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1981). *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Londoño, Juan Luis; Gaviria, Alejandro y Guerrero, Rodrigo (eds). (2000). *Asalto al desarrollo. Violencia en América Latina*. Washington, D.C.: BID.
- Lundwall, Jonna María. (2003). *El capital social y su relación con el desempeño de la democracia local y la descentralización exitosa: el caso de Honduras*. Tegucigalpa: PNUD.
- Maihold, Günther. y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (2001). Democracia y ciudadanía en Centroamérica. En: R. Córdova Macías, G. Maihold y S. Kurtenbach (compiladores). *Pasos hacia una nueva convivencia: democracia y participación en Centroamérica*. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO, Instituto de Estudios Iberoamericanos de Hamburgo e Instituto Ibero-Americano de Berlín.
- McClosky, Herbert y Brill, Alida. (1983). *Dimensions of Tolerance: What Americans Believe about Civil Liberties*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- McClosky, Herbert (1964). Consensus and Ideology in American Politics. *American Political Science Review*, 58, pp 361-382.
- Muller, Edward N.; Jukam, Thomas O. y Seligson, Mitchell A. (1982). Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A comparative Analysis. *American Journal of Political Science* 26. Pp. 240-264.
- Norris, Pippa. (1999). *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Organización Mundial de la Salud. (2000). Informe mundial sobre la violencia y la salud. Washington, D.C.: OPS.

- Organización Panamericana de la Salud. (2006). “Seguridad humana y salud”.
- Ozbudun, Ergun. (1989). Studies on Comparative Elections. *Comparative Politics*, 21, 2.
- Pérez Sáinz, Juan Pablo; Andrade Eekoff, Katharine. (2001). *Capital social y artesanía en El Salvador*. San Salvador: FLACSO-Programa El Salvador.
- Pérez, Orlando. (2003). Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala. *Political Science Quarterly*, 118 (4). Winter 2003-2004.
- PNUD. (2005). Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano El Salvador.
- PNUD. (2004). La Democracia en América Latina. Hacia una democracia de ciudadanos y ciudadanas.
- PNUD. (2003). Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano, El Salvador. San Salvador.
- PNUD. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 y 2005). Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano Mundial. Estados Unidos: PNUD.
- Policy Research Initiative (PRI Project). (2003). “Social Capital Workshop. Concepts, Measurement and Policy Implications”. (Mimeo).
- PROBIDAD. (2003). *Índice Latinoamericano de Transparencia Presupuestaria. Informe de El Salvador*. San Salvador: PROBIDAD.
- Rodríguez, Florisabel y Madrigal, Johnny. (2003). “Los hijos y las hijas de la democracia: estudio comparativo”. Cuadernos de trabajo 2003-10. San José: Procesos.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. (s/f). *Toward a Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America*. Mimeo.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. y Sarsfield, Rodolfo. (2006). CAM/Democracy Study: Outline of Required Chapters. (Mimeo).
- Seligson, Mitchell. (2006). “The measurement and impact of corruption victimization: Survey evidence from Latin America”. *World Development* 34: 2, pp 381-404.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. (2005). The political culture of democracy in Mexico, Central America and Colombia, 2004. Vanderbilt University.
- Seligson, Mitchell. (2003). “The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries,” *Journal of Politics* 64, 2, pp 408-433.

- Seligson, Mitchell A. (2002). Trouble in Paradise: The Impact of the Erosion of System Support in Costa Rica, 1978-1999. *Latin American Research Review*, 37, No. 1.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. y Azpuru, Dinorah. "Las dimensiones y el impacto político de la delincuencia en la población guatemalteca". En Luis Rosero Bixby (ed.), *Población del istmo 2000: Familia, migración, violencia y medio ambiente*. San José: Centro Centroamericano de Población.
- Seligson, Mitchell A.; Cruz, José Miguel y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (2000). *Auditoría de la Democracia. El Salvador 1999*. San Salvador: Universidad de Pittsburgh, IUDOP y FUNDAUNGO.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. (1996). *Political Culture in Nicaragua: Transitions, 1991-1995*. Managua: mimeo, United States Agency for International Development.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. et al. (1995). Who Votes in Central America? A Comparative Analysis. En: M. A. Seligson y J. Booth (Eds.). *Elections and Democracy in Central America, Revisited*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. y Córdova, Ricardo. (1995). *El Salvador: De la guerra a la paz, una cultura política en transición*. San Salvador: Universidad de Pittsburgh, IDELA y FUNDAUNGO.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. y Booth, John A. (eds.). (1995). *Elections and Democracy in Central America, Revisited*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. y Córdova, Ricardo. (1995). Nicaragua 1991-1995: Una cultura política en transición. En: R. Córdova Macías y G. Maihold (compiladores). *Cultura política y transición democrática en Nicaragua*. Managua: Fundación Friedrich Ebert, FUNDAUNGO, Instituto de Estudios Nicaragüenses y Centro de Análisis Socio Cultural de la UCA-Managua.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (1992). *Perspectivas para una democracia estable en El Salvador*. San Salvador: IDELA.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. y Muller, Edward N. (1987). *Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica 1978-1983*. *International Studies Quarterly*. Pp. 301-326.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. y Caspi, Dan (1983). Arabs in Israel: Political Tolerance and Ethnic Conflict. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 19. pp 55-66.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. y Caspi, Dan (1983). Toward an Empirical Theory of Tolerance: Radical Groups in Israel and Costa Rica. *Comparative Political Studies*, 15. pp 385-404.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. (1983). On the Measurement of Diffuse Support: Some Evidence from Mexico. *Social Indicators Research*, 12. Pp. 1-24.

Stouffer, Samuel A. (1955). *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*. New York: Doubleday.

Sullivan, John L.; Shamir, Michael; Walsh, Patrick y Roberts, Nigel S. (1985). *Political Tolerance in Context: Support for Unpopular Minorities in Israel, New Zeland, and the United States*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Sullivan, John L.; Piereson, James y Marcus, George E. (1982). *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Transparency International Latinoamérica y el Caribe. (2006). *Índice de percepción de corrupción*.

TSE. Resultados elecciones 2004 y 2006. El Salvador.

Wiedlandt, Gonzalo. (2005). “Hacia la construcción de lecciones de posconflicto en América Latina y el Caribe. Una mirada a la violencia juvenil en Centroamérica”. *Políticas sociales 115*. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL.

Williamson, John. (2003). From Reform Agenda. A short history of the Washington Consensus and suggestions for what to do next. *Finance & Development*, September.

Apéndices

- Apéndice A: Descripción de la metodología del estudio en El Salvador
- Apéndice B: Las tablas de regresión.
- Apéndice C: Carta de consentimiento del IUDOP.
- Apéndice D: Cuestionario aplicado en El Salvador

Apéndice A: Descripción metodológica del estudio en El Salvador

1.0 Determinación de la muestra

1.1 Universo poblacional

El universo de estudio comprendió la totalidad geográfica del país, la cual ésta compuesta por 14 departamentos y 262 municipios, incluyendo tanto las zonas urbanas y rurales de éstos.

De acuerdo a la Proyección de Población de El Salvador 1995-2025 de la Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos del Ministerio de Economía (DIGESTYC),¹¹⁶ el país contaba en el 2005 con una población total de 6,874,926, de la cual el 59.76% estaba concentrada en las zonas urbanas del país y el restante 40.24% corresponde a los habitantes de las zonas rurales.

1.2 Población

Las unidades objeto de estudio correspondió a la población mayor de 18 años, residente en hogares.

1.3 Método de muestreo

El primer criterio para diseñar el procedimiento de muestreo es que la muestra resultante reflejase lo más fielmente posible la totalidad de la población salvadoreña, tomando como base la Proyección de Población de la Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos del Ministerio de Economía (DIGESTYC).

El sistema de muestreo utilizado fue probabilístico, estratificado y multietápico, por conglomerados y aleatorio en la selección de las unidades en cada una de las etapas que comprende el muestreo.

El muestreo fue estratificado según los 262 municipios que corresponden a los 14 departamentos del país; y contó con varias etapas de selección de la unidades: en un primer momento se seleccionaron las Unidades Primarias de Muestreo que corresponden precisamente a los municipios, luego las Unidades Secundarias que corresponden a segmentos censales en el área urbana y cantones en el área rural, posteriormente se eligieron las Unidades de Tercera Etapa conformadas por manzanas y finalmente se eligieron conglomerados de 6,7 u 8 viviendas en el caso del área urbana –dependiendo del estrato- y 12 viviendas en el área rural. Dentro de cada

¹¹⁶ Estos datos han sido elaborados por la Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTYC) del Ministerio de Economía, basados en el Censo de Población realizado en 1992. Ver: Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTYC), Fondo de población de las Naciones Unidas (FNUAP) y Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía (CELADE). (1996). *Proyección de la población de El Salvador 1995-2025*. San Salvador: Ministerio de Economía. Dicho censo es el último realizado a nivel nacional en el país, por lo cual, es a partir de ellos que se hacen los cálculos correspondientes a este muestreo, tomando también como base la proyección de población mencionada anteriormente.

estrato las UPM's se seleccionaron de acuerdo a la probabilidad proporcional al tamaño poblacional de cada municipio.

En cada vivienda se seleccionó un único hogar y dentro de éste se entrevistó a una sola persona mayor de 18 años que cumpliera con los requisitos de sexo y edad requerida para completar la muestra.

1.4 Marco muestral

Dicho marco está compuesto por la cartografía censal obtenida de la Dirección General de Estadística y Censos (DIGESTYC), la cual incluye tanto a las ciudades de las zonas urbanas del país como a los cantones que comprende la zona rural.

La mayor parte de la cartografía censal está actualizada hasta 1996 y otra al 2000, como parte de los esfuerzos hechos por la DIGESTYC para actualizar su información de base para las Encuestas de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples. Pero hay que mencionar que una parte de la cartografía utilizada en la encuesta corresponde a la levantada durante la ejecución del censo de 1992 y la cual no ha sido actualizada posteriormente, pero es la única con la que se cuenta en la actualidad, sobre todo en el caso de algunos mapas de la zona rural.

1.5 Tamaño de la muestra

Se estableció de antemano realizar un total de 1,500 entrevistas. Tomando en cuenta el dato anterior y considerando un 95% de confianza (Z), una varianza de 50% (p), el error muestral estimado es del +/- 2.5%. Para establecer dicho error se hizo uso de la siguiente fórmula diseñada para poblaciones infinitas:

$$E = Z \sqrt{pq / n}$$

donde,

$$E = (1.96)^2 (0.5) (0.5) / 1,500 = 2.5$$

La forma de selección de la muestra fue polietápica, realizando dentro del proceso de muestreo una serie de estratificaciones que permitieron seleccionar una muestra aleatoria.

1.6 Determinación de la muestra por estrato y áreas urbano/rural

Por la falta de información sobre la cantidad poblacional urbana y rural por municipio, se procedió a estimar dicha población utilizando las tasas de crecimiento anual tanto de la zona urbana como rural a nivel nacional. Para lo anterior, se hizo uso de los datos existentes sobre el

crecimiento poblacional tanto en lo urbano como en lo rural de los años 1995, 2000 y 2005,¹¹⁷ para poder estimar los datos municipales de interés para el año 2005. Así, tomando los datos del Censo Nacional de 1992 del Ministerio de Economía y la Dirección de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTYC), se obtiene la información poblacional por municipio para el año 1992. A estos datos se les aplicó la tasa de crecimiento poblacional anual estimada para el período de 1992 a 1995 para obtener la población urbana y rural para el año 1995.

Por ejemplo, la tasa de crecimiento anual del área urbana entre 1992 y 1995 fue de 8.2%. Para estimar la población urbana por municipio para 1995 se hizo uso de la siguiente fórmula:

$$\text{Población urbana municipal para 1995} = [[(8.2/100) \times \text{Población urbana municipal en 1992} \\ \times 3] + \text{Población urbana municipal en 1992}]$$

En el caso de la zona rural, se tenía que la tasa de crecimiento anual fue de -1.1%. Para estimar la población rural por municipio para 1995 se hizo uso de la siguiente fórmula:

$$\text{Población rural municipal para 1995} = [[-1.1/100) \times \text{Población rural municipal en 1992} \\ \times 3] + \text{Población rural municipal en 1992}]$$

Obteniendo el dato poblacional urbano – rural por municipio para 1995, se realizó el mismo procedimiento anterior para calcular dicha población al 2000 y luego al 2005, basándose en los datos obtenidos anteriormente para 1995. Las fórmulas utilizadas para calcular la población urbana y rural para 2000 y posteriormente para 2005 son las siguientes:

$$\text{Población urbana municipal para 2000} = [[(2.6/100) \times \text{Población urbana municipal en 1995} \\ \times 5] + \text{Población urbana municipal en 1995}]$$

$$\text{Población rural municipal para 2000} = [(1.3/100) \times \text{Población rural municipal en 1995} \\ \times 3] + \text{Población rural municipal en 1995}]$$

$$\text{Población urbana municipal para 2005} = [(2.3/100) \times \text{Población urbana municipal en 2000} \\ \times 3] + \text{Población urbana municipal en 2000}]$$

$$\text{Población rural municipal para 2005} = [(1.2/100) \times \text{Población rural municipal en 2000} \\ \times 3] + \text{Población rural municipal en 2000}]$$

Teniendo la cantidad poblacional por zona urbana y rural en cada municipio y por ende la cantidad total en cada uno de ellos, se procedió en un primer momento a estratificar la población con base en la cantidad de habitantes por municipio, éstos últimos son en este caso las Unidades Primarias de Muestreo. El primer estrato estaba conformado por aquellos municipios con más de 100,000 habitantes (estos municipios tienen una probabilidad de selección de 1; es decir, quedan autoseleccionados dentro de la muestra); el segundo estrato contenía a los municipios con 50,000

¹¹⁷ Estos datos corresponden a la Proyección de la Población de El Salvador, 1995-2025, elaborado por la Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTYC) basados en el Censo Poblacional realizado en 1992.

a 100,000 habitantes; el tercer estrato correspondía a los municipios con 20,000 a 50,000 habitantes y el cuarto y último estrato incluyó a los municipios con menos de 20,000 habitantes.

En un paso posterior, se determinó el número de boletas a aplicar por estrato de acuerdo a la cantidad poblacional que aglutinaba cada uno de ellos. Así, el estrato uno comprende el 39.34% de la población total del país, por lo que tendría que realizarse en dicho estrato 590 boletas del total de las 1500 establecidas para la muestra. El estrato dos comprende el 16.93% de la población total, en este sentido tendría que aplicarse 254 encuestas, los estratos tres y cuatro aglutinan al 20.80% y 22.93% del total poblacional respectivamente, y correspondería realizar 312 y 344 encuestas en cada uno de ellos respectivamente.

De acuerdo a la cantidad poblacional urbana y rural que concentra cada estrato, se procedió a distribuir la cantidad de boletas para cada estrato establecido anteriormente, de acuerdo a la cantidad poblacional urbana y rural en cada uno de ellos. Así por ejemplo, en el estrato 1 se estimó que habría que realizarse 590 encuestas, de las cuales 530 serían hechas en la zona urbana y 60 en la rural. Y así sucesivamente para cada estrato, a continuación se presenta el detalle de la distribución de la muestra por estrato y zona:

Estratos	Tamaño de la muestra		Muestra urbana		Muestra rural	
	%	n	%	n	%	n
Estrato 1	39.34	590	58.05	530	10.22	60
Estrato 2	16.93	254	15.44	141	19.25	113
Estrato 3	20.80	312	13.80	126	31.69	186
Estrato 4	22.93	344	12.71	116	38.84	228
Total	100.00	1500	100.00	913	100.00	587

Tabla 1. Distribución de la muestra por estrato y zona.

1.7 Ajuste de la muestra por “no cobertura”

En esta muestra no se admitió la sustitución y reemplazo de unidades de muestreo con el objetivo de eliminar los sesgos que pueden generar esta sustitución y reemplazo; por lo mismo y para garantizar el desarrollo de la muestra con los tamaños mínimos esperados, en un paso posterior se hizo un “ajuste por no cobertura” del tamaño de la muestra de cada zona (urbana – rural) de cada uno de los estratos, tomando en cuenta el factor de “no cobertura”. Dicho factor utilizado para cada estrato y en zonas urbanas y rurales, es el estimado con base en la experiencia del IUDOP en estudios anteriores. Por ejemplo, en el caso de los municipios del estrato 1, la tasa de “no cobertura” es de 0.15 en la zona urbana y 0.2 en la zona rural. Con base en lo anterior, el nuevo tamaño de la muestra para la zona urbana del estrato 1 es el siguiente:

$$n^* = (1 + t) \times n$$

$$n^* = (1 + 0.15) \times 530$$

$$n^* = 610$$

y en el caso de la zona urbana

$$n^* = (1 + t) \times n$$

$$n^* = (1 + 0.2) \times 60$$

$$n^* = 72$$

Estratos	Muestra urbana ajustada	Muestra rural ajustada	Tamaño muestra ajustada
Estrato 1	610	72	682
Estrato 2	162	136	298
Estrato 3	145	223	368
Estrato 4	133	274	407
Total	1050	705	1755

Tabla 2. Distribución de la muestra ajustada de acuerdo a la “tasa de no cobertura” según estrato y zona.

1.8 Selección de las diferentes unidades de muestreo

Para continuar el proceso se eligieron los municipios que se incluirán dentro de la muestra (dentro de cada estrato), luego se seleccionaron los cantones en las zonas rurales y los segmentos en las zonas urbanas. Este último proceso de escogitación de segmentos se llevó a cabo cuando se contó con todos los mapas censales de las zonas urbanas de los municipios que componen la muestra, luego de realizar el proceso de segmentación de los mismos –el cual se explicará detalladamente más adelante–.

Para la selección de los municipios, se tomaron en cuenta el número de conglomerados que serían necesarios elegir para completar la muestra urbana en cada uno de los estratos. Para ello se definió de antemano que en el estrato 1 se escogerían conglomerados de 6 viviendas cada uno, en el estrato 2 y 3 serían de 7 viviendas y en el estrato 4 cada conglomerado tendría 8 viviendas. En el caso de estrato 1, se calculó que se realizarían 610 entrevistas en el área urbana, esto se dividió entre seis para obtener el número de conglomerados necesarios, lo cual dio como resultado un total de 102 conglomerados. Como en este estrato todos los municipios fueron autoseleccionados, se procedió a distribuir el total de conglomerados en cada municipio en proporción al tamaño de cada uno de ellos. Para lo anterior se utilizó el procedimiento que se describe a continuación.

Se construyó un listado de municipios por estratos ordenándolos del más grande al más pequeño de acuerdo a la cantidad de población en cada uno de ellos. Además, el listado contenía una columna con la suma acumulativa de las poblaciones de cada uno de los municipios. Luego, se eligió dentro del listado acumulativo un inicio aleatorio y se estableció un intervalo para realizar, a partir de ese inicio aleatorio, una selección sistemática de los municipios dentro de cada departamento. Para seleccionar el inicio aleatorio, se generó un número aleatorio en cada estrato haciendo uso de la función RAND de Excel (número aleatorio normalizado entre 0 y 1), dicho número se multiplicó por el total de la población estimada para 2005 que aglutinaba cada estrato y el municipio donde se ubicaba la cantidad resultante dentro del listado acumulativo, era el primer municipio seleccionado. Por ejemplo, en el caso del estrato 1 el número aleatorio generado por Excel fue de 0.37812, al multiplicarlo por el total de la población aglutinada en dicho estrato (0.37812 x 2,688,878) dio como resultado 1,016,718.5, dicho número se ubica en la cantidad acumulada correspondiente al municipio de Soyapango, por lo mismo ese municipio fue el primero donde se ubicó el primer conglomerado dentro del estrato 1.

Luego para continuar con la ubicación del total de conglomerados correspondientes al estrato, se hizo uso de un intervalo, el cual se determinó dividiendo el total de la población del estrato entre el número de conglomerados necesarios para completar la muestra. Dicho intervalo se sumaba a la cantidad inicial que determinaba el primer municipio y así, el municipio donde se ubicaría el siguiente conglomerado era aquel donde se completaba dicha sumatoria, y así sucesivamente hasta ubicar el total de conglomerados del estrato. En el caso del estrato 1, todos los municipios comprenden más de un conglomerado, por el hecho de que estos aglutinan una cantidad considerable de población. Continuando con el estrato 1, el intervalo que se obtuvo de dividir el total de la población del estrato entre el número de conglomerados necesarios ($2,688,878 / 102$) fue de 26,362, dicho intervalo fue sumado a la cantidad del inicio ($1,016,718.5 + 26,362$) y se obtuvo el valor de 1,043,080 el cual indicó el segundo municipio donde se ubicaría el siguiente conglomerado, que en este caso resultó ser el mismo municipio de Soyapango. Así se procedió sucesivamente hasta ubicar el total de conglomerados en el estrato. Cuando la aplicación de la sumatoria del intervalo excedía la población total del estrato, se acumulaba para continuar con el procedimiento desde el inicio del listado de dicho estrato. Este procedimiento antes descrito se utilizó en cada uno de los estratos para seleccionar los municipios a incluir en la muestra y ubicar dentro de ellos los conglomerados necesarios para cumplir con la muestra de cada estrato.

Municipio	Población	Población acumulada	Orden de selección en áreas urbanas
Usulután	90,020	90,020	4, 5
San Marcos	86,298	176,318	6,7
Chalchuapa	83,135	259,453	8,
Cuscatancingo	79,735	339,189	9, 10
Zacatecoluca	78,294	417,483	11
San Martín	76,781	494,264	12, 13
Cojutepeque	68,241	562,505	14
Ilobasco	67,182	629,687	15,16
Izalco	66,965	696,652	17
San Vicente	63,967	760,619	18
Quezaltepeque	62,028	822,647	19
Metapán	61,871	884,518	20,21
Acajutla	60,767	945,284	22
Opico	59,203	1,004,487	23
Colón	54,865	1,059,352	1
La Unión	50,480	1,109,832	2
Sensuntepeque	50,463	1,160,295	3
Total	1,160,295		

Tabla 3. Listado de municipios del Estrato 2 utilizado para la selección de los mismos.

Número aleatorio generado: 0.883199

Cantidad inicial de selección: $1,160,295 \times 0.883199 = 1,024,771$

Intervalo obtenido: $1,160,295 / 23 = 50,448$.

La Tabla 3 especifica cómo se seleccionaron los municipios en el estrato 2. en la primera columna se listan los municipios que comprenden el estrato 2 del más grande al más pequeño en población, la segunda columna muestra la población de cada municipio; en la tercera se detalla la población acumulada y en la última se especifica el orden en el cual fueron seleccionados los municipios. Como se observa, cuando la aplicación de la sumatoria del intervalo excede la población total del estrato se acumula para continuar con el procedimiento desde el inicio del listado.

Una vez seleccionados los municipios en cada estrato y distribuida la muestra urbana en cada uno de ellos, se procedió a distribuir la muestra rural en cada estrato. Para ello, se aplicó el mismo procedimiento utilizado para distribuir la muestra urbana, sólo que en esta ocasión sólo fueron listados de mayor a menor los municipios seleccionados en el paso anterior, para distribuir en esos mismos municipios la muestra rural. Para el caso de la muestra rural se estableció seleccionar conglomerados de 12 viviendas, que para este caso cada conglomerado de 12 viviendas corresponderá a un cantón a seleccionar.

Hay que señalar, que en el caso de algunos municipios, que según en censo de 1992 ya no poseen población rural y que fueron seleccionados dentro de la muestra a través de un proceso de distribución de la muestra urbana, se eliminaron del listado utilizado para distribuir los conglomerados necesarios para cubrir la muestra rural en cada estrato. En dichos municipios únicamente se realizó el total de conglomerados que les corresponde a la muestra urbana.

Posteriormente, se eligieron los diferentes puntos de muestreo dentro de cada municipio que deberían ser incluidos en la muestra. Para ello se realizaron dos procedimientos diferentes en función de la naturaleza de la zona del municipio. En las zonas urbanas se procedió a dividir cada municipio en segmentos poblacionales con base en los mapas de la Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTYC); mientras que en las zonas rurales, se tomó a los cantones como unidad poblacional y se listaron para ser elegidos de forma aleatoria.

En el caso específico de las zonas rurales, se eligieron por municipio seleccionado tantos cantones como conglomerados fuesen necesarios para cubrir la muestra, para lo cual se hizo de una forma totalmente aleatoria, pues en la mayoría de los casos fue necesario elegir únicamente un cantón por municipio y solamente en algunos de ellos fue necesario seleccionar dos cantones. Los cantones fueron ordenados en orden alfabético dentro de cada municipio seleccionado, luego elegía un número aleatorio entre 0 y 1, ese número se multiplicaba por el total de cantones pertenecientes al municipio y en el cantón que se ubicaba en el número resultante era el seleccionado; cuando se requería de dos cantones se realizó ese mismo procedimiento para seleccionar el segundo cantón.

En las zonas urbanas, el proceso de selección de los segmentos donde se aplicaron las encuestas fue sistemático con un punto de arranque aleatorio utilizando los mapas de la DIGESTYC. Por municipio se seleccionaron tantos segmentos como conglomerados le correspondían a cada municipio; es decir, que en cada segmento se realizaron únicamente la cantidad de encuestas que le corresponde a un conglomerado, la cual varía en función del estrato al que pertenece cada municipio, como ya se menciona anteriormente.

Cada mapa de los municipios muestra una zona urbana de dos mil a quince mil viviendas y fueron divididos en segmentos numerados correlativamente siguiendo una secuencia en espiral. Cada segmento abarcó alrededor de 100 viviendas en aquellos municipios con bajas concentraciones poblacionales y alrededor de 300 viviendas en aquellos que son densamente poblados. Una vez divididos los mapas, se procedió a calcular una constante que permitiera seleccionar los segmentos de forma sistemática, de acuerdo a la cantidad de conglomerados que le correspondía a cada municipio para completar la muestra urbana.

Luego, para cada mapa urbano se dividió el número de segmentos del mapa del municipio entre el número de segmentos que deberían ser incluidos dentro de la muestra, el cual corresponde al número de conglomerados necesarios para cubrirla. Esto dio como resultado una cifra que se convirtió en un intervalo de razón fija, según la cual se escogieron los segmentos en función de un punto de arranque aleatorio. Por ejemplo, si la división del número total de segmentos entre el número de segmentos a escoger da como resultado 8, se escogió un número aleatorio entre el 1 y el 8, y a partir de ese número se escogieron los segmentos en un intervalo de 8 segmentos. Más concretamente, si el número elegido aleatoriamente es el 6, se escogió el segmento con ese número, luego se sumaron 8 segmentos más y así el próximo número elegido será el 14, y así sucesivamente hasta tener el número de segmentos estipulado para ese municipio.

La muestra contó con un total de 222 puntos de muestreo diferentes, tomando en cuenta zona urbana y rural –59 puntos de muestreo en la zona rural y 163 en la zona urbana-.

La aplicación del cuestionario se hizo por aproximación sistemática a los hogares ubicados en los segmentos y cantones. En el caso de la zona urbana se dividió cada segmento en un número determinado de manzanas, conteniendo cada una de ellas una cantidad constante de viviendas. Luego, se eligió dentro de cada segmento una manzana en forma aleatoria. Posteriormente, dentro de cada manzana seleccionada se eligió un conglomerado de 6,7 u 8 viviendas continuas –dependiendo del estrato al que pertenezca el municipio-. Dichas viviendas se eligieron a partir de la vivienda situada más al sur de la manzana seleccionada –esa fue la primera vivienda del conglomerado- y las siguientes 5 viviendas (ó 6 ó 7) correspondieron a las viviendas que se encuentran contiguas a la primera seleccionada, recorriendo la manzana en dirección a las agujas del reloj.

En los cantones se ubicó la vivienda más al sur del cantón y se tomaron las 11 viviendas contiguas a ella y para elegir las se hizo igual que en la zona urbana; es decir, se recorrió el cantón siguiendo las agujas del reloj.

En cada una de las viviendas que comprendan el conglomerado se ubicó a la persona que cumpla con los requisitos requeridos para la muestra. Los entrevistadores explicaron a las personas abordadas los objetivos y el tema general de la encuesta y se entrevistaron únicamente a las personas que quisieran colaborar, entrevistando sólo a una persona por hogar que cumpla con las características de sexo y edad requeridas para completar la muestra. Para lo anterior, cada boleta estaba marcada con el sexo y rango de edad que debe tener la persona a entrevistar.

En la última etapa del muestreo se consideraron dichas cuotas por sexo y edad de las personas a encuestar. Esto con el propósito de asegurar una distribución de la muestra que corresponda a la

distribución de la población total del país en función de esas dos variables; así como también, eliminar el criterio de selección personal del encuestador al escoger la persona a entrevistar en cada vivienda. Las cuotas por sexo y edad estaban distribuidas como lo muestra la Tabla 4.

Edad	Sexo						Total		
	Masculino			Femenino					
	Cantidad			Cantidad			Cantidad		
	Poblacional*	%	N	Poblacional*	%	N	Poblacional*	%	N
18 a 34 años	1,110,146	26.9	472	1,113,631	27.0	474	2,223,777	53.9	946
35 años y más	868,557	21.1	370	1,030,974	25.0	439	1,899,531	46.1	809
	1,978,703	48.0	842	2,144,605	52.0	913	4,123,308	100.0	1,755

**Tabla 4. Distribución de cuotas por sexo y edad¹¹⁸
(Muestra ajustada por no cobertura).**

* Según las proyecciones de población para el 2005. Ver: DIGESTYC, FNUAP y CELADE (1996).

Con todos los procedimientos anteriores se permite la aleatoriedad y la distribución en la selección de la muestra, lo cual asegura la representatividad poblacional del estudio.

Procesamiento de la información

Es necesario señalar que para el desarrollo de esta encuesta el levantamiento de datos se realizó con equipo de tipo PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) comúnmente llamado en el mercado Palm.

El uso de la Palm o PDA en esta investigación tenía como objetivo mejorar el procesamiento y recolección de información. Una de las ventajas del uso de esta tecnología es que se reducen los tiempos generales, permitiendo obtener tiempo adicional para el análisis de los datos, ya que la información recolectada por los encuestadores en campo era descargada diariamente, lo cual permitía verificar la cantidad y calidad de las encuestas que se estaban tomando.

El procesamiento de la información se realizó de forma automática. En primer lugar se hizo el proceso de sincronización de la Palm con la computadora para luego ejecutar el vaciado de información. Posteriormente la información recopilada era trasladada automáticamente al “Statistical Package for Social Science” (SPSS), con el objetivo de realizar con este paquete todos los análisis necesarios para la elaboración del informe; así como también, la elaboración de tablas y gráficos.

Análisis estadístico

Se utilizaron métodos de análisis estadístico relativamente simples. Para establecer la asociación entre dos variables numéricas se usa el coeficiente de correlación de Pearson. Este tiene valores de 0 a 1. Cuando hay perfecta correspondencia entre dos valores el coeficiente es igual a la unidad. Mientras que para establecer la asociación entre una variable continua y otra categórica se utiliza el análisis de varianza. Para establecer si hay una relación estadísticamente significativa

¹¹⁸ Los datos expuestos en esta tabla sobre cantidad poblacional según sexo y rangos de edad, han sido extraídos de “La Proyección de la población de EL Salvador 1995-2025” elaborada por la Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTYC) del Ministerio de Economía (1996), junto con CELADE y FNUAP.

entre dos variables categóricas, se utilizó el test de chi cuadrado. Para integrar la información de varias preguntas sobre un mismo tema se construyeron escalas por simple suma. Siempre se procede a normalizar el índice resultante de modo que tome valores de 0 a 100. Como indicador de la consistencia o confiabilidad interna de las escalas así construidas se utiliza el coeficiente Alfa de Cronbach. Coeficientes de 0.70 o más se consideran confiables y consistentes, pero en algunos casos se usaron escalas cuyos coeficientes están por debajo de dichos valores. También se utilizó el análisis factorial para determinar el número de dimensiones o factores implícitos en una serie de preguntas sobre el mismo tema.

En repetidas ocasiones se estimaron modelos lineales de regresión múltiple por mínimos cuadrados ordinarios. Usualmente la variable dependiente en estos modelos es algún índice construido con varios reactivos. Los coeficientes de regresión de estos modelos (y su significación estadística) permiten valorar de manera concisa los co-factores que “explican” estos índices. Aunque a veces nos referimos a estos co-factores como “determinantes”, en realidad, con la información disponible no es posible establecer relaciones de causalidad. Únicamente se tienen “asociaciones”. En los modelos de regresión también se presentan los coeficientes de regresión estandarizados “Beta”. Estos son útiles para valorar la importancia relativa de los distintos factores explicativos en el modelo, pues miden los efectos de unidades estándar. Como indicador de la bondad de ajuste del modelo en su conjunto se usó el coeficiente de determinación “R cuadrado”. Este coeficiente informa de la proporción de varianza explicada por el modelo en su conjunto, en comparación con la explicación que se obtendría con un modelo “nulo” (variable dependiente estimada simplemente por su promedio). También se utilizaron modelos de regresión logística binaria cuando la variable dependiente es dicotómica en sus valores. En estos casos, se utilizó el “R cuadrado” de Nagelkerke como indicador de la varianza explicada por el modelo.

Precisión de los resultados

Toda encuesta por muestreo está afectada por dos tipos de errores: los errores de no muestreo y los errores de muestreo. Los errores de no muestreo son aquellos que se cometen durante la recolección y procesamiento de la información, estos se pueden controlar construyendo un adecuado instrumento de medición, entrenando a los encuestadores para una correcta aplicación del instrumento, supervisando el trabajo de campo, creando un programa de captura de datos eficiente, revisión de cuestionario y adecuada codificación, así como una limpieza del archivo, entre otras. Estos errores se pueden controlar pero no se pueden cuantificar. Sin embargo la comparación de los resultados de la muestra con los de la población da una idea de si esos errores han generado sesgos que restan representatividad a la muestra.

Los errores de muestreo, por otro lado, son producto del azar y resultan del hecho de entrevistar una muestra y no el total de la población. Cuando se selecciona una muestra ésta es una de las tantas muestras posibles a seleccionar de la población. La variabilidad que existe entre todas éstas posibles muestras es el error de muestreo, el cual podría medirse si uno dispusiese de todas esas muestras, situación obviamente irreal. En la práctica, lo que se hace es estimar este error sobre la variación obtenida a partir de la misma muestra. Para estimar el error de muestreo de un estadístico (promedio, porcentajes, diferencias y totales), se calcula el error estándar que es la

raíz cuadrada de la variancia poblacional bajo las mismas condiciones. Para el cálculo de este error es muy importante considerar el diseño con el que se seleccionó la muestra.

El efecto del diseño, EED, indica la eficiencia del diseño empleado en relación a un diseño de muestra irrestricto aleatorio (MIA). Un valor de 1 indica que la varianza obtenida por ambos diseños (complejo y MIA) es igual, es decir el muestreo complejo es tan eficiente como uno MIA con el mismo tamaño de muestra. Si el valor es menos a 1, indica que la varianza obtenida con el muestreo complejo es menor a la obtenida con el MIA.

Apéndice B: Las tablas de de regresión

	Coeficientes no		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Error típ.			
(Constante)	31.641	3.066		10.321	.000
ed Nivel educativo	-.292	.146	-.066	-2.004	.045
q1r Género recodificada	1.763	1.065	.041	1.656	.098
q2 Edad	-.101	.038	-.070	-2.672	.008
q10 Ingresos familiares	-.633	.290	-.064	-2.183	.029
soct1r Situación económica del país recodificada	.064	.026	.066	2.428	.015
l1 Ideología (escala izquierda-derecha)	.604	.217	.080	2.790	.005
m1r Evaluación trabajo realizado presidente Saca recodificada	.176	.025	.217	6.986	.000
pn4r Satisfacción forma democracia funciona recodificada	.113	.026	.130	4.442	.000
pn5r Opinión sobre que tan democrático es el país recodificads	.071	.021	.096	3.313	.001
aoj12r Confianza en el sistema judicial para castigar recodificada	.081	.015	.144	5.488	.000
sgl2r Trato le han dado en la municipalidad recodificada	.082	.025	.080	3.231	.001

Tabla IV.1.a Predictores de apoyo al sistema, 2006.¹¹⁹

Variable dependiente: PSA5 Escala de apoyo al sistema.

R cuadrado=.312

R cuadrado corregida=.305; sig<.001

¹¹⁹ Para simplificar la interpretación de los resultados del modelo de regresión múltiple, se recodificaron algunas de las preguntas: q1 se convirtió en q1r con el valor de 0 para las mujeres y 1 para los hombres; soct1 se transformó en soct1r con el valor 0 para muy mala, 25 mala, 50 ni buena ni mala, 75 buena y 100 muy buena; m1 se transformó en m1r con el valor 0 para la opción muy malo, 25 malo, 50 ni bueno ni malo, 75 bueno y 100 muy bueno; pn4 se convirtió en pn4r con el valor 0 para la opción muy insatisfecho, 33 insatisfecho, 67 satisfecho y 100 muy satisfecho; pn5 se transformó en pn5r con el valor 0 para la opción nada democrático, 33 poco democrático, 67 algo democrático y 100 muy democrático; aoj12 se convirtió en aoj12r con el valor 0 para la opción nada, 33 poco, 67 algo y 100 mucho; y sgl2 se transformó en sgl2r con el valor 0 para la opción muy mal, 25 mal, 50 ni bien ni mal, 75 bien y 100 muy bien.

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Error típ.	Beta		
(Constante)	67.376	3.304		20.393	.000
ed Nivel educativo	.358	.174	.069	2.056	.040
q2 Edad	.046	.046	.027	1.001	.317
q1r Género recodificado	5.000	1.310	.097	3.817	.000
l1 Ideología (escala izquierda-derecha)	-1.609	.263	-.181	-6.129	.000
m1r Evaluación trabajo realizado presidente Saca recodificada	-.130	.029	-.136	-4.482	.000
pn4r Satisfacción forma democracia funciona recodificada	-.087	.030	-.083	-2.918	.004
riqueza Índice de riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	.775	.396	.060	1.958	.050

Tabla IV.2.a Predictores de la tolerancia política, 2006.¹²⁰

Variable dependiente: tol Escala de tolerancia política

R cuadrado=.151.

R cuadrado corregida=.147; Sig<.001

¹²⁰ El índice de riqueza se construyó a partir de la suma de las preguntas: R1+R3+R4+R5+R6+R7+R12. La escala tiene un rango de 0 a 9.

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
sexo	-.324	.243	1.787	1	.181	.723
q2	-.016	.009	3.200	1	.074	.984
edanno	-.081	.056	2.056	1	.152	.922
Wealth	.193	.062	9.534	1	.002	1.212
ocup1a	.195	.102	3.681	1	.055	1.215
aoj18	.765	.230	11.062	1	.001	2.149
q10r	.252	.169	2.232	1	.014	1.287
Constant	-3.188	.730	19.053	1	.000	.041

Tabla V.2.a Predictores de victimización por corrupción, 2006.

Variable(s) dependiente en el paso 1: sexo, q2, edanno, Wealth, ocup1a, aoj18, q10r.

R cuadrado de Nagelkerke = .111, sig <.001

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Error típ.	Beta		
(Constant)	46.624	9.326		5.000	.000
Género	-6.791	2.545	-.091	-2.668	.008
¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? Años	-.461	.086	-.184	-5.346	.000
Cuál fue el último año aprobado	.242	.547	.015	.443	.658
UR	-2.925	2.746	-.041	-1.065	.287
¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?	-.063	.669	-.004	-.094	.925
Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	-.376	.788	-.022	-.477	.633
¿Está usted trabajando actualmente?	1.100	2.798	.013	.393	.694
Porcentaje de la población que han sido víctimas de la corrupción al menos una vez el último año	.099	.031	.107	3.168	.002
Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...?	.027	1.261	.001	.021	.983

Tabla V.3.a Predictores de la justificación por corrupción, 2006.

Dependent Variable: juscor

R cuadrado = .053.

R cuadrado corregida= .043, sig <.001

	Coeficientes no		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	estandarizados	Error típ.			
	B	Error típ.	Beta		
(Constant)	31.932	8.759		3.646	.000
UR	-2.973	3.597	-.042	-.827	.409
TAMANO	.502	1.096	.024	.458	.647
Sexo	-5.423	1.797	-.078	-3.018	.003
¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? Años	-.014	.060	-.006	-.227	.820
[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E] ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?	1.480	.529	.095	2.797	.005
Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	-.553	.643	-.032	-.860	.390
Cuál fue el último año aprobado	1.244	.413	.079	3.009	.003
Con qué frecuencia mira noticias en la TV...	-1.682	.996	-.046	-1.688	.092
En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en el último año?	1.481	2.844	.014	.521	.603
¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada?	10.025	.913	.311	10.984	.000
Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que esta involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted?	-6.847	1.831	-.098	-3.741	.000

Tabla VI.1. Predictores de la sensación de seguridad, 2006.

Dependent Variable: Escala de sensación de seguridad

R cuadrado = .130

	B	E.T.	Wald	gl	Sig.	Exp(B)
Ed Educación	.011	.020	.319	1	.572	1.011
q2 Edad	.003	.006	.212	1	.645	1.003
Estratopri Estrato poblacional	.388	.073	28.363	1	.000	1.474
q1r Género recodificada	.592	.172	11.841	1	.001	1.808
elspn3cr Representación de intereses en el gobierno local recodificada	.006	.002	6.152	1	.013	1.006
pp2r Trabajó por algún candidato o partido en elecciones 2004 recodificada	.012	.002	31.822	1	.000	1.012
Medios Exposición a noticias	.017	.004	20.404	1	.000	1.017
Constante	-5.029	.459	120.027	1	.000	.007

Tabla VII.1. Predictores de la asistencia a reunión municipal, 2006.

Variable(s) introducida(s) en el paso 1: ed, q2, estratopri, q1r, elspn3cr, pp2r, medios.

Variable dependiente: NP1R.

R cuadrado de Nagelkerke=.136, sig<.001

Modelo	Coeficientes no		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	estandarizados B	Error típ. Error típ.			
(Constante)	23.773	2.856		8.325	.000
q2 Edad	-.010	.034	-.007	-.301	.763
q1r Género recodificado	-1.325	.983	-.030	-1.347	.178
ed Educación	.317	.111	.070	2.858	.004
soct1r Percepción sobre la situación económica del país recodificada	.076	.022	.076	3.441	.001
it1 Confianza interpersonal	-1.661	.494	-.075	-3.365	.001
sgl2r Trato recibido en la municipalidad recodificada	.403	.025	.376	16.158	.000
elspn3cr Representación de intereses en el gobierno local recodificada	.166	.015	.247	10.772	.000
Medios Exposición a noticias	-.048	.021	-.052	-2.270	.023

Tabla VII.2. Predictores de la satisfacción con los servicios que presta la municipalidad, 2006.

Variable dependiente: sgl1r Satisfacción con los servicios del Gobierno local recodificada

R cuadrado=.306

R cuadrado corregida=.302; sig<.001

Modelo	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	T	Sig.
	B	Error típ.	Beta		
(Constante)	36.919	2.665		13.854	.000
ed Educación	.111	.103	.026	1.081	.280
q1r Género recodificado	.312	.935	.007	.333	.739
q2 Edad	.088	.032	.064	2.724	.007
it1 Confianza interpersonal	-1.859	.475	-.089	-3.915	.000
pn4r Satisfacción funcionamiento democracia recodificada	.044	.020	.051	2.219	.027
sgl1r Satisfacción con los servicios presta la comunidad recodificada	.364	.023	.389	16.048	.000
elspn3cr Representación de intereses en el gobierno local recodificada	.113	.015	.179	7.366	.000

Tabla VII.3. Predictores de la satisfacción con el trato recibido en las municipalidades, 2006.

Variable dependiente: sgl2r Trato le han dado en la municipalidad recodificada

R cuadrado=.281

R cuadrado corregida=.278; sig<.001

Modelo	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	T	Sig.
	B	Error típ.	Beta		
(Constante)	27.606	3.880		7.115	.000
ed Educación	-.535	.149	-.085	-3.596	.000
q2 Edad	-.050	.047	-.025	-1.048	.295
q1r Género recodificado	-.550	1.385	-.009	-.397	.692
it1 Confianza interpersonal	-2.492	.702	-.080	-3.548	.000
sgl2r Trato recibido en la municipalidad recodificada	.272	.038	.183	7.111	.000
sgl1r Satisfacción con los servicios que presta la municipalidad recodificada	.288	.036	.207	7.921	.000
elspn3cr Representación de intereses en el gobierno local recodificada	.239	.023	.254	10.484	.000

Tabla VII.4. Predictores de la confianza en las municipalidades, 2006.

Variable dependiente: b32r Confianza en la Municipalidad recodificada

R cuadrado=.279

R cuadrado corregida=.276; sig<.001

	B	E.T.	Wald	gl	Sig.	Exp(B)
Estratopri Estrato poblacional	.163	.050	10.473	1	.001	1.177
q1r Género recodificada	-.043	.114	.142	1	.707	.958
m1r Evaluación del presidente	-.005	.002	4.958	1	.026	.995
pp2 Trabajo por algún candidato o partido en las elecciones de 2004	1.090	.270	16.313	1	.000	.336
poll interés en la política	-.256	.064	15.723	1	.000	.774
Ed Nivel educativo	.011	.016	.466	1	.495	1.011
q2 Edad	.014	.004	11.622	1	.001	1.014
Riqueza Posesión de bienes materiales	.062	.036	2.985	1	.084	1.064
vb10 simpatiza con algún partido	-.522	.132	15.672	1	.000	.593
elsvb15 Valoración resultado elecciones pasadas representa la voluntad del pueblo	-.154	.059	6.834	1	.009	.857
Inform Conocimiento político	.016	.003	26.658	1	.000	1.016
Constante	3.170	.669	22.429	1	.000	23.819

Tabla VIII.4.a Predictores del voto, 2006.

Variable(s) introducida(s) en el paso 1: estratopri, q1r, m1r, pp2, poll, ed, q2, riqueza, vb10, elsvb15, inform.

Variable dependiente: VB6R

R cuadrado de Nagelkerke=.157, sig<.001

Apéndice C: Carta de consentimiento del IUDOP



Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas
Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública

Apartado postal (01) 168, Boulevard Los Próceres, San Salvador, El Salvador, C.A.
Tel. (503) 2210-6600 ext. 415. Telefax: (503) 2210-6672. email: b Moran@iudop.uca.edu.sv

1 de junio de 2006

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a por sorteo para participar en un estudio de opinión pública, el cual es financiado por la Universidad de Vanderbilt. Vengo por encargo del Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP) de la Universidad Centroamericana (UCA) para solicitarle una entrevista que durará alrededor de 45 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación de El Salvador.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse al **Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública de la Universidad Centroamericana (UCA) a los teléfonos 2210-6672 ó 2210-6600, ext. 415, con el señor José Miguel Cruz o el señor Mardoqueo Rivera.**

¿Desea participar?

Atentamente,


José Miguel Cruz

Director



Apéndice D: Cuestionario aplicado en El Salvador

Versión # 23E IRB Approval: 060187



LA CULTURA POLITICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA:
El Salvador, 2006

© Vanderbilt University 2006. Derechos reservados. All rights reserved. País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad	PAIS	3
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____	IDNUM	
Estratopri: (1) Mayores de 100 mil habitantes (2) Entre 50 y 100 mil habitantes (3) Entre 20 y 50 mil habitantes (4) Menos de 20 mil habitantes	ESTRATOPRI	03 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UPM. _____	UPM	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Departamento : _____	ELSDEPT	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Municipio: _____	ELSMUNICIPIO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Zona: _____	ELSZONA	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SEGMENTO CENSAL _____	ELSSEGMENTO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Sector _____	ELSSEC	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
CLUSTER. (Punto muestral)[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]	CLUSTER	
UR 1. Urbano 2. Rural	UR	
Tamaño del lugar: 1. San Salvador (área metropolitana) 2. Ciudad grande 3. Ciudad mediana 4. Ciudad pequeña 5. Área rural	TAMANO	

Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español	ELSIDIOMA	1
Hora de inicio: ____:____ [no digitar]		---
Fecha de la entrevista día: ____ mes:____ año: 2006	FECHA	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
OJO: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA		

Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	Q1	<input type="checkbox"/>
---	----	--------------------------

A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]	A4	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
---	-----------	---

Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios	02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos	59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16
Delincuencia, crimen, violencia	05	Narcotráfico	12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza	04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55
Explosión demográfico	20	Otro	70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	No sabe	88

DEM13. ¿En pocas palabras, que significa para usted la democracia? [OJO: No leer alternativas. Después de la primera y segunda respuesta preguntar, “¿significa algo más?”] . Aceptar hasta tres respuestas.

	1 ^o Respuesta DEM13A	Sondee: ¿significa algo más? 2 ^o Respuesta DEM13B	Sondee: ¿significa algo más? 3 ^o Respuesta DEM13C
No tiene ningún significado	0		
Libertad:			
Libertad (sin decir que tipo)	1	1	1
Libertad económica	2	2	2
Libertad de expresión, de voto, de elegir, de derechos humanos	3	3	3
Libertad de movimiento	4	4	4
Libertad, falta de	5	5	5
Ser independientes	6	6	6
Economía:			
Bienestar, progreso económico, crecimiento	7	7	7
Bienestar, falta de, no hay progreso económico	8	8	8
Capitalismo	9	9	9
Libre comercio, libre negocio	10	10	10
Trabajo, más oportunidad de	11	11	11
Trabajo, falta de	12	12	12
Sufragio:			
Derecho de escoger líderes	13	13	13
Elecciones, voto	14	14	14
Elecciones libres	15	15	15
Elecciones fraudulentas	16	16	16
Igualdad:			
Igualdad (sin especificar)	17	17	17
Igualdad económica, de clases	18	18	18
Igualdad de género	19	19	19
Igualdad frente a la leyes	20	20	20
Igualdad de razas o étnica	21	21	21
Igualdad, falta de, desigualdad	22	22	22
Participación:			
Limitaciones de participación	23	23	23
Participación (sin decir que tipo)	24	24	24
Participación de las minorías	25	25	25
Poder del pueblo	26	26	26
Estado de derecho:			
Derechos humanos, respeto a los derechos	27	27	27
Desorden, falta de justicia, corrupción	28	28	28
Justicia	29	29	29

Obedecer la ley, menos corrupción	30	30	30
Gobierno no militar	31	31	31
Vivir en paz, sin guerra	32	32	32
Guerra, invasiones	33	33	33
Otra respuesta	80	80	80
NS/NR	88	88	88
Código (si da únicamente una respuesta, se codifica 13B y 13C con 0. Si da dos respuestas, se codifica 13C con 0.) [Si da una sola respuesta, marcar y pasar a A1]	13A <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	13B <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	13C <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

DEM13D. ¿De estos significados de democracia que usted ha dicho, en su opinión cuál es el más importante? [Preguntar sólo si dio dos o tres respuestas a la pregunta anterior. Anote el código.] 88. NS 99. INAP [Una o ninguna respuesta]	DEM13D	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
--	--------	--

Ahora, cambiando el tema.....[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS		
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1	
A2. Mira noticias en la TV.	1	2	3	4	8	A2	
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	A3	
A4i. Lee noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4I	

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena(2) Buena(3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular)(4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) No sabe	SOCT1	
SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor(8) No sabe	SOCT2	
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) No sabe	IDIO1	
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	IDIO2	

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismos, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... ?	Sí	No	NS/NR		
CP2. A algún diputado de la Asamblea Legislativa	1	2	8	CP2	
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (municipalidad),	1	2	8	CP4A	
CP4. A algún ministerio/secretaría, institución pública, u oficina del estado	1	2	8	CP4	

PROT1. Alguna vez en su vida, ¿ha participado usted en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? [Si contestó “nunca” o “NS”, marcar 9 en PROT2 y pasar a CP5]	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS		PROT1
PROT2. ¿En el último año, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS	(9) Inap	PROT2

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...	Sí	No	NS/NR	INAP	
CP5. ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [Pase a CP6] (8) NS/NR [Pase a CP6]	1	2	8		CP5
CP5A. ¿Ha donado usted dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	1	2	8	9	CP5A
CP5B. ¿Ha contribuido usted con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	1	2	8	9	CP5B
CP5C. ¿Ha estado asistiendo usted a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	CP5C
CP5D. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar usted a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	CP5D

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6

CP7. ¿De una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8	CP7
CP8. ¿Un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8
CP9. ¿De una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP9
CP10. ¿De un sindicato?	1	2	3	4	8	CP10
CP13. ¿De un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP13

LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra ..? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS	LS3
--	-----

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ..? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS	IT1
---	-----

ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1

L1. (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) Ahora para cambiar de tema... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1
Izquierda					Derecha					(NS=88)

Recoger Tarjeta # 1

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...	
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No(8) No sabe/ no recuerda	NP1
NP1B. ¿Hasta que punto cree usted que los funcionarios de la municipalidad hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS	NP1B
NP2 . ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda	NP2
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son ...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) No sabe	SGL1
SGL2. ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la	SGL2

<p>municipalidad para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal?(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular)(4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) No sabe</p>		
<p>LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la municipalidad, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más al municipio (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios (3) No cambiar nada[NO LEER] (4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios [NO LEER] (8) No sabe / no contesta</p>	LGL2	
<p>LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad?(1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) No sabe</p>	LGL3	

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias: [**Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta**]:

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS	JC1	
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC4	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC10	
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC12	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC13	

JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre la Asamblea Legislativa, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8)NS	JC15	
JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8)NS	JC16	

<p>Ahora, yo le voy a leer varias frases. Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo?</p>	POP1	
<p>POP1. [Leer alternativas] 1. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición, [o al contrario], 2. Aunque atrase el progreso del país, nuestros presidentes no deben limitar la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. 8. NS/NR</p>		
<p>POP2. [Leer alternativas] 1. El Congreso impide mucho la labor de nuestros presidentes, y debería ser ignorado, [o al contrario], Aún cuando estorbe la labor del presidente, nuestros presidentes no debieran pasar por encima del Congreso. 8. NS/NR</p>	POP2	
<p>POP3. [Leer alternativas] 1. Los jueces con frecuencia estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, y deberían ser ignorados, [o al contrario], 2. Aún cuando a veces los jueces estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, las decisiones de los jueces siempre tienen que ser obedecidas. 8. NS/NR</p>	POP3	
<p>POP4. [Leer alternativas] 1. Nuestros Presidentes deben tener el poder necesario para que puedan actuar a favor del interés nacional, [o al contrario], 2. Se debe limitar el poder de nuestros Presidentes para que nuestras libertades no corran peligro. 8. NS/NR</p>	POP4	
<p>POP5. [Leer alternativas] 1. Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo impidan, [o al contrario], 2. Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste. 8. NS/NR</p>	POP5	

<p>VIC1. ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [pasar a AOJ8] (8) NS [pasar a AOJ8]</p>	<p>VIC1</p>
<p>VIC2. ¿Qué tipo de acto delincencial sufrió? [<i>Leer las alternativas</i>] (1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física (3) Agresión física sin robo (4) Violación o asalto sexual (5) Secuestro (6) Daño a la propiedad (7) Robo de la casa (88) NS (99) Inap (no víctima)</p>	<p>VIC2</p>
<p>AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí [pasar AOJ8] (2) No lo denunció [Seguir](8) NS/NR [Pasar a AOJ8] (9) Inap (no víctima) [Pasar a AOJ8]</p>	<p>AOJ1</p>
<p>AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [<i>No leer alternativas</i>] No sirve de nada Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias No tenía pruebas No fue grave No sabe adónde denunciar (8) NS/NR (9) No víctima</p>	<p>AOJ1B</p>
<p>AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8)NS</p>	<p>AOJ8</p>
<p>AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy Inseguro (8) NS</p>	<p>AOJ11</p>
<p>AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [<i>Leer alternativas</i>] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AOJ11A</p>
<p>AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [<i>Leer alternativas</i>] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AOJ12</p>
<p>AOJ16A. En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en el último año? (1) Si (2) No 8 (NS)</p>	<p>AOJ16A</p>
<p>AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada(8) NS</p>	<p>AOJ17</p>

AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted?

AOJ18

(1) Policía protege (2) Policía involucrada con delincuencia (8) NS

De los trámites que usted o alguien de su familia haya hecho alguna vez con las siguientes entidades, ¿se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? **(REPETIR LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA)**

	Muy satisfecho	Algo satisfecho	Algo insatisfecho	Muy Insatisfecho	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS/NR	
ST1. La policía nacional civil	1	2	3	4	9 8	ST1	
ST2. Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	9 8	ST2	
ST3. La fiscalía	1	2	3	4	9 8	ST3	
ST4. La alcaldía	1	2	3	4	9 8	ST4	

[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. *[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada			Mucho			No sabe	

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe		
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de El Salvador garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)	B1	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de El Salvador?	B2	
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político salvadoreño?	B3	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político salvadoreño?	B4	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar el sistema político salvadoreño?	B6	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	B10A	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?	B11	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fuerza Armada?	B12	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Asamblea Legislativa?	B13	
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?	B14	
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la República?	B15	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional Civil?	B18	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	B20	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	B21	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	B31	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?	B32	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser salvadoreño?	B43	
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la República?	B16	
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos?	B17	
B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte de Cuentas de la República?	B19	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	B37	
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?	B47	

Ahora, usando **la tarjeta "A"**, por favor conteste estas preguntas

Ahora, en esta misma escala, (<i>seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos</i>)	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS	
N1. Hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza.	N1	
N3. Hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos.	N3	

Ahora, en esta misma escala, (<i>seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos</i>)	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS
N9. Hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno.	N9
N10. Hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos.	N10
N11. Hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana.	N11
N12. Hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo.	N12

[Recoja tarjeta A]

Ahora vamos a hablar de otros temas

ELSB52 Cuando usted enfrenta un conflicto legal, civil, interpersonal, etc., o en caso de que usted enfrentara un conflicto legal, civil, interpersonal o de otro tipo, usted: (1) No hace nada (2) Concilia con la contraparte (3) Lo resuelve a su manera (4) Acude a una autoridad judicial (Juez, Policía, Fiscal) (5) Consigue un abogado(9) Utilizaría un centro de mediación para resolver el conflicto (8) NS	ELSB52
ELSB54 ¿Cree usted que el hecho de que las audiencias en los procesos penales sean públicas contribuye a disminuir la impunidad?(1) Sí(2) No(8) NS	ELSB54
ELSB56. ¿Ha escuchado hablar acerca de la existencia de los centros de mediación promovidos por la Procuraduría General de la República?(1) Sí [<i>Siga</i>] (2) No [<i>Pase a ELSAY7</i>]	ELSB56
ELSB57. ¿Considera usted que su nivel de información acerca de la existencia de los centros de mediación promovidos por la Procuraduría General de la República es...? (1) Adecuado(2) No es suficiente (8) NS/NR	ELSB57
ELSB58 ¿Esta usted muy de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en contra o muy en contra con la existencia de estos centros de mediación promovidos por la Procuraduría General de la República? (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) Algo de acuerdo(3) Algo en contra(4) Muy en contra (8) NS/NR	ELSB58
ELSB59 ¿Para usted, la existencia de estos centros de mediación promovidos por la Procuraduría General de la República son...? (1) Nada importantes (2) Poco importantes (3) Importantes (4) Muy importantes(8) NS/NR	ELSB59

<p>ELSAY7. Suponga que usted tiene un problema con respecto a una propiedad que otra persona reclama como suya. ¿A quién acudiría usted para resolver ese problema?</p> <p>(0) Alcaldía A una organización no gubernamental de ayuda (ONG) (2) A un amigo o familiar que tiene influencias en el gobierno A un tribunal de justicia A la PNC A una oficina del gobierno encargada de esos asuntos A un amigo o familiar que tiene experiencia resolviendo problemas por su cuenta A un abogado NS</p>	<p>ELS AY7</p>
<p>ELSAY8. Suponga que en su comunidad hay un problema con respecto al suministro de un servicio público. ¿A quién acudiría para resolver ese problema?</p> <p>(0)Alcaldía A una organización no gubernamental de ayuda (ONG) A un amigo o familiar que tiene influencias en el gobierno A un tribunal de justicia A la PNC A una oficina del gobierno encargada de esos asuntos A un amigo o familiar que tiene experiencia resolviendo problemas por su cuenta (7) A un abogado (8) NS</p>	<p>ELS AY8</p>

<p>M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Antonio Saca es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo)(8) NS/NR</p>	<p>M1</p>	
--	-----------	--

[Entregue tarjeta B]: Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo.” Un número entre el 1 y el 7 representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdoMuy de acuerdo							No sabe

Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe	
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ING4
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los salvadoreños tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	PN2
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	DEM23

RECOGER TARJETA B

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en El Salvador? (1) muy satisfecho (2) satisfecho (3) insatisfecho (4) muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	PN4
PN5. En su opinión, ¿El Salvador es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) muy democrático(2) algo democrático(3) poco democrático (4) nada democrático (8) NS/NR	PN5
ELSPN3A. ¿Qué tanto cree usted que el gobierno nacional representa sus intereses y le beneficia como ciudadano?(1) Mucho(2) Algo(3) Poco (4) Nada (8) No sabe, no responde	ELSPN3A
EPN3B. ELSPN3B. ¿Qué tanto cree usted que los diputados de la Asamblea Legislativa representan sus intereses y le benefician como ciudadano? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco(4) Nada (8) No sabe, no responde	ELSPN3B
ELSPN3C. ¿Qué tanto cree usted que la alcaldía de su localidad y el concejo municipal representa sus intereses y le beneficia como ciudadano? (1) Mucho(2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) No sabe, no responde	ELSPN3C

[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted desapruueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que usted aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente						Aprueba firmemente				No sabe

	1-10, 88	
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.		E5
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.		E8
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.		E11
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.		E15
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.		E14
E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.		E2
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.		E3
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales		E16

[No recoja tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de usar otra vez la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente						Aprueba firmemente				No sabe

	1-10, 88	
D32. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?		D32
D33. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político salvadoreño?		D33
D34. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?		D34
D36. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?		D36
D37. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?		D37

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en El Salvador. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos [tarjeta C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----

Desaprueba firmemente

Aprueba firmemente

No sabe

	1-10, 88	
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de El Salvador, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <i>[Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]</i>	D1	
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	D2	
D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	D3	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	D4	
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	D5	

RECOGER TARJETA "C"

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (8) NS	DEM2	
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura(2) Participación de todos (8) No responde	DEM1 1	
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer] (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR	AUT1	

PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR	PP1	
PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2004? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR	PP2	

Me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones 1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; 3) no corruptas.					
DC1. Por ejemplo: Un diputado acepta una mordida de diez mil dólares pagada por una empresa. Considera usted que lo que hizo el diputado es [Leer alternativas] : 1) corrupto y debe ser castigado 2) corrupto pero justificado 3) no corrupto NS=8					DC1
DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 5 dólares de más al empleado público municipal. Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es [Leer alternativas] : 1) corrupto y ella debe ser castigada 2) corrupto pero se justifica 3) no corrupto 8) NS					DC10
DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿usted Cree que el político es [Leer alternativas] : 1) corrupto y debe ser castigado 2) corrupto pero justificado 3) no corrupto NS=8					DC13

	No	Sí	NS	INAP	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...					
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?	0	1	8		EXC2
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?	0	1	8		EXC6
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio/ delegación en el último año No → Marcar 9 Si → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	0	1	8	9	EXC11
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? No → Marcar 9 Si → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida en el último año?	0	1	8	9	EXC13

	No	Sí	NS	INAP	
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? No → Marcar 9 Si → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en el último año?	0	1	8	9	EXC14
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Si → Preguntar: Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno)?	0	1	8	9	EXC15
EXC16. ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Si → Preguntar: En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno)?	0	1	8	9	EXC16
EXC17. ¿Alguien le pidió una mordida (o soborno) para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?	0	1	8		EXC17
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida (o soborno)?	0	1	8		EXC18
EXC19. ¿Cree que en nuestra sociedad el pagar mordidas (o sobornos) es justificable debido a los malos servicios públicos, o no es justificable?	0	1	8		EXC19

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos esta...? [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR		EXC7
--	--	------

Ahora queremos saber cuanta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...		
GI1. ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [NO LEER: George Bush] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI1	
GI2. ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa de El Salvador? [NO LEER: Rubén Orellana] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI2	
GI3. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene El Salvador? [NO LEER: 14] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI3	
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en El Salvador? [NO LEER: 5 años] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI4	



GI5. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [NO LEER: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también “Lula”] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI5	
VB1. Para hablar de otra cosa...¿Tiene usted Documento Único de Identidad (DUI)? (1) Sí(2) No(3) En trámite (8) NS	VB1	
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales? (1) Sí votó [<i>Siga</i>] (2) No votó [<i>Pasar a VB4</i>](8) NS [<i>Pasar a VB6</i>]	VB2	

<p>ELSVB3 [VB3]. ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales? [NO LEER LISTA]</p> <p>0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejo boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto)</p> <p>Antonio Saca (ARENA)</p> <p>Schafik Hándal (FMLN)</p> <p>Héctor Silva (Coalición CDU-PDC)</p> <p>Rafael Machuca (PCN)</p> <p>5. Otro _____</p> <p>77. Otro</p> <p>88. NS/NR</p> <p>99. Inap (No votó)</p> <p>(Después de esta pregunta, Pasar a VB8)</p>	<p>ELSVB3</p>
<p>VB4. [Sólo para los que no votaron]</p> <p>¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [anotar una sola respuesta]</p> <p>1 Falta de transporte</p> <p>2 Enfermedad</p> <p>3 Falta de interés</p> <p>4 No le gustó ningún candidato</p> <p>5 No cree en el sistema</p> <p>6 Falta de cédula de identidad</p> <p>7 No se encontró en padrón electoral</p> <p>10 No tener edad necesaria</p> <p>11 Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado</p> <p>12 Tener que trabajar / Falta de tiempo</p> <p>13. Incapacidad física o discapacidad</p> <p>14. Otra razón</p> <p>(88) NS/NR</p> <p>(Después de esta pregunta, Pasar a VB6)</p>	<p>VB4</p>
<p>VB8. [Para los que votaron] Cuando votó, ¿cual fue la razón más importante de su voto? [Leer todos] [Solo aceptar una respuesta]</p> <p>Las cualidades del candidato</p> <p>El partido político del candidato</p> <p>El plan de gobierno del candidato</p> <p>(8) NS (9) Inap (no votó)</p>	<p>VB8</p>
<p>VB6. ¿Votó usted para diputado en las últimas elecciones?</p> <p>1. Sí [Siga] 2. No. [pasa a ELSVB21] 8. NS [pasa a ELSVB21]</p>	<p>VB6</p>
<p>ELSVB7. ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputado en las últimas elecciones?</p> <p>0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejo boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto)</p> <p>1. ARENA</p> <p>2. FMLN</p> <p>3. PCN</p> <p>4. PDC</p> <p>5. CD</p> <p>6. PLN</p> <p>88. No sabe</p> <p>99. INAP (no votó)</p>	<p>ELSVB7</p>



<p>ELSVB21. Como usted sabe, un número importante de gente no votó en las pasadas elecciones para diputados y alcaldes en marzo de 2006. ¿Cuál de los siguientes motivos explica por qué la gente no votó?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Falta de transporte 2 Enfermedad 3 Falta de interés 4 No le gustó ningún candidato 5 No cree en el sistema 6 Falta de cédula de identidad 7 No se encontró en padrón electoral 10 No tener edad necesaria 11 Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado 12 Tener que trabajar / Falta de tiempo 13. Incapacidad física o discapacidad 14. Otra razón (88) NS/NR 	<p>ELSVB21</p>
<p>VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Siga](2) No [pase a ELSVB14](8) NS [pase a ELSVB14]</p>	<p>VB10</p>
<p>VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted ? [NO LEER LISTA].</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ARENA 2. FMLN 3. PCN 4. PDC 5. CD 6. FDR 88. No sabe 99. INAP 	<p>VB11</p>

<p>ELSVB12. ¿Qué tan cercano se siente usted de ese partido con el cual simpatiza? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>1. Muy cercano 2. Algo cercano 3. Poco cercano 4. No se siente cercano [Pase a ELSVB14] 8. No sabe, no responde</p>		ELSVB12	
<p>ELSVB13. ¿Qué tanto cree usted que ese partido representa sus intereses?</p> <p>1. Mucho 2. Algo 3. Poco 4. Nada 9. INAP</p>		ELSVB13	
<p>ELSVB14. En su opinión, los partidos políticos que han perdido credibilidad, ¿podrían recuperar esa credibilidad o ya no la pueden recuperar?</p> <p>1. La podrían recuperar 2. No la podrían recuperar 8. No sabe, no responde</p>		ELSVB14	
<p>ELSVB15. ¿Qué tanto considera usted que el resultado de las pasadas elecciones representa la voluntad del pueblo? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>1. Mucho 2. Algo 3. Poco 4. Nada 8. No sabe, no responde</p>		ELSVB15	
<p>ELSVB17. En su opinión, ¿qué tan democráticos son los partidos políticos en su funcionamiento interno? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>1. Muy democráticos 2. Algo democráticos 3. Poco democráticos 4. Nada democráticos 8. No sabe, no responde</p>		ELSVB17	
<p>ELSVB19. ¿Está usted interesado en participar en el proceso de selección de los candidatos de los partidos o esto es algo que sólo compete a los partidos? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>1. Sí estoy interesado 2. Es algo que compete sólo a los partidos 8. No sabe, no responde</p>		ELSVB19	

<p>ELSVB20. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que se haga una ley para obligar a los partidos políticos a que den cuentas del financiamiento público y privado que reciben, así como de la manera en que lo gastan? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>1. Aprueba mucho 2. Aprueba algo 3. Desaprueba algo 4. Desaprueba mucho 8. No sabe, no responde</p>		ELSVB20	
---	--	---------	--

<p>POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?</p> <p>1) Mucho 2) Algo 3) Poco 4) Nada 8) N/S</p>		POL1	
<p>POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? (Leer alternativas)</p> <p>1) A diario 2) Algunas veces por semana 3) Algunas veces por mes 4) Rara vez 5) Nunca 8) N/S</p>		POL2	

USAR TARJETA “B” OTRA VEZ.

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas actitudes que tienen las personas. En una escala del 1 al 7 donde uno significa nada de acuerdo y 7 significa mucho de acuerdo , ¿hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?	Escala Nada Mucho	NS/ NR		
AA1. Una manera muy eficaz de corregir los errores de los empleados es regañarlos frente a otros empleados ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con esa práctica?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8	AA1	
AA2. La persona que aporta más dinero a la casa es la que debería tener la última palabra en las decisiones del hogar. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8	AA2	
AA3. En la escuela, los niños deben hacer preguntas solamente cuando el maestro lo indique. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8	AA3	
AA4. Cuando los niños se portan mal, se justifica a veces que sus padres les den nalgadas. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8	AA4	

RECOGER TARJETA “B”

Ahora cambiando de tema, ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares:			
DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR		DIS2	
DIS3. Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR(9) Inap (No buscó trabajo)		DIS3	
DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR		DIS4	
DIS5. En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR		DIS5	

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó? _____ Año de _____
(primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = _____ años total [Usar tabla abajo para código]

	1°	2°	3°	4°	5°	6°	
Ninguno	0						ED
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
No sabe/no responde	88						

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años Q2

<p>Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Católica (2) Cristiana no católica (incluye Testigos de Jehová) (3) Otra no cristiana (5) Evangélica (4) Ninguna (8) No sabe o no quiere mencionar</p> <p>[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E]</p>	Q3
<p>Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?</p> <p>(00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de \$45 (02) Entre \$46- \$90 (03) \$91-\$144 (04) \$145-\$288 (05) \$289-\$432 (06) \$433-\$576 (07) \$577-\$720 (08) \$721-1008 (09) \$1009-\$1440 (10)\$1440-y mas (88) NS/NR</p> <p>RECOGER TARJETA E</p>	Q10
<p>Q10A. ¿Recibe su familia remesas del exterior?</p> <p>NO → MARCAR 99, PASA A Q10C 99. Inap SI → PREGUNTAR MONTO:</p> <p>¿Cuanto recibe por mes? [usar códigos de pregunta Q10 si dijo cantidad en moneda nacional; si dijo la cantidad en moneda extranjera, escribir cantidad y especificar moneda]</p>	Q10A

Q10B. ¿Hasta que punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? (1) mucho(2) algo(3) poco(4) nada(8) NS/NR(9) INAP	Q10B	
Q10C. ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo Sí, preguntar dónde] (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos) (4) No (8) NS/NR	Q10C	

Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? 1) Sí 2) No 8) NS/NR	Q14	
Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted percibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas] 1. Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar 2. Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades 3. No les alcanza, tienen dificultades 4. No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades 8. [No leer] NS/NR	Q10D	
Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR	Q11	
Q12. ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (00= ninguno) NS.....88.	Q12	_____

ELSETID. ¿Usted considera que es una persona:blanca, mestiza, indígena, Afro-salvadoreña (negra), mulata, u otra? 1.1 (1) Blanca(2) Mestiza(3) Indígena (7) Otra 1.2 (8) NS/NR	ELSETID	
ELSETIDA. Considera que su madre es o era una persona, mestiza, indígena, negra o mulata? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (7) Otra (8) NS/NR	ELSETIDA	
ELSLENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa] (1) Castellano (2) Nahuatl (4) Otro (nativo) (5) Otro extranjero (8) NS/NR	ELSLENG1	

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: *(leer todos)*

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí	R1	
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí	R3	
R4. Teléfono convencional (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4	
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4A	
R5. Vehículo	(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	R5	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R6	

R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí	R7	
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí	R8	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R12	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R14	
R15. Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí	R15	

<p>OCUP1. ¿Cuál es su ocupación principal? [No leer alternativas; si contesta que está sin trabajo o desempleado preguntar cuál era su ocupación anterior (anotar código) y luego marcar “No” en la pregunta siguiente (OCUP4)]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Profesional, directivo 2. Técnico 3. Oficinista 4. Comerciante 5. Campesino o agricultor 6. Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) 7. Artesano 8. Servicio doméstico 9. Otros servicios 10. Obrero especializados (operador de maquinaria) 11. Obrero no especializados 12. Estudiante [Pase a MIG1] 13. Ama de casa [Pase a MIG1] 14. Pensionado , jubilado, rentista [Pase a MIG1] 88. NS/NR 	OCUP1	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>OCUP4. ¿Está usted trabajando actualmente?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sí [Siga] 2. No [Pasar a DESOC2] 8. NS/NR [Pasar a MIG1] 	OCUP4	
<p>OCUPIA En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Asalariado del gobierno? 2. Asalariado en el sector privado? 3. Patrono o socio de empresa? 4. Trabajador por cuenta propia? 5. Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? 8. NS/NR 9. INAP 	OCUPIA	
<p>OCUP1B1. ¿En total cuántos empleados hay en la empresa o en el lugar donde usted trabaja? [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Menos de 5 empleados (2) De 5 a 9 empleados (3) De 10 a 19 empleados (4) De 20 a 100 empleados (5) Más de 100 empleados (8) NS/NR 	OCUP1B1	

(9) INAP OCUP1C. ¿Tiene usted seguro social? Sí No 8.NS/NR	OCUP1C	
DESOC2. [SOLO SI RESPONDIO NO A OCUP4] => ¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo? _____ semanas (88) NS(99) Inap	DESOC2	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

MIG1. Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió usted principalmente? en el campo? en un pueblo? O en una ciudad?: 1. En el campo 2. En un pueblo 3. En una ciudad 8. NS/NR	MIG1	
--	------	--

MIG2. Hace 5 años, ¿donde residía usted? [Leer alternativas] 1. En este mismo municipio [Pase a TI] 2. En otro municipio en el país [Siga] 3. En otro país [Pase a TI] 8. NS/NR [Pase a TI]	MIG2	
---	------	--

MIG3. El lugar donde vivía hace 5 años era: [Leer alternativas] (1) Un pueblo o una ciudad más pequeño que este (2) Un pueblo o una ciudad más grande que este (3) Un pueblo o ciudad igual que este (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	MIG3	
---	------	--

Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____ TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____	TI	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
---	----	--

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada. Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____ Firma del supervisor de campo _____ Comentarios: _____ _____ Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____ Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____
--